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ABSTRACT 
 
British intelligence reports from 1971 describe how Pakistan suffered acute instability 
after central government forces attempted to quash the East Pakistan nationalist 
movement, sparking guerrilla resistance, massive refugee flight and extensive social 
disorder.  Much of the British media, political opposition and public sided with the 
nationalists, accusing government forces of violating human rights, and even of 
genocide.  The British government, in contrast, declared it would not interfere in a civil 
war with ‘hideous atrocities…being committed on both sides’.  While intent on 
neutrality and non-interference, officials continued deliberating on how to react to the 
crisis as it evolved.  British responses, which extended to aid and bilateral diplomacy, 
were thus shaped by a number of contextual factors—particularly the nature of 
intelligence reports from the region, public and parliamentary pressure, Cold War 
geopolitical constraints and, as expected, strategic calculations of Britain’s interests on 
the subcontinent.  The British position, of course, was not entirely spontaneous nor did 
it always relate directly to the crisis, but more generally to the post-war context in 
which the Heath government functioned.   
Reflecting both self-interest and genuine concern, British responses to the East 
Pakistan crisis that ultimately led to the birth of Bangladesh, provide insights into a 
markedly under-researched episode of nationalist conflict in a former British colony.  
They reveal the complex challenges that the multi-layered violence posed to external 
observers, and in doing so, undermine the widespread tendency to cast the violence 
exclusively as either civil war or genocide.  Finally, they illustrate the ambiguities of 
this juncture in British history when, apparently ready to accept its secondary power 
status, Britain still sought with varying degrees of success to retain international stature, 
resulting in a dualistic foreign policy towards South Asia that combined reserve with 
cautious initiative. 
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis has developed significantly since its conception.  A few words on its 
evolution may be useful to the reader before approaching the work in its entirety.  The 
project, in essence, was born of my desire to learn why the crime of genocide—the 
intentional destruction of human groups—appears to be a hallmark of our time, and why 
external powers that might have intervened (either morally or militarily, unilaterally or 
multilaterally) have rarely done so.  My interest in these issues was ignited at an early 
age, during Holocaust education programs at my secondary school in Canada when 
students were asked to reflect on the destruction of European Jewry, just as news of 
comparable atrocities in Rwanda reached us; genocide, it seemed to me during this 
intense exposure to the subject, was too disturbing a phenomenon, too gross and 
recurrent a blot on contemporary history, to not understand—as was the international 
community’s failure to prevent or suppress it.  
It was with the aim of investigating these twin subjects—genocide and 
international (non-) intervention in the twentieth century—that in 2000, following an 
undergraduate degree in history at the University of Toronto, I undertook an M.A. in 
Holocaust Studies at UCL (the first degree in Britain of its kind), and three years later, 
the intensive ‘Genocide and Human Rights University Program’ at the University of 
Toronto.  (Both programs had only recently been established, reflecting the growth of 
the field of genocide studies at the time, and the context of my academic choices.)  
When I entered for the Ph.D. in history at UCL in 2004, I did so hoping to find a 
compelling case study on responses to genocide to which I could make a significant 
intellectual contribution.    
As I began my research, attending genocide studies seminars and conferences, 
conducting literature reviews and writing short papers, I noted with increasing 
frequency written and spoken references to a ‘genocide in Bangladesh’.  Pakistani 
military forces, it was said, had killed one to three million Bengali civilians during the 
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East Pakistan/Bangladesh secession crisis of 1971; Western powers, including Britain, 
who had authorised the contested borders only decades earlier, had either supported the 
regime or expressed indifference.  Familiar with the commonly cited episodes of post-
colonial genocide such as in Cambodia and Rwanda, as well as with studies on the role 
of former colonizers, this ‘new’ case piqued my interest.  I wished to know more 
beyond the said description, widespread in genocide studies circles at the time, and only 
now beginning to shift.   
My search for scholarly accounts produced little.  Surveys of the secondary 
literature on the 1971 crisis revealed that it was deeply politicised, or at best, 
superficially researched, while analyses of the British response were practically non-
existent.  I recognized that this was a gap that needed addressing, and that doing so 
would require extensive original research.  As chance would have it, British government 
files from the 1971 period had recently been made available to the public at the UK 
National Archives.  With considerable curiosity, I entered the archives to preliminarily 
examine this material.  There, I found detailed reports of Pakistani state-endorsed 
atrocities against civilians, transcripts of British parliamentary debates on the issue of 
genocide, and records of sources pressuring the government to take action coupled with 
internal discussions on how to allay such pressure.  I had, it seemed, been presented 
with an opportunity to shed light upon this under-researched case of genocide via the 
perspective of the apparently apathetic ex-colonial authority.  So it was that I chose 
British responses to the traumatic birth of Bangladesh as the subject of my Ph.D., and 
set out to examine the issues of systematic violence and non-involvement therein.  
However, as I began to engage with the archive material more extensively, 
scrutinizing the masses of intelligence that the British were receiving, my impression of 
the conflict as an ‘ignored genocide’ began to unravel.  Yes, reports of state terror 
against civilians did indeed reach the British, but so too did offsetting accounts of 
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reciprocal violence spanning the spectrum of international crimes.  And while the 
British were reticent to acknowledge those committed by the Pakistan government, 
damaging as it would have been for British regional interests, officials sought to 
respond to violence on the subcontinent in other manners, through diplomacy and aid.  
Thus, rather than the ‘Western bystander to genocide’ trope, which I had been expecting 
to find, a picture emerged of multi-dimensional violence that elicited mixed responses 
from British governmental observers, who appeared to be influenced by a range of 
considerations that extended beyond narrow national interests.  
Following significant reflection on the complex narratives enveloping both 
British and Bangladeshi history which were before me, urged along by knowledgeable 
readers of my work, I reframed my research questions in a more open-ended manner 
better suited to the material, that is: How did the British perceive of and respond to the 
violent events which led to the creation of Bangladesh, and what factors shaped those 
perceptions and responses?  This thesis, the outcome of the developmental path 
described, seeks to answer these questions with a dense analytical account that 
documents the ambiguities and challenges the relatively simplistic explanations we have 
of events to date. 
By repositioning myself in relation to the body of data I was collecting, and 
revising my study afresh on the basis of ever-more open enquiry, I have learned 
valuable lessons pertinent to the craft of history: to question rather than confirm 
assumptions, to remain vigilant of ones motivations and conditioning, and to let go of 
preconceptions that hinder rational investigation in order to present a textured 
interpretation of the past based on a critical assessment of the sources available.  In 
doing so, I hope to have provided a deeper understanding of this under-examined yet 
highly controversial period in international history when composite violence was met 
with composite response.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Britain, in the early 1970s, had just emerged from a twenty-five year period of vigorous 
decolonization, brought on by the international and domestic upheavals of preceding 
decades. Its vast empire virtually dismantled, the country under the Conservative 
leadership of Edward Heath, was on the eve of entering the European Community. 
Historians have cast Britain at this time either as a state in uncomfortable decline, 
forced to look inwards and renounce its international aspirations—or, more positively, 
as a secondary power with changing national priorities ready to concentrate on its ‘back 
garden’.4 
  During this tenuous transition, Britain was confronted by crises in its former 
colonies, with which it struggled to contend.  Of these, the conflict over the secession of 
East Pakistan from West Pakistan from 25 March to 16 December 1971 was notable in 
scale.  According to British intelligence, an estimated ten million refugees fled to India 
and untold numbers died after Pakistan’s military junta in the West, led by General 
Yahya Khan, authorized its army to put down a swelling East Pakistani independence 
movement through bloodshed and terror.  Reports indicated that Pakistani troops were 
not the only perpetrators of violence: East Pakistani nationalists had engaged in 
guerrilla warfare with India’s assistance; they had persecuted local ‘collaborators’ 
thought to support continued union with West Pakistan, and in turn, had been 
persecuted by the latter.  Communal violence between ordinary civilians in urban and 
rural areas throughout East Pakistan, what is more, was another discernible dimension 
to the conflict.  Following India’s military intervention in support of the nationalists and 
a brief Indo-Pakistani war in December, East Pakistan became the independent state of 
Bangladesh. 
                                                
4 See, for example, F. S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945–1973 (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1974); Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945–1973 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975); David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1990); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World 
Power in the 20th Century, 2nd ed. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000).  
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Only a quarter of a century earlier, in 1947, the British had granted the Indian 
subcontinent independence after two hundred years of colonial rule,5 and sanctioned its 
partition into ‘Hindu’ India and ‘Muslim’ Pakistan, the latter chiselled from provinces 
in the north west including half of the populous Punjab (West Pakistan) and the eastern 
two thirds of Bengal (East Pakistan).  Pakistan, a political collage of distinct 
populations whose two wings, separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory, 
shared only a common religion—Islam—was thus created by a British act of 
parliament.  Britain departed immediately afterwards (a departure notoriously followed 
by murderous population exchanges between the successor states), and following a 
decade of tentative bilateral initiatives, Anglo-Pakistani relations waned.6  The 
Commonwealth of Nations—Britain’s ‘substitute for empire’ designed to maintain links 
between the British government and former colonies—proved, moreover, to be an 
ineffective, largely ceremonial forum, to the disillusionment of both states.7 
Notwithstanding the fragile condition of Anglo-Pakistani relations in the post-
war period, by the time the East Pakistan question threatened to cause widespread 
instability, Britain continued to possess a variety of interests in the region.  Pakistan, 
wedged between India, China, Iran and Afghanistan, held obvious strategic value for 
Western policies of Cold War containment, and both the UK and Pakistan were 
members of the 1955 CENTO and SEATO pacts to limit Soviet influence in the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia.  In addition, Britain numbered among Pakistan’s principle 
                                                
5 The British East India Company governed India unofficially from 1757 to 1858, followed by the Crown 
until August 1947. 
6 Anita Inder Singh documents Britain’s receding influence in Pakistan in contrast to that of the USA, in 
The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1993); see also, Naseem Farooq Bajwa, Pakistan and the West: the First Decade, 
1947-1957 (Karachi and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Stanley Wolpert offers a rich and lively 
analysis of Britain’s responsibility for communal violence accompanying India’s partition in Shameful 
Flight: the Last Years of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).   
7 Bajwa Pakistan and the West, 8, 223; Northedge Descent from Power, 228-237; S. R. Ashton, ‘British 
government perspectives on the Commonwealth, 1964–71: an asset or a liability?’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, vol. 35, no. 1 (2007): 73, 76, 82; Thomas B. Millar, ‘The Commonwealth 
and the U.N.’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58 (1968): 36. 
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trading partners and a total of 2000 British nationals lived in both wings of the country.8  
Britain was also home to a Pakistani community of approximately 140,000–200,000 
members, constituting one of the largest foreign (non-European) populations in the 
country at the time;9 a reported one third was comprised of Bengalis, the main ethnic 
group in East Pakistan.10  Thus Britain, no longer the ruling power in Pakistan nor even 
a major ally, still sought to retain influence there, and maintained consulates in both 
wings of the country. 
From the beginning of December 1970, amidst mounting popular unrest in East 
Pakistan, British diplomats in Dacca, Karachi and Islamabad began reporting to London 
with increased frequency.  In the first week of March 1971, as tensions intensified, 
Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), under Foreign Secretary Alec 
Douglas-Home, set up several ‘Pakistan Crisis Units’ under the auspices of the South 
Asia Department (SAD) to streamline the incoming information.11  The multitude of 
telegrams and reports describe, in considerable detail, the personalities of key leaders in 
the region and the build-up of political strife, followed by the outbreak of violence 
between (and within) communal groups, the massive human dislocation and 
humanitarian crises, the growth of the East Pakistani insurgency, and the actions of the 
Pakistani army, decried by Bengali nationalists and many observers at the time as the 
crime of genocide—‘acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
                                                
8 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), A Year Book of the Commonwealth 1971 (London: HMSO, 
1971), 330; FCO, A Year Book of the Commonwealth 1972 (London: HMSO, 1972), 340; United 
Kingdom National Archives (UKNA): Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (CAB) 148/117. 
‘India/Pakistan: Note by the Secretaries’, 24 November 1971.  
9 UKNA: FCO 37/879. Telegram 407 ‘East Pakistan’, Islamabad—FCO, 27 March 1971; Michael 
Rendall and John Salt, ‘The Foreign Born Population’, Chapter 8, in Focus on People and Migration, UK 
Office for National Statistics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Table 8.2., 
http://mighealth.net/uk/images/6/67/For.pdf (last accessed 16 April 2012). 
10 According to the UK Office for National Statistics, census information pertaining to ethnicity was not 
requested until 1991. This figure appeared as a ‘very rough estimate’ in UKNA: FCO 37/888. Note 
(handwritten annotation), the South Asia Department (SAD)—FCO, 25 June 1971. 
11 UKNA: CAB 148/115. 7th Meeting, Item No 3: ‘East Pakistan Situation’, 5 March 1971. Records do 
not indicate the time span between when these units were first proposed and when they began to function.  
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national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.12  Britain’s representatives on the 
ground refrained from using this term as they strained to identify the different forms of 
aggression taking place before them, emphasizing throughout how British interests—the 
safety of nationals, British owned businesses and property, and Anglo-Pakistani 
relations—were affected by the instability.    
Reports, once they arrived in London, went directly to the FCO’s South Asia 
Department.  Then, depending on their content, they were copied to additional Foreign 
Office departments, the Cabinet Office Intelligence Assessment Unit and, critically, the 
Prime Minister’s Office at 10 Downing Street.  Edward Heath received copies of key 
telegrams and regular ‘Pakistan Situation Reports’—intelligence summaries compiled 
for the Prime Minister by regional specialists.  Heath initialled these documents, and 
sometimes scribbled comments or instructions in their margin.  The paper trail on East 
Pakistan thus wound its way across the desks of many junior and senior officials in the 
Heath administration, ultimately arriving at that of the head of government.  Former 
civil servants agree that the Foreign Office’s information apparatus was extensive, 
reaching policy makers at every level.  ‘Intelligence on East Pakistan received a wide 
distribution,’ recalls Arthur Collins, the Acting Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca 
during the crisis.  ‘These distribution lists were fairly comprehensive—they didn’t leave 
many people out’.13  ‘The information machinery worked well enough to ensure 
everyone got to see reports,’ concurs John Birch, who then worked at the India Desk of 
the South Asia Department. ‘At least twenty offices and one hundred people saw 
                                                
12 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 
1948), Article II.  The article further stipulates that acts of genocide include:  
              a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical   
    destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
13 Arthur Collins (Acting Deputy High Commissioner Dacca, June - September 1971; First Secretary 
Political, 1970 - 1972), Personal Interview by author, 18 June 2009, London UK, tape recording. When 
citing government communication on the crisis, I list the main recipients, but for space normally omit the 
multiples offices that received copies. 
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telegrams’.14  Ian McCluney, Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary in 
1971, similarly recalls how ‘[i]nformation got a very thorough circulation. You could be 
sure you could always get it to the right people, who if necessary, would act on it’.15 
Foreign Office officials, it would seem, strove to accurately document the crisis 
in Pakistan to keep the government abreast of the ever-shifting events and help senior 
ministers formulate appropriate courses of action.  These records have since been 
declassified in accordance with the thirty-year rule, and transferred to the United 
Kingdom’s National Archives.  I have collected and analysed this documentation, 
interviewed former civil servants, and surveyed an extensive range of primary and 
secondary sources to assess what the British government knew about the cataclysm of 
1971, how officials responded, and what factors may have influenced their responses, in 
order to provide insights into British foreign policy of the era, and into the complexities 
the crisis posed to government observers.   
I have found that the British government, while receiving reports describing 
systematic persecution of Bengalis by Pakistani government forces and reports of 
atrocities committed by various actors, perceived of the violence primarily as a civil 
war, which, in public statements and internal documents, they broadly defined as a 
conflict on ‘both sides’.  This perception of events, I will argue, was a ‘convenient 
truth’; convenient in that it served Britain’s strategic interest to avoid direct 
involvement, yet truthful, in that it was based on an ostensibly accurate interpretation of 
the information available, using a descriptor which was at once reductive—denoting 
                                                
14 John Birch (FCO South Asia Department, India Desk, 1971 - 1972), Personal Interview by author, 23 
September 2009, London UK. 
15 Ian McCluney (Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary, 1969 - 1971), Personal Interview by 
author, 26 September 2009, London UK.  For general information on Foreign Office record-keeping 
during the era, see Martin Minogue, ed., ‘Official Secrets’ in Documents on Contemporary British 
Government: I. British Government and Constitutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 254-260, and FCO Historical Branch, FCO Records: Policy, Practice and Posterity 1782-1993, 
2nd ed. (London: Historical Branch, Library and Records Department, 1993). For personal insights into 
Foreign Office method, see Alyson J.K. Bailes, ‘Reflections on Thirty Years in the Diplomatic Service 
[1969-2002]’ (189-197), and Sir Alan Campbell ‘From Carbon Paper to E-mail: Changes in Methods in 
the Foreign Office, 1950-2000’ (168-176) in The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Gaynor Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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organised warfare between two parties—but also highly ambiguous, allowing the 
potential for atrocities of all kinds to be committed in its name.  This ‘truth’, as a result, 
did not adequately convey the full spectrum of violence that occurred in East Pakistan 
in 1971, particularly systematic acts of state terror.  
The British maintained this interpretation of the affair both publicly and 
privately, and used it to justify their decision, taken the moment the crisis erupted, to 
remain neutral and not interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs—a stance consistent with 
the Cold War climate, British interests and Britain’s own restricted potential for activity 
abroad.  Yet the British response was not limited to neutrality and non-intervention; 
officials continually deliberated on how to deal with the crisis as it evolved, often 
considering different courses of action during internal discussions.  As such, the range 
of British responses—which included sending humanitarian aid, withholding 
development aid, privately urging Pakistani officials to refrain from force, and 
eventually tilting towards India amidst increasing Indo-Pakistani tensions—was only 
partly the product of a fixed or predetermined policy.  Rather, the government 
responded, to a notable extent, on an ad hoc basis according to a series of contextual 
factors that manifested themselves over the nine-month crisis.  These, in turn, were 
indirectly conditioned by Britain’s post-war circumstances of decline coupled with a 
lingering determination to remain active overseas.  It is thus an array of factors, mainly 
circumstantial but also historical, that served to motivate British responses to the East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis—responses that are best characterised as both guarded and 
proactive.  
I have arrived at these conclusions using a triangulated approach to data 
collection and analysis, centred upon archive documents, oral testimonies, and 
secondary source literature.  This multi-method technique has allowed me to 
qualitatively analyse the subject of British perceptions of and responses to the crisis 
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from different viewpoints, cross-reference information, and arrive at conclusions based 
on the intersection (and divergences) of all three.  In employing it, I hoped to avoid the 
pitfalls of shallow analysis potentially associated with single-method approaches, 
pitfalls that in the case of this polemic subject are quite cavernous.16  I have moreover 
kept a ‘highly detailed audit trail’17 of my methodological decisions with regard to data 
collection and interpretation procedures, which I propose to summarise here. 
  In their classic guide to historical research, Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff 
declare: ‘Technique begins with…[the] catalogue of a library….[O]ne must from the 
very beginning play with the subject, take it apart and view it from various sides in 
order to seize on its outward connections.’18  My quest for primary information did 
indeed begin with the UK national archive electronic catalogue, where I conducted 
various key word searches using Bangladesh, Pakistan, East Pakistan, and India, 
confined to the years 1970 to 1972.  This produced numerous results in the form of file 
number references, grouped by date under various British government departments 
dealing with the subcontinent.  The department that held the greatest number of files 
was the Foreign Office, followed by (significantly fewer) in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, Cabinet and the British Council.   
Over the course of 2006 to 2008, and in 2010, I scrutinized these files, focusing 
my attention on the departments noted.19  I frequently rechecked the electronic 
catalogue to ensure my original searches were accurate and had not omitted any 
                                                
16 Triangulation is ‘a validity procedure where researchers search for more convergence among multiple 
and different sources of information to form themes or categories of study’ to demonstrate the rigour of 
their findings (John W. Creswell and Dana L. Miller, ‘Determining validity in qualitative inquiry’, 
Theory into Practice, vol.39, no.3 (2000): 124-131).  
17 Patricia Leavy, Oral History: Understanding Qualitative Research (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 153. 
18 Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1970), 23-24; emphasis in original. 
19 For thoroughness, I also reviewed material originating in departments that held relatively few (one to 
two) files. These consisted of: the Treasury, the Department of Technical Co-operation and of successive 
Overseas Development Bodies, the Medical Research Council, the Unemployment Assistance Boards and 
the Ministry of Defence.  None contained information related to the crisis, apart from a Ministry of 
Defence file on British assisted evacuations in December 1971 (UKNA: Ministry of Defence (DEFE) 
4/263/3. Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes, December 1971. Part I, Item 5. ‘Service Assisted 
Evacuation from West and East Pakistan’).  
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potentially important reference.  Some way into these records, it became clear that the 
‘East Pakistan 1971’ search category and its related government departments did in fact 
hold the bulk of information related to the crisis, be it regional intelligence reports, 
foreign office policy assessments, parliamentary debate records, press clippings, or 
letters of protest from private citizens. (Duplicates of some of these were filed unevenly 
under Bangladesh, Pakistan and India in addition to scores of pages of unrelated 
material.)  I therefore focused my examination primarily, though not exclusively, on the 
East Pakistan files from 1971.    
I reviewed material from the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 
departments first, aware that these, having been read and initialled by the Prime 
Minister and/or other senior members of government, were most likely to have 
impacted policy making.  I then turned to the vast number of FCO files, paying 
particular attention to those pieces that the Foreign Secretary had signed, such as the 
substantial layers of notes prepared to assist him in the numerous House of Commons 
debates on East Pakistan.  I also noted how drafts of these notes, prepared by junior 
officials in the South Asia Department, often underwent only minor alterations before 
reaching the Foreign Secretary.  Segments of these notes, in turn, usually appeared 
verbatim in the PREM files, or as part of summaries in the Prime Minister’s situation 
reports.  This bottom-up information cycle, as I will elaborate upon in the text, has 
contributed to my belief that decision-making during the crisis was, in effect, a 
collective process in which the civil service participated to a significant degree.  This 
was all the more so, seeing as no government minister appeared to express explicit 
interest in shaping Britain’s approach towards events, but relied instead on the said 
information to formulate policy. 
 As I reviewed each file piece, I analysed its contents on a rational-empirical 
basis, coding the data by identifying linkages and/or anomalies using a combination of 
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reason and common sense.20  I recorded any item of information that appeared to 
disclose the government’s confidential perceptions of and responses to the crisis, 
comparing it to the positions which senior officials took in parliament, the media, and in 
their dealings with other countries.  It should be noted that British intelligence on the 
East Pakistan crisis was based almost entirely on indirect information.  High 
Commission officials in East Pakistan, as I discuss later, rarely witnessed the events 
they described, but relied on a series of informants (primarily British locals, 
missionaries, and Bengali academics), all with their individual biases who, in turn, 
relied on others for information.  These documents, then, are at least twice removed 
from the events that they profess to describe and, as a result, are tertiary sources with 
regards to the East Pakistan crisis.  Their central value for this thesis is that they 
constituted the main source of information that shaped British government perceptions 
of the crisis and, in this sense, are primary or ‘original’ sources vis-a-vis the British.21   
I cross-referenced information from different sources to establish the credibility 
of each individual piece, noting that there did not appear to be any significant gaps in 
the files, or indications that the files had been weeded or otherwise corrupted.  
Documents that might have reflected poorly on the British position (indicating, for 
example, that the government was obfuscating on the subject of systematic atrocities) 
were there, as were more mundane administrative records.  I also made note of these 
seemingly inconsequential documents (for example, statistical reports on the condition 
of East Pakistan’s ports and infrastructure) in my aim to analyse a detailed and 
representative cross-section of the governmental material.  I thus compiled a condensed 
digital archive of sorts, containing hundreds of pages of document transcripts 
                                                
20 Marc Trachtenberg assesses the values of this approach in The Craft of International History: A Guide 
to Method (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 27-30. 
21 For the potential uses of hearsay evidence, see Louis R. Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer 
of Historical Method (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 165. 
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accompanied by my annotations, alongside dozens of photographs of key documents, 
the most pertinent of which are reproduced here in the appendix.   
I organised this material into three categories: by date, geographical location and 
by subject matter (the last being themes which tended to recur in the files)22 and 
subjected this data to further ‘cycles of analysis’23 using the techniques described.  The 
overview of British perceptions of the nine-month crisis in this thesis is hence organised 
chronologically, while British responses are largely organised thematically.  
Naturally, reconstructing Britain’s responses based on written records, extensive 
and diverse as these records may be, encounters the inherent limitations of any 
historical study, that of imperfect representation.  Ritchie Ovendale describes the 
dilemma succinctly:  
The primary source, the historical record, is both selective and subjective.  Hansard is 
not an accurate record of what was said in the House of Commons: members have the 
right to change the text of their speeches.  Cabinet minutes, minutes of Chiefs of Staff 
meetings and the like, are only summaries of what was said….Despatches are often sent 
by officials with particular objectives in mind and distort the account of events 
accordingly.  It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between an ‘event’, what 
happened in the past, which is finite, immutable, and unknowable, and the record of that 
event, the historical fact, which is already at least one remove from the event.  What the 
historian handles is the record.24  
 
A historical reconstruction is, in other words, just that—a reconstruction.  It can 
never aspire to be a mirror image of the past.  It will be all the more incomplete, given 
the multitude of private communication and initiatives, via telephone, letters and in 
person, which are not recorded, have been lost or are simply unavailable.  The narrative 
communicated by this thesis and the primary documents I have cited in support of this 
narrative, are therefore representative of the archive material—‘the surviving part of the 
                                                
22 With regard to the subcontinent these were: the Pakistan army campaign, guerrilla warfare, army-
guerrilla violence, inter-communal violence, internal political developments, other country reactions, the 
refugee-humanitarian crises, and the Indo-Pakistan war.  Information related to British activities in the 
region emphasised: British nationals, the British Council, property, commerce, regional alliances and 
Anglo-Pakistan relations. Further themes included: UK policy (neutrality/non-intervention, aid, 
diplomacy) and domestic responses (press, public, parliament).  
23 Leavy Oral History, 148-149; for an in-depth discussion of document analysis, see Trachtenberg The 
Craft of International History, 140-169. 
24 Ritchie Ovendale, ed., British Defence Policy Since 1945, Documents in Contemporary History 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), 2. 
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recorded part of the remembered part of the observed part of…[the] whole’25—that I 
have analysed in an attempt to convey the British government’s perceptions of and 
responses to the break up of Pakistan in 1971 as fully as possible.  
To deepen and substantiate my impressions of British responses, I set out to 
compile an oral history of the subject based on qualitative interviews with the remaining 
parliamentarians and civil servants of the era, whose names appeared in the government 
records.  I obtained their contact details from editions of Who’s Who (OUP), and wrote 
to each requesting an interview, stating in general terms that I was pursuing a doctorate 
on British perceptions of and responses to the creation of Bangladesh.  Most politely 
declined to be interviewed—the conflict was nearly forty years ago and they 
remembered little.  These refusals, often written in an unsteady hand, did not convey the 
sense of seeking to avoid a discussion on the subject; their professions of failing of 
memory due to age and passage of time resonated as credible.26   
Nearly a dozen of those whom I contacted, however, agreed to discuss the 
subject either in personal interviews, or by post, email or telephone.  Of these, two had 
been based in British High Commissions in Islamabad and Dacca, tasked with reporting 
on the conflict from the ground, ensuring the welfare of British nationals and dealing on 
a diplomatic basis with the regional government.  Six respondents had been stationed in 
the Foreign Office in London, three of whom were in the South Asia Department 
responsible for assessing High Commission reports from the subcontinent, while the 
other three had been Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, responsible among 
their other duties for relaying the information produced by SAD to the Foreign 
Secretary, and if necessary summarising it and providing further assessment.  Finally, 
                                                
25 Gottschalk Understanding History, 45-46. 
26 Robert Armstrong’s response is representative: ‘Though I was Edward Heath’s Principle Private 
Secretary at the time, I fear that I do not now retain any memory of what he, or other members of his 
Government, knew or were thinking about the events accompanying the separation of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan.  I do not think that I could add anything to what you have found from the FCO files in the 
National Archives’ (Robert Armstrong, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1970 - 1974, 
Letter to author, 9 May 2009.) 
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two respondents were Conservative MPs who had visited the region in 1971 as part of a 
British parliamentary delegation, while one was a key member of the Labour party who 
recollected in general terms how the crisis was perceived by the opposition.   
Of the many names that appeared in government records, this is a relatively 
small sample.  Nevertheless, as one that comprises people at various levels of the 
government with diverse perspectives, characteristics and experiences—it is 
representative enough to constitute an important contribution to the depth of my 
analysis of the subject.27  Moreover, this element of oral history is unique within the 
emerging literature on the subject, and as time passes, will no longer be a viable method 
of research.   
In my dealings with the respondents and interpretation of their testimonies, I 
strove to uphold the tenets of oral history related to ethical practice, authentic 
reproduction of narrative, critical interpretation and reflexivity.28  I requested the 
authorisation of all respondents to identify them by name in the thesis, tape record our 
meetings (in the case of interviews), and quote directly from their testimony.  Where 
authorisation was not given, I preserved anonymity or otherwise complied with their 
wishes.  In the excerpts of personal interviews herein, I have sought to faithfully 
reproduce their content and tone through verbatim transcripts that emphasise the ‘voice 
of participants’29 and their particular manners of expression.  In addition to transmitting 
the ‘feeling tones’30 and narrative flow, each excerpt is fully referenced to denote who 
the speaker is.  I have only occasionally incorporated my own voice (in the third person) 
                                                
27 On achieving validity by means of ‘thoroughness’ of sampling and data collection, see Leavy Oral 
History, 138-139. 
28 For discussion, see Leavy Oral History (2011); Donald A. Ritchie, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Oral 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2010).  
29 Leavy explains how referring to an interviewee as ‘participant’ (as opposed to research subject, for 
example) denotes the essentially ‘collaborative nature of oral history’ where both the researcher and the 
‘researched’ participate in the production of knowledge, and where authority over this process is shared 
(Oral History, 8-9). 
30 Leavy Oral History, 150. 
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to indicate a particular question I may have posed.31  While retaining a due level of 
‘scepticism’ with regard to each interviewee,32 I noted that most appeared enthusiastic 
to revisit events they claim not to have thought (nor been asked) about for decades.  
They did not seem particularly practised in speaking about the subject, but expressed 
themselves with apparent spontaneity and candour, elements that I have attempted to 
convey in the text.  
I was conscious of my own role in the interview process, and tried to influence 
respondents as little as possible, keeping personal tendencies or assumptions to a 
minimum by asking a standard set of open-ended queries (ex. Could you describe your 
official position and professional duties in 1971?  What do you recall most vividly 
about your dealings with the crisis?  What were your impressions of British official 
responses to the crisis?).  As many had difficulty recalling basic details about the 
period, I occasionally showed them documents they had signed in order to refresh their 
memories, as well as parliamentary debates on the issues of civil war and genocide to 
initiate a discussion on perceptions of the violence. 
All in all, these testimonies provide compelling insights into the information 
gathering and foreign policy making mechanisms of the government during the crisis, 
including how decisions were made and past precedents and/or historical analogies were 
viewed.  (British policy towards the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war, in particular, was 
evoked by parliamentarians at the time as a comparison to East Pakistan, and will be 
examined in this context.)  I have, wherever possible, sought to put individual 
comments into perspective, thus exploring the macro-micro linkages that ‘convey both 
the particulars of the participants stories and the larger issues to which the participants 
experiences speak’.33  To be sure, the testimonies are distorted by the unreliability of 
                                                
31 The separation of voices is crucial to avoid the problem of ‘ghost writing’ (Leavy Oral History, 140) 
32 Robert J. Shafer offers a useful checklist to test the validity of witness testimonies in A Guide to 
Historical Method, rvsd. ed. (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1974), 157-158.  
33 Leavy Oral History, 141. 
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memory,34 particularly with regards to an event that is, by now, decades old.  ‘I have 
little memory of that time,’ one interviewee lamented, ‘not only little memory of the 
facts, but also of the feelings’.35  Notwithstanding this inevitable limitation, many 
respondents, independently of each other, provided parallel information on varied 
topics, as well as incidental or causal statements with regards to dates, events and 
personalities which coincided factually with government records, thus lending a level of 
credibility to their testimony (and to the archival documents).  Overall, their testimonies 
reinforce the impression produced by the archive files—that is, just as the latter 
conveyed ambiguity and complexity with regards to British perceptions and responses 
to the crisis, so too did my communication with these witnesses of the era.  
 While archival documents and witness testimonies comprise the bulk of original 
research, the thesis also incorporates other primary sources: British media reports and 
transcripts of parliamentary debates, memoirs and autobiographies of senior ministers, 
published government documents such as manifestos and white papers, and statistical 
information on British overseas trade, development and defence sectors. (United 
Nations documents have also been consulted, including humanitarian relief project 
records and Security Council debates.)  I offer my analysis of these at relevant points in 
the text, based on the principles of primary source critique referred to above. 
To contextualise and broaden this study, I surveyed an extensive range of 
secondary sources related to Britain and to Bangladesh at collections spanning the entire 
University of London network of libraries, the British Library, and the University of 
Toronto (my alma mater).  My search of online library, journal and dissertation 
databases (such as JSTOR, project MUSE, Copac, World Cat, UK Index to Theses and 
                                                
34 The debate on memory and history has amassed a large literature. For recent reflections on the topic, 
see Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004; trans., 
Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer) and Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz, eds., Memory: 
Histories, Theories, Debates, 3rd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).  
35 Peter Smith (pseudonym) was an official at the British High Commission in Islamabad in 1971.  He 
agreed to be interviewed twice for this thesis but wishes to remain anonymous. (Telephone Interview by 
author, 10 June 2009; Personal Interview by author, 16 June 2009, UK, tape recording.) 
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ProQuest) demonstrated that Anglophone collections in other countries generally 
contained either similar (but often much slimmer) holdings than those I had personally 
accessed.  To start with, I reviewed the few works that exist on the topic of British 
responses to the East Pakistan crisis, followed by literature on the crisis itself and its 
historical background, my appraisals of which appear further on.  I then evaluated 
various histories of Britain in the post-war era.  These address British decolonization 
and relations with South Asia prior to and after Indian independence in 1947, the 
domestic and international climate of the early 1970s, and the specific policies and 
policy making mechanisms of the Heath government.  The thesis is also informed, 
though to a lesser extent, by sources on the phenomenon of systematic violence and 
international responses to such violence.  
The thesis seeks to describe and elucidate British perceptions of and responses 
to the East Pakistan crisis over five chapters.  This Introduction (Chapter I) sets out the 
aims of research, the central arguments to be expounded within the thesis, the range of 
bibliographical sources used as support, and the research methods applied.  This will be 
complemented by a discussion of the relevant literature, followed by reflections on the 
three-fold significance of this research.   
Chapter II opens with a brief discussion on the rise of nationalism in East 
Pakistan, leading to a full summary of British intelligence during the turbulent months 
of 1971.  The latter is based on my empirical analysis of the cables that Britain’s 
representatives in East and West Pakistan sent to London prior to, during and 
immediately after the crisis.  While this section offers an original and detailed account 
of events on the subcontinent supported by written documents from the period (rare in 
the existing literature), the emphasis here is not on recounting what actually transpired.   
Rather, it is on how Foreign office officials are likely to have interpreted this 
intelligence, as they sought to trace the causes of instability in the region.  
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Chapter III is divided into several subsections, each of which focuses on a 
government response and the contextual factors underlying that response.  The latter 
include official perceptions of the conflict, public and parliamentary pressure, Cold War 
geopolitical constraints, strategic calculations of Britain’s regional interests on the 
subcontinent, basic humanitarian concern and the day-to-day practicalities of 
government.  My approach has been to address the range of British responses, whether 
they involved action or inaction, and to understand the underlying factors and 
circumstances.  I have sought to pay equal attention to the variety of responses, without 
highlighting any one in particular, as they appear to be interrelated and of more or less 
equal significance. 
 The reactions of the British media, parliamentarians, and certain vocal sectors 
of the public (many of whom raised the question of genocide in relation to the crisis), 
are also given a limited treatment here.  As this thesis concentrates on the acts of 
government, I have researched how officials perceived the latter through media 
clippings, letters of protest and other material, which they collected and kept on record.  
It is evident from Foreign Office files and additional sources consulted, that public and 
parliamentary pressure did exist, and in sufficient quantities to cause the government 
concern, inducing them to act more vigorously with regards to development and relief 
aid, and even to seek legal opinions on whether the violence did in fact qualify as 
genocide. 
Chapter III ends with excerpts of my interviews with former British civil 
servants posted in Dacca, Islamabad and London in 1971.  I have organised these into 
an analytical framework based on geographical location and recurrent themes in order 
to illuminate what it was like to represent Britain at the birth of Bangladesh, and why 
aid, diplomacy, and above all, neutrality/non-intervention appeared to be the most 
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appropriate options amongst those available, both to the officials interviewed and to the 
government ministers whom they served. 
Chapter IV describes the broad historical context in which events unfolded, over 
two subsections.  The first seeks to demonstrate how the Heath government’s focus (and 
some would say fixation) on Europe and British industry, while absorbing the greater 
part of the government’s attention, did not preclude it from seeking to retain influence 
in more distant regions in which Britain was formerly active.  Indeed, the government’s 
varied responses to the South Asia crisis are but one example of how, notwithstanding 
the considerable international and domestic tumult of the 1970s, it sought to nourish 
links with certain former colonies.  This the government did with varying degrees of 
success through small-scale defence agreements and bilateral negotiations, rather than 
through the Commonwealth, a body that was increasingly seen as a conduit of cultural 
diplomacy rather than a strategic one.   
Britain’s fluctuating relations with India and Pakistan from 1947 to 1971, 
detailed in the second subsection, illustrate how the proactive aspects of the 
government’s responses towards the East Pakistan crisis (particularly its dealings with 
India) were a continuation of classic British post-war foreign policy, rather than a 
definitive break with the seemingly more enterprising past.  Taken together, these 
external initiatives and responses reflect the internationalist36 facets of Heath’s 
premiership, facets which to date have often been underestimated by scholars. 
Chapter V, the conclusion, provides closing thoughts on how decisions were 
made during the crisis and reviews the main findings of the thesis, comparing these to 
other interpretations of the government files analysed here.  To date, I would like to 
emphasise, these comprise no more than a few scholarly articles.  This thesis is thus an 
                                                
36 This broad term is used widely in the literature on Heath to denote the government’s foreign policy 
aims and concerns outside of Europe. (See for example, the collection of essays in The Heath 
Government, 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, eds. Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: Longmans, 
1996).) 
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attempt to provide the first full-length academic monograph devoted to the subject—
that is, an original international political history of Britain at the birth of Bangladesh, 
based on an exhaustive analysis of the official records of the former and a wide range of 
other primary and secondary sources.  In light of the very limited state of research, it is 
hoped that this work will serve as a seminal foundation for studies of this immense 
post-colonial conflict, as seen from the perspective of the former colonizer.  
Earlier works on the subject (of which there seem to be four in total), are based 
almost exclusively on media reports and British parliamentary transcripts, and 
unfortunately appear rather subjective in nature.  Two make the contentious claim that 
British governments throughout the twentieth century (most obviously Churchill’s prior 
to the partition of India, but also Heath’s in 1971) have been ‘anti-Pakistan’ as a matter 
of policy.  Kamal Aziz, in A Study of British Attitude Towards the East Pakistan Crisis, 
argues that conventional ‘British hostility’ in 1971 expressed itself in the government’s 
official neutrality (that is, its refraining from actively supporting Pakistan’s leadership), 
while the Prime Minister’s meetings with Indira Gandhi publicized in the British press 
later in the year, attested to the British ‘fascination for Hindu leaders’.37  HMG’s 
actions, from Aziz’s point of view, correspond to a long-standing attitude towards 
Muslims in India, littered with ‘expressions of a deep-seated and vigorously-stated anti-
Muslim feeling—which….was a deliberately thought-out, deeply-felt, frequently 
expressed and long-pursued policy of state’.38  M. Aslam Qureshi’s review of Anglo-
Pakistani relations from 1947 to 1976 is more restrained.39  Yet it too cites questionable 
evidence of institutionalised British hostility towards Pakistan in 1971, possibly 
predating the latter’s creation, depicted as the cause of immense ‘hurt’ and ‘pain’ to 
                                                
37 Khursheed Kamal Aziz, Britain and Pakistan: A Study of British Attitude Towards the East Pakistan 
Crisis of 1971 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1974; reprint 2008), 2, 266.   
38 Aziz Britain and Pakistan, 2.  
39 M. Aslam Qureshi, Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1976 (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 
1976). 
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Pakistanis.40  Qureshi’s unsubstantiated indictment of British ‘antagonism’ (and 
frequent references to a deep-seated ‘Hindu conspiracy’ in East Pakistan), reinforce the 
impression that the author is far from objective.41  
The other two works, while reflecting deeper analysis, are also somewhat 
problematic. B. Vivekanandan’s ‘Britain and the Bangladesh Question’ accepts 
Britain’s concern for its regional interests precluded the government from firmly siding 
with one party or the other, and goes on to applaud the latter’s eventual tilt towards 
India (and by extension Bangladesh).42  The article, nevertheless, written in 1973, 
contains numerable references to ‘bonds of friendship’ between Britain and Bangladesh, 
and gives the distinct impression of an attempt to cement British support for the 
foundling state.43 Harun Or-Rashid’s, ‘British Perspectives, Pressures and Publicity 
Regarding Bangladesh, 1971’, published in Contemporary South Asia in 1995, is 
somewhat more enlightening.44  It summarises the British stance as one of ‘pressure and 
persuasion’, aimed at pressuring Pakistan to reach a political resolution while at the 
same time seeking to retain influence with the regime by stressing its neutrality.45  This 
summary is valid, but perhaps too sanguine in its implication that the British were 
entirely proactive in their approach, rather than reactive.  Somewhat colloquial and 
overly enthusiastic in tone (HMG eventually supported India because it had ‘every 
reason’ to46), the article’s central value lies in its short but detailed overview of the 
reactions by the British public, parliamentarians and media to the crisis, which the 
                                                
40 Qureshi Anglo-Pakistan Relations, iii. 
41 Qureshi Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 265. 
42 B. Vivekanandan, ‘Britain and the Bangladesh Question’, International Studies, vol. 12, no. 4 (1973): 
598-620. 
43 Vivekanandan ‘Britain and the Bangladesh Question’, 619-620. 
44 Harun Or-Rashid, ‘British Perspectives, Pressures and Publicity Regarding Bangladesh, 1971’, 
Contemporary South Asia, vol. 4, no. 2 (1995): 139-50. 
45 Or-Rashid ‘British Perspectives’, 146. 
46 Or-Rashid ‘British Perspectives’, 147. 
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author correctly categorizes as largely pro-Bengali, a point which will be elaborated 
further on.47  
In recent years, in contrast, a few scholars have published their interpretations of 
British responses to the crisis based on a selection of the declassified diplomatic files 
examined in this thesis.  I will introduce their work here, and return to them in the 
conclusion to compare their findings with my own.  This structure may be somewhat 
unusual, however there are so few works on the subject that I believe emphasizing those 
that exist after a full exposition of my own, serves to clarify the issues at stake as well 
as indicate the direction in which the newly emerging field appears to be going.  
According to international historian Simon C. Smith in ‘Coming Down on the 
Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971’, British files from 1971 
demonstrate that Britain’s tilt towards India, which contrasted with America’s siding 
with Pakistan, did not occur as some have alleged, because the British wanted to 
differentiate themselves overtly from the superpower, but rather because of ‘the simple 
fact that British and US interests did not coincide’.48  This, the author suggests, was a 
pattern consistent with each country’s divergent approaches to Asia after 1945, where 
the American tendency to evaluate the region in terms of Cold War stratagem contrasted 
with Britain’s narrower, yet arguably more effective, bilateral approach. 
Historian Dirk Moses, a specialist in post-colonial conflict studies, uses East 
Pakistan as a case study in his wider study on the ‘diplomacy of genocide’.49  Referring 
to the official records from various countries, with an emphasis on Britain, Moses 
contends that internal and external elites including the British, depending on their 
agenda, tended to frame the conflict exclusively as a civil war in a sovereign state, or as 
                                                
47 Or-Rashid ‘British Perspectives’, 140-145. 
48 Simon C. Smith, ‘Coming Down on the Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971’, British 
Contemporary History, vol. 24, no. 4 (2010): 452. 
49 Dirk Moses, ‘East Pakistan and the Diplomacy of Genocide in 1971-73’, paper presented at the session, 
‘East Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971: Mass Violence & The Question of Genocide’, of the Biannual 
Conference of the International Network of Genocide Scholars, Brighton UK, 30 June 2010. 
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a struggle for self-determination against a genocidal regime.  The narrative these elites 
chose, he argues, points not only to wider moral and political priorities, but also to how 
myths are created within the modern nation-state system, perpetually divided between 
the principle of state sovereignty and that of human rights.  The East Pakistan crisis, 
still the object of such myth making, provides scholars with an opportunity to ‘scrape 
beneath the simplifying slogans’ to reveal the true—and intrinsically convoluted—
nature of events.50 
International relations analyst, Karen Smith’s book-length survey of European 
responses to genocide in the post-war era, briefly assesses Britain’s decision to refrain 
from acting against Pakistan during the 1971 crisis, despite Foreign Office assessments 
indicating that Pakistani forces may have committed genocide.51  Britain’s policy, she 
states, ‘reflects the broader zeitgeist, in which the norm of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries (at least in the name of human rights) was considered 
to be an imperative, obligations under the Genocide Convention notwithstanding’.52 
Smith does not delve into other potentially influential factors, particularly the 
government’s overall perceptions of events, effectively attributing the British position 
entirely to Cold War concerns and conditioning. 
International relations scholar, Richard Pilkington’s study of Canada’s responses 
to East Pakistan does not refer to the British position directly, but does make use of 
British assessments that were supplied during the crisis to the Canadian authorities who 
had no direct representation in East Pakistan.53  Pilkington is rather disparaging of the 
Canadians who, he states, knew via the British that the Pakistani military government 
was ‘perpetrating systematic atrocities and gross human rights abuses’ against the 
                                                
50 Dirk Moses, ‘Civil War or Genocide? Britain and the Secession of East Pakistan in 1971’, in Civil War 
in South Asia, eds. Aparna Sundar and Nandini Sundar (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
forthcoming. 
51 Karen E. Smith, Genocide and the Europeans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81-88.  
52 Smith Genocide and the Europeans, 88.  
53 Richard Pilkington, ‘In the national interest? Canada and the East Pakistan crisis of 1971’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (2011): 451-474. 
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democratically elected Bengali leadership and innocent civilians.54  Rather than 
condemn what the author frames as an ostensibly one-sided persecution either publicly 
or privately, Canadian officials maintained that the violence was a civil war and 
continued bilateral aid disbursements to Pakistan—so taking the ‘moral low ground’.55  
Taken together, this thesis and the new research described belong to a nascent 
trend amongst academics from diverse disciplines, subsequent to the opening of 
Western archives, to evaluate responses to the East Pakistan crisis and the implications 
these hold for Western foreign policy, the crisis itself, or a combination of both.  
Historian Christian Gerlach, in Extremely Violent Societies for example, uses diplomatic 
files from American, German and Australian archives to support his original description 
of the crisis as ‘a landslide of multi-polar violent struggles, in which many participated, 
one way or another, for protection, survival, or gain’.56  Gerlach convincingly uses his 
sources to demonstrate how the violence was anything but sudden, rooted in the crisis-
ridden history of Pakistani society itself.  
Sharmila Bose, a specialist on South Asian politics, also uses American 
diplomatic records in her wider investigation into the violence, which is otherwise based 
on the author’s interviews (conducted in the regional languages) with Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi witnesses.57  Bose’s book, one of the first full-length academic studies in 
English on the crisis, explores major aspects of the violence that, to date, remain largely 
unsubstantiated by evidence, empirical or otherwise (these aspects are discussed below).  
As a result, she challenges the dominant nationalist narratives in both Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, narratives that have largely become sacrosanct components of national 
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identity.  Unsurprisingly, the book has generated fierce controversy, spurring vigorous 
discussion amongst scholars and the public alike.58  
S. Mahmud Ali’s Understanding Bangladesh, published in 2010, draws partly 
on Western archives to provide a useful ‘detached but empathetic account’ of the crisis, 
including a detailed description of the central government’s crackdown on the East 
Pakistani ‘autonomist-turned-secessionist campaign’.59  Ali’s assiduous research 
extends beyond the scope of Bose’s in that it surveys the region’s tumultuous history 
dating back to the mid-1700s.  His analytical approach is similar to that which I have 
aspired to employ in this thesis, namely: ‘the rational-empirical model…founded on 
establishing causal linkages—or demonstrating the lack of these—on the bases of 
evidence rather than instinct or preference’.60  Willem Van Schendel’s A History of 
Bangladesh published in 2009 by Cambridge University Press, delves even further back 
into the region’s past, beginning with its prehistory.  Yet when it comes to the 1971 
crisis, his otherwise comprehensive account is rather unsatisfactory, being highly 
descriptive yet not particularly analytical.61  The author, while cognizant of the various 
layers of violence which characterised the period, has chosen to focus his discussion 
somewhat superficially on the ‘main thread’62 of armed conflict between the army and 
East Pakistani nationalists, rather than delve into its complications.  The use of the 
subheading ‘Pakistan’s Final Solution’63 to characterize the military campaign is 
additionally problematic, signifying a comparison with the Holocaust which requires 
substantiation.  The book, nevertheless, serves as an introductory textbook in English on 
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the history of the crisis for students and general readers—indeed, it is one of the first 
that can claim to do so.   
The burgeoning attention to the subject is welcome.  Not only does the new 
research provide reference points within which to situate my own work, it helps to 
counter the absence of dispassionate examinations of the East Pakistan crisis, shedding 
light on the precise nature of events and their wider geopolitical context.  These works 
will thus be cited here wherever relevant, with an emphasis on those that draw on the 
British files in the conclusion.  To repeat, however, such studies amount to a mere 
handful; the circumstances surrounding the violent birth of Bangladesh, and 
international responses to it, have generally not been subjected to serious academic 
scrutiny. 
University library collections in the UK, for example, abound with highly 
subjective ‘analyses’ of the conflict produced on the subcontinent during or just after 
1971.  Iain Cochrane, formerly a London-based doctoral candidate examining the 
historical causes of the Pakistan rupture, is similarly dismayed by these early works 
which, he believes, were ‘rushed through…publication in 1971 and 1972, in India and 
Bangladesh….[to] garner international opinion in favour of the Bengalis’.64  Pro-
independence by nature, the accounts they relate are similar: Pakistani forces committed 
genocide against the peaceful people of East Bengal, brutally denying them their 
unalienable right to self-governance.65  Pro-Pakistani versions of the conflict, appearing 
not long after, counter these with their own tales of victimization and claims to 
legitimacy.66  This subjectivity, rather disappointingly, extends to much of the current 
                                                
64 Iain Cochrane, ‘The Bangladesh Liberation War and it’s Causes: Literature Survey’, unpublished paper 
for the Ph.D. Program at Royal Holloway, University of London, 2005, 1-38.    
65 Examples include Kalyan Chaudhuri, Genocide in Bangladesh (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1972); Abul 
Hasanat, Let Humanity not Forget: the Ugliest Genocide in History, being a Resume of Inhuman 
Atrocities in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh (Dacca: Muktadhara, 1974); Sagar Publications, Editorial 
Department, Bleeding Bangla Desh: Crime Against Humanity (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1971).  
66 Such as Qutubuddin Aziz, Blood and Tears: Atrocities committed in East Pakistan by Awami League 
militants in March-April, 1971 (Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974); Fazal Muqueem Khan, 
 37 
literature and, although this is beginning to change, consensus on what actually 
happened during the crisis remains remarkably slim.  Thus this literature on the crisis, 
as it stands, is essentially divided into two camps with a unifying theme: both sides tend 
to endorse nationalist narratives, and use polemic argumentation to support their 
respective political agendas.   
An important exception is the International Commission of Jurists’ (ICJ) legal 
study of East Pakistan published in 1972.67  The one hundred-page report ‘based partly 
on published books, contemporary newspaper accounts, sworn depositions of refugees 
in India, and oral and written statements of evidence from European and American 
nationals’68 collected by the ICJ between October 1971 to March 1972, appears to have 
been the first to graphically describe alleged elements of the Pakistani military 
campaign, and evaluate these in the context of international humanitarian law.  ‘The 
principle features of this ruthless oppression,’ the report stated:  
were the indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children and the 
poorest and weakest members of the community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out 
of the country a large part of the Hindu population; the arrest, torture and killing of 
Awami League activists, students, professional and business men and other potential 
leaders among the Bengalis; the raping of women; the destruction of villages and towns; 
and the looting of property.  All this was done on a scale which is difficult to 
comprehend.69    
 
The ICJ did not hesitate to list crimes committed by Bengalis and other groups in 
similar detail, lending their account continuing relevance and utility.  Indeed, it is one of 
the key Anglophone sources used in the more objective analyses of the crisis today. 
However, it remains that with regards to the majority of secondary sources 
produced in the aftermath of the conflict and, indeed, in the following decades, those 
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claiming to provide detached analyses of the violence rarely do so in any depth.  Hence 
international relations and South Asia specialist, Bina D’Costa declares, ‘the war of 
1971 remains one of the most under-researched conflicts in the world, and the traumatic 
experiences of the civilians after the war remain virtually unknown despite growing 
interest in nationalism and ethnic violence’.70 
It is curious why, until recently, there has been little serious academic attention 
paid to an event of such proportions, and the fact that foreign diplomatic files were 
formerly unavailable is only part of the answer.  Bangladesh, financially destitute and 
on the margins of geopolitics appears to have aroused little interest in any discipline 
except perhaps development studies.71  Nor can the factual vacuum be attributed to a 
particular disdain for the Indian subcontinent.  After all, the 1947 partition of India, 
comparable in terms of the massive and violent movement of people, has produced an 
ocean of scholarship and is justly recognized as one of the ‘great human convulsions in 
history’.72  The second partition of the subcontinent, over a quarter of a century later, 
has spawned little more than a trickle of non-partisan analyses. 
Indeed, it would appear that Partition Studies, as a branch of South Asian 
history, is sufficiently established to have gone through several waves of inquiry.  One 
such wave was sparked in the late 1990s when the feminist historian Urvashi Butalia 
argued that the ‘particulars’—the stories of individuals, especially of women—were 
absent from the innumerable political histories of partition or the well-established 
‘history from above’.73  Many of her contemporaries agreed, and shifted away from the 
official archives in favour of a ‘new history’ of 1947, or ‘partition from beneath’, based 
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on the memories of ordinary civilians who experienced it.74  Today, still others are 
combining first-hand accounts with governmental records forming yet another strata of 
scholarly investigation into the event.75  In terms of the 1971 partition, there are few 
serious political or social histories to adopt or to reject, rendering the prospect of it 
becoming a distinct subject of study distant.  
Part of the explanation for this void appears to lie in regional politics; successive 
governments on the subcontinent appear to have either repressed discussion of the 
conflict or attempted to manipulate it for their own ends.  According to sociologist 
Nayanika Mookherjee, text books in both Pakistan and Bangladesh are periodically 
adjusted to suit nationalist narratives, omitting and then re-inserting crucial facts 
arbitrarily.76  In Bangladesh in particular, treatment of the 1971 conflict has depended 
on who has held political power—pro-independence parties, such as the Awami League, 
or coalitions of those who supported a united Pakistan, many of whom are often linked 
to extremist religious parties.  Bangladeshi academia’s attempts to uncover the ‘truth’—
often government funded—are also ‘not innocent of state power’.77  Each side appears 
to propagate a competing version of national history that either endorses a (very partial) 
recovery of the conflict or vies against it.  Neither, it would seem, aims to accurately 
portray events as they occurred.  
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On the other hand, there has been a torrent of creative literary and visual 
works,78 as well as oral histories comprised of personal accounts and memoirs emerging 
from Bangladesh, and indeed also from Pakistan and India, which far outweigh the 
quantity of valid scholarly material.79  Even so, Anatra Datta points out, conflicts in 
South Asia—a region whose two oldest countries only turned 60 not long ago—are too 
fresh in people’s minds not to be infused with current politics.  Thus, while there is a 
great deal of literature and artistic retelling of 1971, much of it is highly charged, 
written by participants, witnesses, or those with overriding political agendas.  
‘Somewhat counter-intuitively, this wealth of information ends up dramatically 
complicating the attempt to separate fact from fiction, emotion from reality, and rhetoric 
from “truth”, in the course of any attempt to construct a nuanced account of 1971’.80  
The East Pakistan crisis on the subcontinent, in other words, exists in ‘separate and 
parallel histories’81: a state-endorsed history or ‘macro-narrative’82 which props one 
type of nationalism over another, versus a more complex, but equally problematic, 
micro-narrative based on individual memories and experiences.  
Regional politicization of the conflict has, regrettably, seeped into most of the 
studies by Western scholars, who without mastery of the local languages required to 
carry out independent research, are obliged to rely on the contradictory material that 
exists.  This, perhaps, explains the attraction of foreign diplomatic files, and the 
resulting movement towards more balanced studies.  However, in the end, against a 
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background of propaganda and lack of official documentation, many important aspects 
of the crisis are almost impossible to evaluate with authority.  
Scholars, for example, generally agree on the estimates of refugees, as these 
figures were accepted by UN humanitarian agencies active in the area at the time.83  Yet 
assessments of how many died fluctuate wildly between the official Pakistani figure of 
26,00084 to the soaring toll of three million, ubiquitously quoted in Bangladesh.85  With 
few exceptions, scholars provide scant evidence for the figure they support, and each 
seems to define the crisis differently.  Samantha Power, for example, in her Pulitzer 
prize-winning study America and the Age of Genocide, cursorily states that one to two 
million Bengalis were murdered during a ‘Pakistani genocide’.86  According to Richard 
Sisson and Leo Rose, in a rare study by Western academics based on original 
interviews, possibly 300,000 East and West Pakistanis died in a ‘civil war’.87  Rounaq 
Jahan supports the official Bangladeshi figure of three million, adding that because 
many of the targeted middle class were able to escape, the majority of the campaign’s 
victims were Bengali villagers and slum dwellers—‘defenceless, ordinary poor people 
who stayed behind…and did not suspect that they would be killed, raped, taken to 
prison, and tortured simply for the crime of being born a Bengali’.88  The Ford 
Foundation’s 1971 demographic study, on the other hand, found that the mortality rate 
in a rural area of East Pakistan during the conflict sharply increased (by 40%) due, not 
to overt violence, but to infectious diarrhoeal diseases, such as cholera.  ‘Extrapolation 
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of events…suggests that Bangladesh experienced a major catastrophe in 1971. About 
260,000 births were either averted or postponed by the conflict and the overall number 
of excess deaths probably approached 500,000’.89  
British files, unfortunately, provide little evidence of numbers killed during the 
crisis.  When these are given, they do not go beyond thousands, a range too low to 
consider given the breadth and intensity of the violence.  These minimal figures do, 
nonetheless, render claims of above one million deaths unlikely.90  As the former 
Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca recalls:  
I doubt that it was as many as a million. If you have a million deaths, you have an awful 
lot of bodies to dispose of…Of course, it was all very unpleasant, but there is a natural 
tendency to inflate figures. It simply would not have been easy to have a million people 
dead without more obvious evidence of it...So, I think the number of deaths was really 
quite small—figures in the million mark have to be treated with some caution.91   
 
Ultimately, Willem Van Schendel is correct that, ‘In the absence of any reliable 
assessment after the war…the actual number will never be even remotely certain’.92 
The frequent allegation that anywhere from 200,000 to 400,000 women were 
raped—a figure of which the lower estimate ‘is more than triple that of even the highest 
estimates of rapes of ex-Yugoslavs’93 during the Balkan wars of the 1990s—also 
requires substantiation.  However, studies of sexual violence in conflict situations are 
now prevalent, and the 1971 crisis is gradually being addressed.  Indeed, research into 
women’s experiences, the majority of which has been published over the last five years, 
comprises much of the serious scholarship on the event.94  According to this literature, 
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sexual violence was one of the most distinctive features of the period; women in East 
Pakistan regardless of class, ethnicity, religious/social backgrounds, and age were 
‘principal targets’95 of male aggression including beating, torture and killing.96 
In Mookherjee’s view, the issue of sexual violence and the fate of rape victims 
in Bangladesh have been manipulated more than any other aspect of the violence, 
depending on the agendas of the ruling parties.97  Periods of silence alternated by re-
emergence of the issue, she concludes, are products of national political exigency.  To 
this complicated picture, Yasmin Saikia adds the denial of complicity.  Females in 
1971, Saikia declares, were victimized not only by the Pakistani military, but also by 
Bengali men whom they knew, to revenge local enmities.  ‘Perpetrators were the 
Pakistani “others”, so the state tells people in Bangladesh.  It is an easy, uncomplicated 
story, until we start investigating.  Then the picture becomes convoluted, murky and 
muddy’.98   
The uncomfortable fact that Bengalis also committed acts of brutality against 
‘non-Bengalis’ is another source of confusion and contention.  Indeed, for the 
International Commission of Jurists, the scale of crimes committed ‘was massive, but it 
is impossible to quantify them.  Figures given by both sides tend to be greatly 
exaggerated’.99  ‘Non-Bengali’, in East Pakistan 1971, referred pejoratively to the two 
minority groups with whom there was a long-standing history of animosity: West 
Pakistanis living in the province, many of whom were indiscriminately branded as 
agents of the central government, and Biharis—Urdu-speaking Muslims who had 
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emigrated mainly from the Indian province of Bihar after 1947 to become citizens of the 
newly created Muslim homeland.  Hostility between Bengalis and Biharis manifested 
itself almost at once, after the central (Urdu-speaking) government allotted many of the 
newly arrived Biharis coveted civil posts in the East.100  Biharis were soon considered to 
be closely associated with—and even to represent—the generally oppressive and distant 
authority, leading to resentment and deepening divergences.101  When nationalist 
fervour began mounting in the East, many supported the central government, remaining 
faithful to the concept of a united Pakistan; during the military repression that followed, 
some joined the razakars, an auxiliary force of ‘armed volunteers’ or local recruits.102  
Hence, whether it was in retaliation for collaborating with the Pakistani army, or for 
their perceived elite position in East Pakistani society, Bengalis brutalized Biharis 
during the conflict—and vice versa.  Reciprocal violence at the local level, between 
various communal groups in East Pakistan, thus appeared to constitute further 
dimension to the conflict, woven into the overall fabric of army terror and civil war.   
The position of the significant Hindu Bengali minority in the province was 
doubly precarious: communal tensions with Muslim Bengalis (despite their linguistic 
affinity) were rooted in the region’s troubled history, arguably entrenched at the 1905 
partition of Bengal under British rule.103  Meanwhile, successive Pakistani governments 
had branded Hindus collectively as fifth columnist agents of India, the ultimate 
‘enemy’.104  Indeed, Hindus were widely believed to have been working on behalf of 
India to agitate Bengali nationalist sentiment since Pakistan’s creation.  As a result, 
political unrest in the Eastern wing during the intervening decades was frequently cast 
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as a ‘Hindu conspiracy’,105 and in 1971, Hindus were prime targets of the military 
campaign (and also occasionally of Bengali mob violence).  
Attempts to define these discord-ridden events are, not surprisingly, 
inconclusive.  Some allege that, under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, the Pakistani 
government committed genocide against the Bengalis of East Pakistan who constituted 
a distinct ethnic group.106  The International Commission of Jurists, on the other hand, 
considered that the fact that political activists (real or perceived) were singled out 
‘mitigates against the finding that the intent was to destroy in whole or in part the 
Bengali people as such.  This does not mean, of course, that particular acts may not 
have constituted genocide against part of the Bengali people’ on the occasions in which 
‘the intent was to kill Bengalis indiscriminately as such….There would seem to be a 
prima facie case to show that this was the intention on some occasions’.107  Yet, the 
Commission clarified, the ‘crime of genocide’ could only be said to have been 
committed against Hindu Bengalis who clearly belonged to the ‘national ethnical, racial 
or religious’ groups protected by the Convention.108  (The Commission also pointed out 
that although Bengali insurgents and mobs had committed ‘massive violations of human 
rights’, they did not wish to equate ‘spontaneous and frenzied mob violence’ with 
genocide.109)  
The question of how to define the violence has been debated most recently in a 
special issue of the peer-reviewed Journal of Genocide Research (2011), to which the 
author of this thesis and others currently working on the topic contributed articles.110  
This journal may appear an improbable home for the debate, given that most of the 
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contributors (including myself) do not describe events in East Pakistan strictly as 
‘genocide’ (a fact made apparent at a panelled session on the topic at the International 
Network of Genocide Scholars conference in 2010).111  Rather, we tend to agree that the 
multiple dimensions of violence in 1971 fit no easy categorization, and that more 
inclusive terms, such as ‘extreme violence’ and ‘mass killing’—defined as ‘the 
intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants’112—are more appropriate, as 
they encompass an array of acts falling along a spectrum of collective violence.  All the 
same, while adherents to this view (propagated by the ‘second generation’ of genocide 
scholars113) are increasing, the ‘argument over labelling’ continues and, as South Asia 
specialist Paul Brass observes, ‘is the most debilitating.  It is really a struggle for 
territory, the right to make a claim of utmost suffering and victimhood for a people or to 
extend the claim to encompass a wider range of sufferers.  It is to that extent a political 
rather than a scientific struggle—for attention to one’s cause—in which historians 
themselves become enmeshed’.114    
1971 is justly deemed in Bangladesh ‘the year of chaos’,115 not least because of 
the complexity of the conflict and the absence of information on it, but also because of 
the intense dispute over this information.  Given the unsatisfactory state of 
documentation, writing an authoritative history of the violence is considerably difficult 
as the lack of dispassionate academic research and ‘plethora of oral sources 
“recounting” the events…, as well as an equal variety of somewhat dubious official 
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sources…leaves us with more questions than answers’.116  Nor is writing such a history 
(or exploring why so few have) my objective, compelling as the subject is.  Rather, my 
interest in how Britain, the former colonial ruler, perceived the violence, what it did as a 
result of those perceptions (or irrespective of them), and what the implications are of its 
responses—is an inquiry that is valuable for several reasons.  
To begin with, the records of foreign countries such as Britain can be 
particularly useful in cases such as these where the absence of official documentation 
and scholarly research is compounded by an abundance of politicised accounts. As 
described, representatives at British High Commissions on the subcontinent tracked the 
conflict on a steady basis.  Officials, at home and abroad, carefully assessed this 
intelligence, and cross-referenced accounts to verify authenticity.  They also gathered 
information from diverse sources, placing special emphasis on first-hand accounts; all 
this they did not only with an eye to protecting Britain’s regional interests, but also, as 
one Foreign Office official wrote at the time, to build a ‘historical record’ of the 
crisis.117   
Of course, using British reports to reconstruct the violent events of 1971 has its 
limitations, some of which have been reviewed.  Intelligence gathering and assessment 
during the conflict was inevitably complex under the ‘fog of war and atrocity’.118  
Diplomats in East Pakistan had restricted mobility amidst the province’s marshy 
topography and poor infrastructure. Unable to gather direct evidence of what was 
transpiring, they were forced to rely on a limited number of informants—‘a few foreign 
nationals and East Bengalis in the know. These people had their fingers on the pulse. 
But to obtain really reliable information on which you could base a careful assessment 
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to London of what was going to happen was really quite difficult’.119  Given these 
restrictions, British intelligence can, therefore, provide partial insights into what 
happened during the crisis, and must be considered in conjunction with other sources.   
As recounted earlier, this is a task a few scholars have been undertaking since 
the opening of Western archives.  To date, such comparative studies have been based, at 
least in part, on government records from the United States reflecting the Nixon 
administration’s policy, much of which was published in 2005.120  It goes without 
saying that British responses did not take place in a vacuum, and the policies of other 
governments, particularly those of the dominant powers, had an influence that will be 
addressed.  Yet as a case study, this thesis analyses the policies of other countries 
chiefly through how these were described in the British files or in secondary studies, 
rather than by way of archival records from the country in question.  It is hoped that this 
primary focus on Britain will serve those who wish to compare international responses 
to the crisis, and provide them with insights into the particulars of the British position 
that are afforded by such an approach (particulars which have not been captured by the 
slender studies of the British position to date). 
On a similarly comparative basis, British files on East Pakistan act as a case 
study on how governments perceive violence in foreign countries—whether as ‘civil 
war’, ‘communal bloodshed’, ‘genocide’, or other forms of mass violence—and what 
actions governments take based on those perceptions.  In this case, it would appear that 
the labels commonly available, in and of themselves, do not adequately describe this 
multilayered conflict in which various elite groups and ordinary citizens, both organised 
and unorganised, participated for a variety of motives.  This lends weight to recent 
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comparative studies that employ broad descriptors such as ‘extreme violence’ or ‘mass 
atrocity crimes’ to East Pakistan and similar cases,121 in order to highlight the fluid, 
multi-causal and participatory nature which nationalist violence often assumes, and 
encourage a rethinking of the black and white descriptions commonly applied.  
There is a notable quantity of literature on what governments can effectively 
know and understand about atrocities in foreign countries, and the relationship between 
knowledge, perception and foreign policy; studies of how governments perpetrate and 
conceal atrocities—by exploiting language, propaganda and bureaucracy, for 
example—are equally manifold.  Much of this work came out in the decades following 
the Holocaust, when these issues were explored with urgency, and again more recently, 
in response to the numerous cases of mass killing that accompanied the last decades of 
the twentieth century (and, in some cases, have continued into the twenty-first).  
Although my study of Britain and Bangladesh addresses themes similar to those 
explored by these respected scholars, I refer to their work only occasionally.  I have 
concentrated instead on unearthing original information about Britain’s responses to a 
complex episode of state terror and nationalist violence in its former colony, and 
analysing those responses within the historical and national context in which they took 
place.  I have attempted, moreover, to present this information using lucid and 
communicative prose.  As Bloch wrote, ‘the first tool needed by any analysis is an 
appropriate language; a language capable of describing the precise outlines of the facts, 
while preserving the necessary flexibility to adapt itself to further discoveries and, 
above all, a language which is neither vacillating nor ambiguous’.122  Such a writing 
style, it is hoped, will assist the reader to grasp the complex events and intersecting 
histories examined here. 
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Ultimately, Britain’s understanding of the violence in East Pakistan, and the 
Heath government’s varied responses to that violence, are valuable for what they reveal 
about Britain at a pivotal time in its history when, for all the decline and downsizing of 
previous decades, it remained active in a former colony even as it maintained its 
distance.  Devised on a largely ad hoc basis, Britain’s mixed responses do not fit easily 
into the category of foreign ‘policy’ to the extent that policy implies a conscious 
thought-out position on a particular event, often determined in advance, and usually 
consistent with previous approaches or the ideological orientation of a particular 
political party.  This pragmatic or semi-spontaneous character of the British position 
was not necessarily disadvantageous.  For the country managed to navigate the 
diplomatic dangers and international instability posed by the affair with its regional 
interests and reputation relatively undamaged.  Britain’s activities with regards to the 
Pakistan crisis may thus be perceived as a case of pragmatism in politics, or what some 
may call simply ‘muddling through’.  However characterized, British responses—which 
reflect both self-interest and concern, as well as an array of related priorities—defy the 
simplistic categories into which the Heath government has often been placed.   At the 
same time, they facilitate a deeper understanding of this episode of nationalist violence, 
and the challenges it posed to government observers whose descriptions of the violence 
rarely reflected its scope or nature.  
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II. BRITISH INTELLIGENCE  
ON THE 
EAST PAKISTAN/BANGLADESH CRISIS 
 
From December 1970, British representatives stationed in East Pakistan began to 
anticipate the outbreak of severe political violence in the province.  They started laying 
tentative plans to evacuate nationals in the event of an emergency, and reported to 
London with heightened frequency.123  The threat of such violence was not new.  
Indeed, the concept of Pakistan as a political entity comprising two discontiguous wings 
had begun to weaken shortly after the country’s creation, when East Pakistani elites 
decried what they perceived as structural discrimination against the East, designed and 
implemented by the Western-based central government.124  Disputes over language, 
economy and under-representation in parliament and the military subsequently became 
rife in East Pakistan—where 75 million people, over half of the country’s total 
population resided—occasionally erupting in clashes with government authorities.125 
Statistical data documenting provincial disparity does indeed reflect a state of 
asymmetry between the two provinces,126 leading some scholars to liken the inter-wing 
relationship to a form of ‘imperialist exploitation’ or ‘internal colonialism’.127  Internal 
colonialism describes a situation where a dominant ‘core group’ (in this case West 
Pakistanis) socially, politically and economically exploit a subordinate or ‘periphery’ 
group (East Pakistanis).  According to Michael Hechter, the core group then often:  
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seeks to stabilize or monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the 
institutionalization of the existing stratification system….To the extent that social 
stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural differences, there exists the 
probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own 
culture….This may help it conceive of itself as a separate ‘nation’ and seek 
independence.128  
 
Before the subcontinent’s 1947 partition, Muslims from Bengal and those in the Urdu-
speaking northwest most certainly had ‘observable cultural differences’, sharing neither 
territory, tradition nor language.  Indeed, the sole justification for uniting the two distant 
regions—religion—was unsound, given the radically different evolution of Islam in 
each.129  In the East, the Bengali language and religion were inextricably linked, as 
Muslim conquerors entering the region from the thirteenth century required the local 
language to access the population and establish power.  Thus, Islam became dependent 
on “the growth of Bengali as the lingua franca”130 and acquired significant differences 
from the Arabic Islam that was preached and practiced in the northwest.  
In contrast, Muslims and Hindus within Bengal spoke not only the same 
language, but also shared cultural habits, trading patterns and folklore.131  Historically 
unequal relations and economic rivalry between these two religious groups did not 
manage to overshadow the extensive links emanating from sustained interaction in a 
common space.  Indeed, according to Naila Kabeer, in rural Bengal ‘it was impossible 
to disentangle the origins of various beliefs and customs…which were held by Hindu 
and Muslim peasant[s] alike and were essentially Bengali beliefs’.132  Muslim society in 
pre-partition India was thus fractured on several levels, and while differences may have 
been set aside in the agitation for a common homeland—Pakistan, they resurfaced after 
its birth. 
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Language is arguably the first issue to have destabilized Pakistan.  Indeed, some 
analysts trace Bangladeshi nationalism to 1948, when the designation of Urdu as the 
state language prompted widespread riots in the East.133  To Pakistan’s founders, Urdu 
was the South Asian tongue closest to Arabic and therefore most appropriate to 
establish the character of the foundling state as distinct to that of Hindu India.  An 
attack on Urdu—which appeared to be manifest in East Pakistani resistance—was thus 
equated to an attack on Pakistan by pro-India elements.134  In short, states Kabeer, ‘the 
cultural and linguistic affinity between the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal 
was…profoundly threatening to a state which had only Islam….Reluctant to rely on 
religious alliance alone, successive regimes in Pakistan embarked on a strategy of 
forcible cultural assimilation’135 against the perceived ‘Hindu leaning’136 Muslims of 
East Pakistan.  
The central government, at times, expressed a willingness to reconcile and focus 
on pressing development needs.  Yet inordinate funds were funnelled into the West 
wing, which (partly due to unequal development of the two regions under British rule) 
was the main urban and industrial centre, had a higher percentage of skilled labour, and 
the better economic and administrative substructure.137  ‘From the point of view of a 
country struggling to maximise its growth rate from inauspicious beginnings,’ Graham 
Chapman points out, ‘it would be foolish not to place it [capital] where it would have 
the highest incremental growth’.138  However, in doing so, the East suffered chronic 
decline, reaping none of the major export revenues it generated as the producer of the 
country’s largest export crop, jute, and receiving less than one third of Pakistan’s 
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imports, and only a quarter of foreign aid.139  What British officials would describe as 
various ‘half hearted’140 attempts to pursue a more egalitarian system in the 1950s and 
1960s failed partly ‘out of fear that the Bengalis might dominate in a democratically 
elected government’.141  
This uneven system of governance soon had the effect of alienating East 
Pakistani elites and strengthening their consciousness as a distinct political entity, a 
consciousness that gradually transmitted itself to the wider population.142  According to 
incisive studies of nationalism in South Asia, it is not objective differences between 
groups as such that cause people to consider themselves a separate nation, but rather 
awareness of these differences, which is generated over time by an interplay of internal 
subjective and external material factors.143  In the case of East Pakistan, major 
differences between East and West predating the creation of Pakistan, exacerbated by 
decades of government mismanagement (real and perceived), does indeed appear to 
have formed the background to the growth of Bangladeshi nationalism. 
By the mid-1960s, popular nationalist sentiment had mobilized around the 
centrist Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  Rahman promoted 
‘substantial provincial autonomy’ and a restoration of democracy to replace the civil-
military dictatorship, which had long governed the country by heavy-handed martial 
law.144  Political tensions, a consistent feature of Pakistani public life, intensified 
dangerously from 7 December 1970 after the Awami League won the country’s first 
national elections, thanks to the votes of the more populous Eastern wing.  The central 
government’s slow and inadequate response to a series of cyclones which devastated 
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coastal regions of the province in November, claiming possibly a quarter of a million 
lives, had rallied even broader support for the party which accused the government of 
‘criminal negligence’.145 
According to the British High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard, who had been 
stationed in Islamabad for five years, Pakistani President Yahya Khan had held 
elections to appease political dissent, having genuinely accepted the necessity of 
transferring limited authority to elected representatives.  Yet the scale of the Awami 
League’s victory surprised everyone; it had won 167 of the National Assembly’s 313 
seats.  Equally surprising was the partial success of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s opposition 
Pakistan Peoples Party, which had won a majority of votes in the West with 88 
assembly seats, and was demanding a major role in the new government. ‘Whether 
Pakistan starts a slow climb to a better order, or a rapid descent to chaos,’ reflected 
Pickard, ‘depends on the politicians rising above self-seeking’.146 
Chaos, it became evident, was more likely: constitutional negotiations between 
the two victorious leaders quickly foundered over the Awami League’s controversial 
‘six-point’ political program, which proposed virtual self-rule for the provinces.  On 1 
March 1971, after Bhutto threatened to boycott the next meeting of the National 
Assembly at which Mujib was to take power, President Khan suspended the Assembly 
altogether—‘to allow time for passions to cool and fruitful dialogue to ensue,’ the High 
Commissioner explained.147  Tikka Khan, British officials noted, a Pakistani general of 
reputedly brutal inclinations, was appointed as Governor and Chief of the martial law 
administration in the province, while military reserves were flown in and stationed 
throughout the province.148 
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These measures, reportedly taken ‘to safeguard innocent and otherwise law 
abiding citizens’, exacerbated tensions considerably as outraged East Pakistanis, under 
Mujib’s leadership, launched a ‘Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement’ bringing the 
province’s infrastructure to a halt.149  The first days of the ‘non-violent’ movement, 
according to British representatives in the East, did not merit the title; instead, 
‘hooliganism, looting, arson and mob violence in a framework of general strike’150 took 
place, directed at government forces, so called non-Bengali communities and, 
occasionally, at Hindus.151  
Despite the volatile atmosphere, British officials remained optimistic that a 
political resolution was pending after violence declined at the behest of Awami leaders, 
and Mujib, Khan and Bhutto resumed negotiations in Dacca two weeks later.152 
Nevertheless, talks soon foundered over the intransigence of all parties, apparently 
influenced by extremists in their respective power bases.153 Unable to overcome the 
stalemate, the Pakistani president abruptly quit the meetings towards the end of the 
month, expelled foreign press, banned diplomatic wireless transmissions and, fatefully, 
ordered local martial law authorities to solve the East Pakistan question through force.    
The information blackout accompanying the military action, which began late on 
25 March 1971, was nearly total. For the British government, however, it was not. 
Officials at the British Deputy High Commission in Dacca began secretly 
communicating from emergency transmitters. Their reports were unsettling: the 
Pakistani army ‘moved into’ Dacca at midnight on 25/26 March and ‘fired on anyone 
venturing on the streets.…[I]nstances of callous disregard for life, with looting, burning 
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and random shooting were actually seen’.154  Dacca’s University campus, considered a 
breeding ground for resistance, was the first to be targeted. ‘Members of the 
Army…admitted that they are conducting a punitive campaign against “enemies of the 
people” by deliberately setting fire to property and machine gunning the owners.…Total 
casualties in Dacca are put at about 5,000.…[I]indications are that the Army has 
planned a reign of terror and that it has so far been largely successful’.155  
The High Commissioner in Islamabad concurred: ‘President….has concluded he 
can prevent breakup of the country by force’.156  ‘Punjabi and Pathan contempt for the 
Bengali has risen to the surface and there is much talk of teaching them a lesson’.157  ‘It 
is clear from reports reaching us that the Army is acting with callous disregard for life 
and is adopting terror tactics to cow the Bengalis.  Political leaders are being hunted 
down and shot (there is no precedent in Pakistan’s history)’.158  
The aim of the military strategy dubbed ‘Operation Searchlight’, evident in 
further cables, was to rapidly quash the East Pakistani nationalist movement by retaking 
major urban areas and persecuting Bengalis thought to actively support independence; 
this included certain members of the Awami League, some politicised students and 
academics, influential Awami League supporters, much of the province’s Hindu 
population (branded ‘enemies of the state’), and virtually all Bengali security forces.  
British reports described how this persecution—carried out using tanks, machine guns, 
torches and fighter planes—took different forms, including arrest, harassment, looting 
and destruction of property and murder.159  
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According to British intelligence, however, Pakistani troops were not the only 
perpetrators: ‘The Biharis (non-Bengali and Urdu-speaking) are on the rampage’.160  
They ‘appear to have been incited to riot by the Army, who are turning a blind eye to 
their activities’.161  Bengali nationalists too, it emerged, had attacked non-Bengali men, 
women and children near Chittagong, East Pakistan’s main seaport.  The situation  had 
reversed only when the Pakistani army gained control.  British locals, for their part, ‘had 
been searched by both sides at gun point….By then the Army were incensed over 
atrocities committed against West Pakistani families and were dealing ruthlessly with 
Bengalis’.162  Later accounts would confirm such incidents.  ‘Shortly after news of the 
attack by Pakistani troops on the University at Dacca had reached Chittagong,’ a British 
mill owner told High Commission officials across the border in Calcutta, his non-
Bengali staff ‘was attacked by a mob of Bengalis, who murdered the entire labour force.  
A few days later they rounded up their wives and children and killed them too’.163  
Having barely managed to flee, Calcutta officials noted, ‘nothing would induce him [the 
mill owner] to go either to East or West Pakistan again’.164 
Awami League leaders, in the interim, had gone into hiding or escaped to 
neighbouring India; as early as 26 March (within hours of the start of the military 
campaign), they had declared Bangladesh a sovereign and independent state via 
clandestine radio broadcast.  British representatives noted that military ‘reinforcements 
continue to be flown [from the West] to the East Wing’165 and Bengali resistance, 
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though ‘ill-organized, ill-armed and unco-ordinated’, was mobilizing with India’s tacit 
assistance.166  ‘The Army massacres led to a mass exodus from the city—at least 
100,000 of the poorer people are believe to have left, the roads having been filled 
solidly with people travelling on foot carrying bundles of possessions’.167 
British representatives in the East began evacuating nationals in a series of 
carefully planned operations by sea and air.168  Prime Minister Heath, upon learning that 
‘evacuees arriving in Calcutta have spoken of “inhuman brutality” and “a bloody 
massacre” having taken place’ instructed officials to interview them immediately.169  
These testimonies soon arrived at Downing Street, the Cabinet Intelligence Office and 
other government departments.  They confirmed that several currents of violence were 
underway in East Pakistan: a murderous state terror campaign against perceived 
supporters of Bengali independence (especially Hindus, who began fleeing the province 
in droves), a fledgling civil war between government troops and Bengali nationalists, 
and clashes between Bengalis and ‘non-Bengalis’, apparently arising from pre-existing 
ethnic tensions.  
In Dacca, one witness reported, ‘The Hindu areas in the old town have been 
burnt down and many Hindus were being rounded up and marched off by the 
Army….Some 300-400…were in Saint Gregory’s Catholic School recently and the 
Army took as many as they could put in one truck to Jagannath College where…they 
were all shot.  This adds another piece of evidence to the stories of massacres of 
Hindus’.170  
Meanwhile, another witness confirmed that in Chittagong, army forces had 
clashed with the Bengali resisters who had allegedly murdered several West Pakistani 
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families.  Now, according to an evacuee, ‘Chittagong…[is] a dead town.…The 
population has virtually all fled.  Casualties in the fighting…[are] estimate[d] at a 
minimum of 2,000-3,000 killed. Many dead bodies lie in the streets, being eaten by 
dogs and vultures.  The stench of bodies hangs over the docks and as the [evacuation] 
ship left the jetty the wash brought many bodies out from under it’.171  
A few weeks into the conflict then, the British government had multiple sources 
of information describing how various groups in East Pakistan—the Pakistani army, 
‘non-Bengalis’ and Bengalis—at different times, and in different regions, were 
engaging in violence.  Hence the Foreign Secretary informed Cabinet: ‘The 
situation…[was] very confused; and hideous atrocities were being committed on both 
sides’.172  Only the military crackdown suggests a clear level of organization, enacted as 
it was using heavy machinery of destruction amidst a state-imposed information 
blackout, and regularly described by British officials as a ‘systematic’ ‘reign of terror’ 
against East Pakistanis, with select targets—Hindus and suspected Bengali nationalists.  
 The assault, however, did not appear to be the opening of a well-planned 
extended campaign of destruction against Bengalis, but rather a short-term contingency 
strategy if political negotiations failed: ‘teaching them a lesson’ as British officials 
described it.173  Yet Bengali resisters, overpowered by the army in urban areas by late 
April, began to assemble in the countryside with the support of India, contrary to West 
Pakistani estimates that it would take only days to stamp out opposition and regain 
control of the province.174  
To deal with the unexpected challenge, the Khan administration flew 
supplementary military regiments to the East: ‘PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] are 
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at present engaged on flying the fifth division of Pakistan Army to East Bengal,’ cabled 
British representatives in West Pakistan, adding that ‘Bengali aircrew have been sent on 
leave…since no Bengali is allowed to handle aircraft’.175  ‘Number of men involved is 
18,000.  In first ten days or so of April PIA ferried the fourth division into East Bengal 
amounting to 25,000 men….PIA is operating almost exclusively as transport wing of 
Pakistan Air Force’.176  British cables do not speculate on the number of government 
soldiers in the province at any given point, but random figures cited were always 
minimal in comparison to the immense local population.  Britain’s representative in 
Dacca thus surmised that, ‘the Army plainly intended to conceal its lack of numerical 
strength by a campaign of ruthless terror, killing indiscriminately, and destroying and 
burning everything it chose’.177   
Military authorities in the East also began to recruit regiments of local 
supporters or razakars, principally from Bihari communities and groups of Bengalis 
loyal to united Pakistan.  Now in the name of a province-wide ‘counterinsurgency’, the 
army and auxiliary forces conducted ‘search and destroy’ operations in areas of alleged 
dissidence, targeting suspected nationalists and Hindus, while persecuting ordinary 
Muslim civilians at random.178  After a three-day tour of the region, the British High 
Commissioner’s report was markedly grim:  
The province is dominated by fear.  After completion of main military action, the Army, 
either as deliberate policy or at initiative of local commanders, set out to harass, kill and 
drive out all caste Hindus.  They have used massive retaliation in response to all 
incidents, burning villages and killing unarmed civilians.  No man or officer is in any 
way accountable to the law.  The civil law agencies have been replaced by armed 
Biharis who terrify the population and there is a state of complete lawlessness.179 
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Over the remaining months of 1971, London’s Foreign Office continued to 
receive incriminating descriptions of army persecution:  
Despite official protestations of normalcy and the relative quietness of Dacca irrefutable 
evidence has reached me that a policy of extermination of Hindus is still being 
ruthlessly pursued in area south of Dacca….[D]aily executions…killing, burning 
looting and raping in country villages is corroborated by missionaries.…This wanton 
military action…has brought widespread terror and can only lead to continuing flight of 
refugees to India.  These specific reports are of course consistent with the pattern of 
punitive killing and destruction, aimed mainly but not exclusively at Hindus, which has 
been experienced by the greater part of the province since March.180  
  
These were supplemented by accounts of violence at the local level, as ordinary 
civilians amidst the atmosphere of ‘lawlessness’ were presented with the opportunity—
and possibly even incited—to profit from their neighbours.  Thus an informant told the 
South Asia Department in July:  
The pattern of repression was changing in East Pakistan.  At first it was the Army who 
had shot people and burned houses.  Recently though they had encouraged the local 
‘bully-boys’ in the villages to hand out justice themselves, with the result that Bengali 
Muslims out for personal gain had terrorised Bengali Hindus.…With the police 
dispersed, the Army did not bother about law and order as such.  They were intent only 
on bashing Hindus and Awami League officials.  Relations between Muslims and 
Hindus have never been ideal in East Pakistan, and the average peasant would be 
tempted to take advantage of a situation in which he could chase out Hindus in his area, 
and seize their property.181   
 
Presented with these images of chaos, officials in London began complaining 
that reports of the military campaign were laden with conflicting impressions, begging 
the question: who was ultimately responsible? The central government in West 
Pakistan?  Martial law authorities in the East?  Or perhaps, diverse army regiments were 
acting autonomously, according to the wishes of their individual commanders; perhaps 
there was no single authority.  British intelligence supports all three hypotheses, 
indicating at the very least that the Pakistani army, following the initial military 
operation, was no longer a uniform body with a consistent line of command.  
During High Commissioner Pickard’s exchanges with senior Pakistani military 
authorities in Islamabad in May 1971, for example, the latter expressed surprise and 
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even concern about the army’s ‘massive reprisals’182 in the East; martial law authorities, 
in this case, not the central government, appeared responsible.  The Army Chief of Staff 
in particular, Pickard reported, was ‘very worried about the problem of restraining the 
troops.  What I said confirmed all his own worst impressions.  He was horrified at the 
reprisals policy and thought it impossible to justify on any grounds at all’.183  ‘The 
officers by and large, especially the senior ones, are behaving in a reasonably correct 
manner and restricting themselves to maintaining law and order,’ an informant similarly 
told representatives in Dacca.  However, ‘the taste of blood, particularly the easy blood 
of unarmed civilians and the freedom to loot and rape, has gone to the heads of the 
Jawans [private soldiers] and NCOs…the officers are well aware of the fact that their 
troops are nearly out of control and must be handled very delicately’.184  
According to the Deputy High Commissioner, conflicting impressions existed 
because army regiments were, in fact, behaving contradictorily.  ‘It is acknowledged in 
some parts of the Army that there was some over-reaction on their part.…those who 
admit that mistakes were made are anxious that the Army should try to restore 
confidence in its discipline and fairness’.185  ‘Nevertheless the Army still faces the 
problem which it invoked to justify the early excesses—it must use its strength to 
compensate for its lack of numbers’.186  And so it continues to try to suppress the 
nationalist resistance by ‘instilling fear in the local populace….On the whole…while 
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there seems to have been some improvement in Army conduct the operational reasons 
which encourage a policy of terror still largely apply’.187 
As military regiments in the East continued to brutalize the local population, 
while a few attempted to restore order, the Khan government in the West took some 
measures to normalise the situation.  In June, representatives of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were permitted entry to plan a large-scale relief 
effort, establishing an embryonic international presence in the province.  The ban on 
foreign media was lifted at the same time.  ‘The great thing now,’ exclaimed the British 
Foreign Secretary to Parliament, ‘is that journalists will be able to move freely about 
East Pakistan, and we should, therefore, get a balanced picture.  It has been very 
difficult to establish the facts before’.188  Khan also professed in a nationwide broadcast 
that he was ‘conscious of the legitimate demands of the East Pakistanis’, and would 
resume transferring power to a civilian government by holding fresh elections (barring, 
that is, politicians who had engaged in ‘anti-state activities’).  ‘Normalcy,’ he declared, 
‘…can never return to a country without full participation of the people in its 
administration’.189   
As it turned out, new elections were never held, army terror tactics in the East 
continued and Khan’s public assurances, officials in London later noted, ‘had virtually 
no effect’.190  The Dacca representative’s report captured the situation:  
The MLA [Martial Law Authority] appears to have grossly misjudged the public 
reaction to the excesses it felt bound, or just wanted, to commit at the time….[It] may 
seek to induce a return to ‘normality’, but that does not prevent it from continuing to 
kill freely and openly; armed Bihari irregulars continue to do the work of the Army, 
terrorising the Bengalis and slaughtering the Hindus.  As I write this despatch, reports 
reach me daily of continued killings on a large scale, of wanton destruction of villages 
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and of widespread looting.  The MLA has so far shown itself to be unaware of any 
contradictions in this ‘policy’.191  
 
Ineffective as the President’s initiatives turned out to be, the British government 
remained convinced that they reflected a genuine desire on behalf of Pakistan’s 
leadership to reinstate peace to the province.  Moreover, the multiple forms of 
government and military behaviour strongly indicated that Pakistani authorities, while 
guilty of systematic persecution, had not prepared a long-term campaign of destruction 
against Bengalis.  Instead, the leadership appeared to have adopted an improvised 
approach—brutal but inconsistent—to dealing with unrest in East Pakistan, unrest 
intensified by the fact that various parties were engaging in violence.  Hence, the Dacca 
representative’s assessment that a ‘civil war has been waged with murderous severity’ 
appeared disturbingly apposite, as ‘each day of killing, of non-Bengalis by Bengalis, of 
Bengalis by non-Bengalis, merely stores up a darker future of more atrocities’.192 
By the middle of the year, Downing Street began shifting its attention to the 
increasing danger to regional security, as millions of refugees gathered in overcrowded 
camps along India’s northeastern border, and military tension between India and 
Pakistan mounted.193  According to a confidential report by United Nations officials 
sent to the Foreign Office, ‘[t]he refugees are in a pathetic state.  They are stunned and 
shocked by what has happened, what they have seen and heard, and their present plight 
and circumstances.  They are dejected and demoralized….a number are expressionless 
and unable to talk of their recent experiences’.194  
Meanwhile a British parliamentary delegation of four MPs, Arthur Bottomley 
and Reginald Prentice (Labour), and Toby Jessel and James Ramsden (Conservative), 
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had returned to London after visiting both wings of Pakistan and India’s refugee camps 
from June to July.  The situation, they told the Foreign Office, was grave: the army’s 
terror campaign in East Pakistan continued, prompting an unending stream of refugees 
into India; in such circumstances, a political resolution was unlikely.195  As one delegate 
recounted in the press:  
We left Rawalpindi with a personal assurance from President Yahya Khan that we 
could go where we liked and see what we like in East Pakistan.  It soon became clear 
just how much and just how little this meant….Wherever we went, we were on a 
conducted tour in the hands of the regime…listening to the official point of 
view….Nobody would admit publicly that the Army had committed excesses…. Any 
temptation to accept the smallest part of the Pakistan version would have been swept 
away by the awful reality of what is happening….People were shot or mutilated, houses 
and farms burned.  Women were raped, the soldiers had looted, or encouraged the non-
Bengalis to loot the Bengalis (and especially the Hindus).  This was still happening.196 
 
Amidst the turbulence, UN Security Council members had thus far remained 
silent197—paralysed by the tension between Soviet-backed India and a Pakistan firmly 
supported by the Nixon administration.  On 20 July 1971, in an unusual step, Secretary 
General U Thant personally appealed to the Council:  
The time is past when the international community can continue to stand by, watching 
the situation deteriorate and hoping that relief programmes, humanitarian efforts and 
good intentions will be enough to turn the tide of human misery and potential disaster.  I 
am deeply concerned about the possible consequences of the present situation, not only 
in the humanitarian sense, but also as potential threat to international peace and 
security.198  
 
Both the Foreign Office and Cabinet began swiftly assessing Britain’s options 
should violence in East Pakistan, until then viewed as a strictly internal affair, lead to 
international war and Security Council intervention.  Prime Minister Heath, acutely 
aware that ‘the rot which started in East Bengal may spread even more widely 
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throughout the sub-continent’,199 asked the Foreign Secretary to keep the situation 
‘under particularly close review’.200 
Officials in London, all the while, continued receiving reports written in what 
they agreed was a ‘bleak’ and ‘highly depressing’201 strain: ‘The situation in East 
Pakistan remains unsettled.  The guerrillas, supported from India, are becoming more 
effective and the Pakistan Army and irregulars continue punitive attacks on the local 
population.  Life is disrupted, communications are broken, the economy stagnating and 
the danger of famine growing’.202  ‘From information which we have received…it is 
pretty clear that the flow of refugees has not yet stopped, much less been 
reversed.…Continuing excesses by the Army are preventing any significant return to 
Pakistan’.203 
British files on East Pakistan, during the final tense months of 1971, swell with 
policy papers assessing how Britain could avert war on the subcontinent.  As a senior 
official advised the Prime Minister, Britain must now ‘cope only with the most 
immediate risk, i.e. the risk of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan….[I]f we 
do not act soon, we may well be too late to make any contribution to averting 
disaster’.204  On the whole, preventing hostilities was in Britain’s immediate national 
interests: ‘We can scarcely afford to contemplate sub-continental war, even in terms of 
British commercial interests, to say nothing of moral responsibility….We are already 
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paying, quite literally, for the West Pakistani excesses of last March; the relief bill after 
a major sub-continental war would be immensely greater’.205  
Britain’s Cabinet Defence Committee, for its part, carefully weighed the merits 
of pressing for UN intervention either in the form of mediation, observer missions or 
peacekeeping forces.206  The Committee consistently concluded that for Britain alone to 
promote any initiative ‘would be fruitless…unless we had some degree of support from 
the other permanent members’.207  Conscious of Britain’s restricted capabilities, the 
Prime Minister agreed—‘it was apparent that there was no immediate action we could 
take which was likely to improve the situation.  As regards possible action by the 
United Nations the paralysis of the Security Council in the present situation was 
clear’.208  
Silence at the Security Council was finally shattered on 3 December 1971, when 
Indian military jets began bombing both wings of Pakistan, in response to the latter’s 
‘pre-emptive strike’ against north-western Indian bases.209  Pakistan’s Ambassador to 
the UN declared at the Security Council that India was the aggressor, and must be 
stopped—“no political, economic, strategic, social or ideological considerations may be 
invoked by one state to justify its interference in the internal affairs of another state”.210  
Over the next two weeks, Council members submitted cease-fire resolutions generally 
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condemning India’s action in a series of emergency meetings; the USSR vetoed each 
one.  HMG abstained from voting ‘on the grounds that any resolution which was 
unacceptable to the Security Council and to the parties…was worthless in practical 
terms’.211  
During these final months, British officials continued to receive reports 
describing vicious acts of violence committed by various parties in East Pakistan.  One 
particularly graphic account documented acts of torture puportedly inflicted by West 
Pakistani security forces on suspected Bengali nationalists, ranging from adolescents to 
the elderly.212  Another, a pooled report written by British journalists in the region and 
sent by the Deputy High Commission, describes a systematic attack on Bengali 
professionals during the final days of the Indo-Pakistani war, allegedly carried out by 
Bengali paramilitary groups loyal to Pakistan.  (British representatives on the ground 
generally sought to distance themselves from media coverage of the crisis, which they 
viewed as an obstacle to political resolution and a potential catalyst of anti-British 
sentiment.  In this case, journalists suspected that Pakistani authorities were blocking 
their communication, so the Deputy High Commission agreed to transmit the report to 
London using diplomatic channels.) 
Cream of country’s intellectuals who should now be helping create infant state of 
Bangla Desh were found today, bayoneted garrotted or shot dead in a brickfield outside 
Dacca.  At least 125 doctors professors writers and teachers lay face down in blood red 
pools of water, all with their hands tied behind their backs..…Intellectuals were coldly 
executed about four days ago.  Most were arrested in their homes two days before 
Pakistan surrendered because they were leading opponents of Islamabad.213  
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After Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces on 16 December 1971, the Security Council 
finally managed to issue a resolution calling for a durable ceasefire and the retreat of all 
armed forces to their own territories.214  East Pakistan, within weeks, was 
internationally recognized as the state of Bangladesh.   
                                                
214 UN Security Council Resolution 307, 21 December 1971.  
 71 
III. BRITISH RESPONSES: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
i. DIPLOMACY 
The British government’s immediate reaction to the Pakistani military crackdown in the 
spring of 1971 was to communicate Britain’s neutrality and strict intention not to 
interfere.  “The government had absolutely no proposals for intervention in the 
conflict,” Edward Heath declared at a public gathering two days after the military 
crackdown. “Pakistan is a completely independent sovereign country, a member of the 
commonwealth and we must all regret immensely the strife taking place”.215  While 
‘regretting the loss of life in Pakistan,’ Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home similarly 
informed the House of Commons on 29 March 1971, ‘…this is an internal matter 
affecting relations between two parts of a sovereign country’; ‘We have no intention of 
getting involved’; ‘Everyone abhors violence. The President of Pakistan…was faced 
with a situation in which his country might have been divided in half. We must allow 
the Pakistan authorities to deal with the matter without our intervention’.216  
The British retained this position throughout the year. Alternatively, they 
suggested, while violence in their former colony could ‘not…be ended by external 
intervention…it may be helped by private advice’.217  British officials so offered 
Pakistan frequent ‘private advice’ in 1971 to influence various aspects of the crisis, 
particularly those that presented a clear threat to regional stability and the welfare of 
civilians. 
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State terror and civil war in East Pakistan 
Two weeks into the crisis, Edward Heath wrote to President Khan calling for an ‘end to 
bloodshed and the use of force as soon as possible, and a resumption of discussions’.218 
His otherwise frank appeal was couched in civilities: Khan must be ‘deeply distressed at 
the way things have turned out’; Heath sympathised with the ‘terrible dilemma in 
which…[he was] placed’.219  Although the government must find a political solution, 
Heath remained ‘a friend, and a friend of Pakistan’ and ‘fully recognise[d] that these are 
the internal affairs of Pakistan’.220 
In another letter, Heath warned the President that the efficacy of relief aid to 
Pakistan depended on an end to the violence: ‘While the situation in East Pakistan is an 
internal matter for the government of Pakistan, there is inevitably widespread 
international concern where so many human lives are at stake….it would be particularly 
bad if, in the months ahead, there was suffering and loss of life due to failure to 
distribute food and other supplies throughout East Pakistan.  This would immensely 
increase the difficulty of providing essential assistance to Pakistan’.221 
Weeks later, seeing that the crisis had not subsided, the Prime Minister was even 
more direct: ‘You [President Khan] will, I know, understand the shock…at the 
harrowing reports of the millions of refugees streaming into India and the heartrending 
tales of hunger, disease and death.  While we have held strictly to the view that the 
constitutional position is a matter for Pakistan, there are a growing number of others 
who want to raise it in the Security Council’.222  The Pakistan government, he 
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continued, should guarantee civil rights in East Pakistan, punish regional authorities 
guilty of ‘illegal acts’ and entreat the refugees to return.223  
Britain’s outgoing High Commissioner in Islamabad, Cyril Pickard, also 
pressured behind the scenes for a political solution.  Pickard, stationed in Pakistan since 
1966, was on familiar terms with many senior Pakistani officials, a fact reflected in the 
blunt manner in which he addressed them about the military campaign.  ‘Pakistan’s 
public relations abroad had been appalling,’ he told the Pakistani Foreign Secretary 
weeks after the crackdown—‘It was simply no use repeating that everything was 
normal’.224  The President’s intention to ‘evoke cooperation from the Bengalis…did not 
show in East Pakistan itself.  The behaviour of the troops even today, the burning of 
villages, the looting which was going on, went a fair way towards frustrating the 
President’s intentions….[M]ilitary action was in danger of becoming self-defeating’.225  
Crucially, he continued, foreign aid depended on the West having a favourable opinion 
of Pakistan.  ‘This made it particularly important for Pakistan’s public relations to be 
improved.  Of course all this was Pakistan’s own business but equally it was the 
business of Britain to decide how to respond to requests for aid and assistance’.226 
 Later, after visiting the East himself, Pickard spoke to Pakistan’s Foreign 
Secretary again.  ‘He [the Pakistani Foreign Secretary] questioned me anxiously about 
all I had seen.  He was particularly horrified that massive reprisals had been justified to 
me by both general Tikka and the Chief Secretary.  He was gravely concerned about the 
exodus of Hindus and the reasons for it’.227  Pickard also approached other officials who 
held key positions within the regime, including the ex-Governor of East Pakistan, the 
Cabinet Secretary and the Army’s Chief of Staff.  He told the latter: 
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 In view of our friendship, I was sure he would want me to speak frankly….What I said 
confirmed all his own worst impressions.  He was horrified at the reprisals policy and 
thought it impossible to justify on any grounds at all….I told him firmly what was 
wanted was a guarantee that everyone was accountable to the law and that no soldier 
could kill except in action without being held responsible.  Equally, no-one would be 
shot by the military authorities except as a result of some sort of trial or court martial.228   
 
Pickard’s appeals, as far as the records go, were the most explicit condemnations of the 
terror campaign ever expressed by a British official in 1971.   
The strong style of diplomacy evident in the High Commissioner’s efforts to 
stop the progress of state terror in East Pakistan was not dissimilar to that which his 
successor and the Foreign Office were to adopt weeks later when, in August 1971, it 
emerged that Pakistan intended to try the Awami leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for 
treason in a secret military tribunal.  (Rahman had been arrested by the Pakistani army 
in the early hours of 26 March 1971 and placed in custody in West Pakistan.) 
International outcry was immediate—several NGOs and influential world figures 
submitted protests to the United Nations or directly to Pakistan’s leadership.229  ‘This 
so-called trial,’ India’s Prime Minister told Edward Heath, ‘will only be used as a cover 
to execute Sheikh Mujibur Rahman….We appeal to you to exercise your influence with 
President Yahya Khan to take a realistic view in the larger interest of the peace and 
stability of the region’.230  The British government, Heath responded, was deeply 
concerned and ‘considering whether there is more that we can do at this stage in the 
hope of dissuading him from taking any irrevocable step’.231   
 Meanwhile, Laurence Pumphrey, the incoming High Commissioner to 
Islamabad, identified the countries, organisations and British individuals most capable 
of influencing Pakistan:   
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If international pressure is to have the desired effect of saving Sheikh Mujib’s life it will 
have to be skilfully exerted, and by the right people….The effect of private 
representations to President Yahya by known friends of Pakistan in Britain…should not 
be under-estimated, though care must be taken to avoid any hint of participation in an 
organised campaign, as well as any risk of eliciting the response that…[Britain]…is 
interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs….Whatever pressure is exerted should therefore 
be gradual and cumulative: we should not fire off all our ammunition at once.232 
 
The Foreign Secretary agreed: ‘Any further intervention on our part must…be 
undertaken swiftly’ and ‘the best prospect for further British intercession before the trial 
ends now lies in private approaches’.233  He thus instructed the High Commissioner to 
personally approach the Pakistani President on Mujib’s behalf, at the same time as he 
himself entreated key personalities, including Islamic leaders, to ‘perform…an 
invaluable service both to Pakistan and world peace’ by dissuading Khan from 
proceeding with the trial.234  The Foreign Office noted that its efforts matched those of 
other countries, including the major powers, and thus contributed to a chorus of discreet 
diplomacy.  
International pressure appears to have been successful; Pakistani authorities did 
not proceed with the trial and released Mujib in January of the following year (although 
circumstances surrounding the affair still remain unclear, and trial proceedings, if they 
exist, have never been made public).  Diplomatic representations made by Edward 
Heath and other British officials urging Pakistan’s leadership to reach a political 
solution in the East were less effective, as terror tactics and warfare between Bengali 
resisters and Pakistani forces continued throughout the year.  The British concern for 
regional stability and the welfare of civilians evident in these various initiatives, is 
nevertheless notable.  
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International warfare 
Towards the end of 1971, Heath began urgently contacting state leaders to defuse the 
escalating military tension between India and Pakistan.  In October, he met with Indira 
Gandhi in London who told him that India could no longer bear the strain of millions of 
refugees; she was under considerable pressure to take military action, but would not 
take the first step. ‘If my impression is correct that Mrs. Gandhi really feels that she has 
no room for manoeuvre’, Heath relayed to American President Nixon, ‘…it seems to me 
vitally important that this should be understood by President Yahya.  I am myself in 
correspondence with him….What I shall principally urge on him is how essential it is, if 
we are to avert disaster, that channels of communication should be opened between the 
Pakistan government and the Bangla Desh leaders’.235 
John Noble Graham, former Principle Private Secretary to Alec Douglas-Home, 
recalls attending a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Gandhi during the 
latter’s visit: ‘The British government’s main concern at that time was that the war [in 
East Pakistan] should not spread and that India should not intervene.  I remember Mrs 
Gandhi’s comment, almost a throwaway remark, that India would make no move until 
the snows came.  I am not sure that the significance of this struck us immediately, but 
what I think she was saying was that they would not intervene until the passes were 
blocked by snow so that China would not be able to react militarily’.236  
The Prime Minister, apprised of India’s militaristic intentions and apprehensive 
about its consequences, continued to urge Khan in a ‘spirit of friendship’ to initiate 
dialogue with East Pakistani leaders, reminding him as he did so, of ‘the very deep 
concern of the British Parliament and people at the tragic events which have taken place 
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in East Pakistan since March’.237  Above all, he counselled the President to avoid 
confronting the Indians and internationalising the conflict: ‘The urgent and crucial issue 
now is the risk of conflict with India….I am deeply anxious at the current state of 
tension which, I am convinced must be reduced if the danger is to be averted.  This has 
been uppermost in our minds throughout all the talks which we have had in the past few 
days with the Indian Prime Minister’.238  Advising Pakistan about how it should conduct 
itself in relation to India—its perennial foe with whom it had already been at war twice 
in the previous twenty-five years—appears a rather forward undertaking on the Prime 
Minister’s behalf.  What is more, by referring openly to his ongoing personal 
communication with Indira Gandhi, Heath risked strengthening Pakistan’s suspicion 
that Britain’s allegiance, contrary to its declarations of ‘friendship’ and ‘sympathy’, 
ultimately lay with India.  All at Britain’s South Asia Department were well aware of 
these potential threats to Anglo-Pakistani relations, yet they continued to craft Heath’s 
communications in this open vein, reflecting Britain’s unmistakable desire to prevent 
subcontinental war.  ‘I have written frankly,’ the Prime Minister reminded Khan, ‘…in 
the interest of understanding between us.  I will not conceal from you that…I remain 
deeply apprehensive.  It is a situation in which I find it hard to offer advice with 
confidence, but I am sure that you appreciate the vital importance…of not taking any 
action which might be misconstrued in Delhi’.239   
When India and Pakistan did eventually go to war, Britain tilted towards the 
former and refrained from backing the Pakistani-supported motion for a cease-fire at the 
Security Council.  The seemingly intimate dealings with India described above, would 
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indicate that Britain had, in fact, tacitly chosen sides before the advent of international 
warfare, lending support to Pakistan’s reservations in that regard.   
 
Post-conflict ‘holocaust’ 
British officials made concerted diplomatic efforts in relation to the crisis on one final 
occasion.  After the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971, when India’s 
victory over Pakistan seemed certain, London became concerned that Pakistani POWs, 
West Pakistani civilians and the Bihari population would be targeted for revenge in an 
independent Bangladesh.  Officials on the ground agreed: ‘a bloodbath in East Pakistan 
could begin by killings of anyone (Bengali or non-Bengali) who had collaborated in any 
way with the Pakistani Military Administration.  This could be extended pretty widely 
to include virtually anyone who had carried on with his normal work since 25 
March’.240  
By 8 December 1971, the Foreign Secretary began ‘to consider, along with other 
friendly powers, the possibility of action, whether on a national or an international basis 
to minimise the risks of the “Holocaust”.’241  He ordered regional officials to count the 
groups in question to ‘have the best possible picture of the size of the problem’.242  He 
also advised the British Mission to the UN to discuss the matter with representatives of 
the great powers, including the USSR and the UN secretariat.  ‘If a state of 
“Bangladesh” is to come into being,’ Douglas-Home reflected, ‘it should not begin its 
life with the appalling international reputation which would be the result of the 
massacres we fear’.243  Of course, ‘[i]t is idle to think that anyone could hope to prevent 
all revenge killings of which there are bound to be many.  But the Indians, given the 
                                                
240 FCO 37/897. Secret Minute ‘East Pakistan’, New Delhi—FCO, 15 December 1971. 
241 FCO 37/897. Secret Telegram 1111 ‘Delhi Tel 2999: East Pakistan’, FCO—UKMIS NY, 8 December 
1971. (Appendix Document 20) 
242 FCO 37/897. Secret Telegram 1111, FCO—UKMIS NY, 8 December 1971.  
243 FCO 37/897. Secret Telegram 1111, FCO—UKMIS NY, 8 December 1971.  
 79 
role they have played so far, must be asked to assume responsibility for ensuring that 
there are no wholesale massacres of civilians’.244  
Edward Heath, for his part, assured the new President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, 
who had appealed to world leaders for assistance, that Britain was acutely concerned 
about possible ‘revenge killings in the East’.245  Meanwhile British officials in the 
region, as instructed by London, sought to verify whether there genuinely was such a 
risk.  To supplement these efforts, Britain sent funds to a Red Cross delegation in East 
Pakistan that had arrived after the Indo-Pakistani war, hopeful that an international 
presence would deter further violence.246   
  Britain took no other action.  On 21 December 1971, after visiting enclaves of 
non-Bengalis in self-administered refugee camps on the outskirts of Dacca, the Deputy 
High Commissioner reported: ‘It seems clear that numbers of Biharis have been killed 
in Dacca….Rumoured figures wax wildly.…it is impossible to be certain of numbers, 
but it seems reasonably certain that there has been nothing on the scale of a 
massacre’.247  London, satisfied that the volatility of the situation was exaggerated, 
concluded that Pakistan was ‘over-playing the risk to the Biharis’248 to embarrass Indian 
and Bangladeshi leaders.  Moreover, on 4 February 1972, HMG recognized Bangladesh 
and thus ‘also recognized that its minority problems were…its own internal affair’.249  
‘Only if there is clear evidence that the Bangladesh Government are adopting a policy 
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of repression should we consider getting involved in public or private 
remonstrances’.250  
Stronger intervention, the government concluded, was ultimately not in Britain’s 
interests: ‘It is sad that we cannot do more for the Biharis,’ a Downing Street official 
told the PM, ‘but…more direct espousal of their cause would erode the position HMG 
have built up equidistant between India and Pakistan.  No other large power has 
succeeded in doing this and the Bihari issue could damage us even at this stage’.251  
Britain thus upheld a policy of non-interference, predicated on arguments similar to 
those it had employed to avoid intervening in the East Pakistan crisis itself: namely, that 
state sovereignty must be respected, Britain had limited influence and capabilities, and 
interference would jeopardise wider regional interests. Even so, HMG’s obvious 
concern and readiness to engage in ‘public or private remonstrances’252 had it become 
evident that the Bangladesh government was enacting repressive policies, reflects 
Britain’s willingness to employ robust diplomacy if necessary, for a chiefly 
humanitarian cause.   
 
Contextual factors underlying British diplomatic efforts 
Edward Heath and other British officials, throughout 1971, counselled Pakistani 
authorities to end the military campaign in East Pakistan, reach a political solution with 
Bengali leaders, and avoid war with India.  The government also expressed its concern 
that authorities on the subcontinent should protect vulnerable groups or persons from 
harm, and made efforts to establish whether that was in fact happening.  Officials 
carried out these initiatives alone, or multilaterally, in letters and personal meetings on a 
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formal and informal basis.  In many cases, Foreign Office officials carefully devised the 
content of this communication in advance, producing several drafts in consultation with 
one another.  The language and tone employed in such initiatives—particularly by the 
Prime Minister, whose generally candid messages to Pakistan’s President tended to be 
couched in conciliatory language—thus appear to have been formulated according to a 
number of considerations, described below.   
 
Sensitive post-colonial relations 
Of these considerations, the fragile nature of Anglo-Pakistani relations in the post-war 
era seems to have ranked first.  Foreign Office officials in the region often expressed the 
opinion that, unless Britain exerted private pressure with considerable discretion, the 
government risked alienating Pakistan’s leadership and losing influence in the region 
altogether.  Britain’s High Commissioner, for example, a few weeks after the 
crackdown, suggested that the Prime Minister could ‘try to bring home to the President 
that his course so far has been suicidal, [and] to set out for him the minimum 
concessions to world public opinion’, such as ‘the abandonment of terror tactics’ or ‘an 
end to anti-Hindu incitement’.253  However, he concluded, ‘[u]nilaterally to broach any 
of these concessions to the President would incur his abiding hostility….Yahya will not 
respond to moral lectures or arguments that his policy has been mistaken’.254  
Indeed, Edward Heath’s single reference to ‘bloodshed’, in an otherwise 
sympathetic letter, apparently did offend the Pakistani President.255  Britain’s High 
Commissioner, after delivering the message, thus dutifully explained that his Prime 
Minister had simply meant ‘that there had been bloodshed on both sides….Military 
                                                
253 UKNA: FCO 37/886. Telegram 765, Islamabad—FCO. 6 May 1971. (Appendix Document 17) 
254 FCO 37/886. Telegram 765, Islamabad—FCO. 6 May 1971. 
255 PREM 15/568.  Telegram 445, FCO—Islamabad, 7 April 1971. 
 82 
action involved bloodshed which made the attainment of his [Khan’s] ultimate objective 
more difficult’.256  
British officials were, moreover, keenly aware of their contentious role as ex-
colonialists in Pakistan.  As Richard Wood, the Overseas Development Agency 
Minister, put it:  
The problem facing the United Kingdom Government is—how can we do anything 
useful without simply being subjected to the charge by Pakistan that we are interfering 
in its internal affairs and possibly finding that anything we do is counter-
productive?...For Britain alone to try to act in a matter like this is to arouse all the 
suspicions that we are trying to be the imperial power again.257  
 
Anglo-Pakistan relations at the time of the crisis were, without question, volatile.  Two 
treatments of the British response published in Pakistan and referred to earlier (Aziz 
(1974) and Qureshi (1976)), point indignantly to the existence of institutionalised British 
‘hostility’ towards Pakistan.258  This argument is described in distinctly polemic 
overtones, reflecting the sensitivity, even emotion, with which some viewed the former 
colonial power.  Shehar Khan, in his more even-toned analysis of ‘Relations between 
Pakistan and Britain, 1947-1962’, attributes this sensitivity to circumstances surrounding 
the division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a division he explains, which was widely 
perceived in Pakistan as favouring India.259  Thus Qureshi’s assertion that ‘the manner in 
which Pakistan became independent has coloured all the political life of the State, [and] 
has governed Pakistan’s emotional and practical attitude towards Britain’, however 
heatedly recounted, appears to hold some truth.260  
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Laurence Pumphrey was confronted by the problems attending this complex 
relationship upon his arrival in East Pakistan in mid-1971; he too located their source in 
historical associations and confrontations:  
Of foreigners, we have the deepest knowledge of this part of the world and take the 
deepest interest in it.  Our views, as expressed in Parliament, the BBC or the press, are 
believed here to carry weight far beyond our own borders.  We can be attacked as 
former imperialists who frustrated the normal development of the Sub-Continent, 
always it has seemed favouring the Hindu against the Muslim.  That we are 
fundamentally hostile to Islam is apparent—to the eyes of the Islamic bigot—from all 
that lies between our participation in the Crusades and the Suez operation of 1956.…it 
is not surprising that after the Indians we are the first object of official displeasure.261  
 
So it was that, despite efforts by the Heath administration during the crisis to retain the 
confidence of Pakistani officials with declarations of ‘warmth’ and ‘friendship’, Britain 
was eventually accused of engaging in ‘anti-Pakistan activities’262 and, indeed, of 
interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs—the very charge they strove to avoid.  ‘[W]hen 
the time comes to pick up the bits of our shattered relationship,’ Pumphrey surmised 
well before the end of the crisis, ‘we shall find that some of them have been lost’.263  
British officials, it would appear, had some justification to treat relations with Pakistan 
during the period with caution.  
 
Avoidance of harmful repercussions  
The Foreign Office, aware that diplomatic representations on the subject of the crisis 
could threaten fragile relations, believed that stronger forms of pressure might have 
even greater ramifications.  Senior officials, for example, agreed that the Aid to 
Pakistan Consortium had substantial influence in the region, but that interrupting 
development aid in progress would be unwise.  A ‘complete cut-off’ may destroy the 
Pakistani economy and have ‘incalculable results’ in India, compounding the 
humanitarian crises both in Bengal and in East Pakistan.264  President Khan, on the 
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other hand, was likely to be more open to suggestions from ‘those he regards as 
friends’, namely the British government or the UN Secretary General.265  Seeing that the 
British government genuinely hope to assist, ‘whether or not the Secretary-General is 
prepared to make a further effort, HMG should’.266 
 ‘Agreed,’ responded the Prime Minister in a handwritten annotation to these 
suggestions,267 and sent a letter (drafted by the South Asia Department) to Khan stating 
that, ‘[u]nless confidence can be restored and the migration, for whatever reason, of 
millions of Pakistanis can be stopped, the world community will be frustrated in its 
efforts to help to solve this tragic human problem….Evidence towards a political 
solution will, more than anything else, ensure continued support for Pakistan’.268 
The Prime Minister’s message referred only obliquely to Pakistan’s persecution 
of East Pakistani civilians.  HMG tended to remain deliberately vague on this aspect of 
the violence (comments upon which readily caused offence)—thus, the refugees were 
fleeing ‘for whatever reason’.  However Heath’s message did imply that if political 
violence in the region did not end, consequences for Pakistan would be grave, including 
possible Security Council intervention.  Clearly, British officials were convinced that a 
combination of frank and cautious diplomatic representations from Pakistan’s ‘friends’ 
could have some effect.  Conversely, stronger measures like public or private 
admonitions or withdrawing aid entirely, might have jeopardized the safety of British 
nationals in the region, bred support for extremist groups, and damaged the West’s 
overall ability to pressure for an end to the hostilities—adverse consequences in no 
states’ interests.269  They accordingly advised the Prime Minister to exert pressure on 
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Khan throughout the crisis through carefully-worded confidential initiatives that 
retained, above all, a balanced tone: ‘We have sought…to continue the frank exchange 
between the Prime Minister and the President without unnecessarily antagonizing 
Yahya Khan’.270 
 
Confidence in state authorities 
British officials had a further motive for exercising discreet diplomacy: they believed 
that Pakistani authorities were genuinely seeking to resume political negotiations with 
representatives of East Pakistan.  Hence, Richard Wood’s conviction that although, ‘we 
all feel at the suffering which, not tens or hundreds of thousands, but literally millions 
of human beings have undergone as a result of these recent events,.…I remain 
convinced today—that the President was wholly sincere in his desire to establish a 
civilian democratic government’.271  The Foreign Secretary agreed—Pakistani 
authorities understood the importance of a political compromise.  Indeed, ‘I think that 
the President of Pakistan is convinced of this.  He tells us that he is busily engaged in 
trying to create the political structure on the ground in East Pakistan which will give the 
necessary confidence to the refugees to return’.272  The Cabinet Defence Committee was 
also certain that Britain should continue urging a political compromise, as Khan ‘is 
probably sincere in his wish for an agreed solution to the problem’.273 
As described earlier, Britain’s faith in Pakistani authorities was founded, in part, 
on various measures the central government took mid-year to improve conditions in the 
East, such as allowing in UNHCR representatives, lifting the media ban, and declaring a 
partial amnesty for junior Awami League politicians.  Khan reinforced these acts by 
                                                
270 PREM 15/569. Letter, FCO—10 Downing Street, 21 July 1971. 
271 FCO 37/887. Richard Wood, clipping of Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, col. 761-762, 14 
May 1971. 
272 FCO 37/889. Alec Douglas-Home, clipping of Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, col. 871, 
8 June 1971. 
273 UKNA: CAB 148/116. ‘Pakistan: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs’, 27 July 1971. 
 86 
declaring his intention to hold fresh elections.274  Although these steps ‘had virtually no 
effect’,275 the Foreign Office remained certain that they reflected the President’s desire 
to restore democracy to Pakistan, which was after all, consistent with the attempt to 
hold elections to begin with.  Britain’s private initiatives were thus crafted with 
requisite discretion: ‘We want to retain…what influence we still may have with Yahya 
Khan.…He is still, we believe, genuinely seeking a way out of the present impasse….to 
insist that the President has not done enough would merely turn him against us’.276  
 
Political realism and humanitarianism  
Foreign Office officials also believed that direct disapproval would simply not work—
‘Yahya,’ the High Commissioner in Islamabad insisted, ‘will not respond to moral 
lectures or arguments that his policy has been mistaken’.277  Interestingly, the High 
Commissioner seems to have disregarded his own advice: Cyril Pickard, after visiting 
East Pakistan, denounced the Army’s conduct directly to several senior military 
commanders; he felt those he spoke to were ‘greatly moved’ by all he said and was 
convinced they would ‘speak to the President and see what steps can be taken to remove 
the state of fear in East Pakistan and restore some confidence’.278  
Archer Blood, the American Consul General in Dacca in 1971, recalls in his 
memoirs having engaged in lengthy conversations with Pickard.  “Pickard told me…he 
had confronted Tikka directly with possibility that Pak Army [sic] is bent on 
extermination or removal of Hindus from East Pakistan.  Tikka had denied any such 
intention…Sir Cyril…told me he was going to report plight of refugees to General 
Hameed (Tikka’s superior) in effort to ‘make their welfare a touchstone of Army 
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intentions’.”279  Moreover, from talks he recently had with Yahya and other senior 
authorities, “Sir Cyril was convinced that they sincerely wanted to restore civilian rule 
but.…progress toward a political solution was hardly possible when the Army was 
busily burning villages in reprisal and killing Hindus throughout the province.  He 
said…he intended to urge on him [General Hameed] the absolute necessity of an end to 
Army violence as a pre-condition to political solution”.280  
Pickard’s exchanges with Pakistani authorities—according to the records—are a 
unique example of a British official bluntly pressuring Pakistan’s leadership to put an 
end to military operations in the East. It is interesting to note that the High 
Commissioner made these efforts after touring East Pakistan; Britain’s most senior 
representatives, stationed in the West, rarely travelled to gather first-hand impressions 
of the Eastern wing.  In this case, Pickard’s visit moved him from simply reporting the 
violence in East Pakistan to directly disapproving of it.  Of course, Pickard took these 
actions at the end of his tour in Islamabad, a tour that had lasted the standard duration of 
such postings.  He was, as he himself reported, simply taking leave of local authorities; 
many calls were ‘intended…to be purely…formal’,281 although it is clear that they went 
beyond that..  Ian McCluney, a former Foreign Office official and later High 
Commissioner to Sierra Leone, was not surprised that Pickard spoke so openly to 
authorities on this occasion.282  Diplomats, he explained, have difficulty accessing local 
authorities—they are constantly looking for the excuse to talk to them.  Pickard’s 
farewell calls provided a perfect opportunity to pressure for a change in Pakistani policy 
under the guise of protocol.  Indeed, London may have been aware that this could 
transpire; Foreign Office diplomats, McCluney confirms, are permitted to ‘vent’ their 
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grievances or ‘air their views’, within reason, about a country to which they have been 
posted as a matter of standard leave-taking procedure (particularly if their experience 
has been a volatile one, as in conflict-ridden areas).283  Whatever the case, the fact that 
the British High Commissioner in Islamabad condemned the Army’s actions to senior 
figures in the Pakistani administration is a noteworthy addition to Britain’s diplomatic 
efforts to defuse the crisis, and an example of the concerned and forthright diplomacy 
that officials were capable of pursuing.  
The Foreign Office exerted a similar style of diplomacy in August 1971, when 
upon hearing that Mujibur Rahman risked execution, they rapidly assessed how Britain 
could dissuade Pakistani leaders from taking the ‘irrevocable’284 step.  As with violence 
in the East, officials decided diplomatic channels would be most effective, and 
proceeded to make private representations.  Senior officials, including Alec Douglas-
Home, agreed to act swiftly, and approached those they believed had influence in 
Pakistan, including President Khan.  Their internal messages on the subject are imbued 
with urgency.  Indeed, Britain’s Foreign Secretary made it clear to Pakistan’s High 
Commissioner in London that he personally opposed trying the Awami leader, and 
while he was ‘an old friend of Pakistan…there was one thing which could very much 
upset this, namely the execution of Mujib’.285  
It is interesting to note that the flurry of diplomatic activity accompanying 
Mujibur Rahman’s trial in August and, later on, the fate of the Bihari population in 
December 1971, stands in contrast to the somewhat more reserved missives about 
political violence in East Pakistan.  Douglas-Home, for his part, expressed no ‘personal 
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opinion’286 on the matter, neither to Pakistani authorities nor in internal communications 
on the subject.   
Given that officials only occasionally exercised such concerted diplomacy, 
however, one can merely speculate upon their motives.  It was perhaps easier to process 
single clearly defined issues, like the fate of one man, or the risks to a vulnerable 
minority in peace time; systematic and spontaneous state slaughter—amidst civil war 
and interethnic violence—may simply have been too vast to assimilate.  The cases of 
Mujibur and the Biharis presented clear-cut and circumscribed moral, political and legal 
challenges, which offered the prospect of resolution.  The string of massacres in East 
Pakistan committed by all sides, as a former Foreign Office official said, were a 
‘blur’287—and, therefore, more difficult to digest, and infinitely more difficult to 
respond to in any manner that might have been considered effective.  
In the case of Mujibur Rahman’s trial, moreover, while humanitarianism may 
have been a factor, officials believed a verdict ending in execution would severely 
disrupt regional stability and spark widespread public outcry.  As Peter Smith recalls, 
Britain’s High Commissioner in Islamabad was asked to approach Pakistan’s President 
‘to ensure he [Mujib] was being treated decently….just to express worry, really.  And I 
suppose it was so that Douglas-Home could say in Parliament, “We have instructed our 
High Commissioner to express our concern”.288  ‘[Y]ou have to be able to say you’re 
doing these things to Parliament’.289   
Diplomatic intervention on behalf of Sheikh Mujib, in other words, appears to 
have been essentially strategic.  ‘You can’t get personal, you just can’t—it would be 
disastrous,’ declares Smith. ‘The High Commissioner was sent to Yahya to “make 
representations” is the diplomatic phrase, and he did, and that was that.  But it wasn’t 
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“you must let him go”, it was just “for goodness sake, can you assure us that he’s 
decently treated”?’290 Britain, moreover, was not acting alone—governments 
worldwide, including the United States, were pressuring Pakistan to desist, and 
multilateral action was considered infinitely less controversial. 
Finally, officials appeared to feel that discreet diplomatic measures could earn 
‘political points’ for their country and boost the government’s image at home.  This is 
supported by Britain’s subsequent encounter with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who, after 
his release from Pakistan in January 1972, stopped unexpectedly in London en route to 
Dacca.  Senior British officials welcomed him warmly, confidentially sponsored him 
for the evening and sent him to Dacca on an RAF aircraft.  They did this, they wrote, ‘in 
view of the political advantages to be gained by the provision of the Comet, which was 
strongly supported by the FCO….It was a very notable success on our part that it was a 
British aircraft which brought Sheikh Mujib home’.291  Political strategising and 
humanitarianism, as it were, often intersected in Britain’s diplomatic efforts in 1971. 
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Summary: diplomatic efforts 
British officials regularly employed discreet diplomacy during the crisis in order to 
encourage Pakistani authorities to resume political negotiations, avoid international war 
and ensure the welfare of civilians, especially vulnerable minorities. There is no 
evidence that the government sought to approach Pakistan’s leadership using non-
diplomatic channels, via for example, commercial, media, military or security services.  
Indeed, officials appeared wary of using these, particularly the media (BBC), whose 
critical reporting of events it was feared might jeopardise the safety of British nationals 
in the region and erode Britain’s claims of neutrality.  Traditional diplomacy thus 
appeared to be HMG’s preferred strategy, as far as the records go. 
The tone that pervaded the greater part of this communication shifted between 
frankness, reserve and empathy, all the while seeking to exert discreet pressure.  On the 
whole, British officials genuinely wished to ease suffering on the subcontinent; they 
believed that the Pakistani government was trying to achieve peace, and that strong 
pressure would jeopardise British interests in the region (including nationals), as well as 
Britain’s ability to influence Pakistan—influence which was tenuous in light of the 
sensitive nature of post-colonial relations.   
Robust diplomatic activity around an apparently humanitarian issue was rare, 
but it also took place.  As Cyril Pickard was to describe years later at a seminar on 
contemporary British diplomacy, it is precisely this type of variegated 
communication—which aims to influence by alternating conciliation with pressure that 
is a key function of the diplomat.292  It is evident from government records that the 
British sought to do just that in the case of the East Pakistan crisis, motivated by 
considerations ranging from political realism to basic human concern. 
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ii. DOMESTIC RESPONSES & THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE 
‘Britain has enduring influence on the subcontinent….Will the Foreign Office contrive privately 
even one formal expression of horror and regret?  No single act at this stage will end the 
tempest of Bangla Desh….But this very fact makes all protests, however meek, however genteel, 
a contribution to human dignity, and it makes silence shameful’.  
                                   —‘A Time to Speak Out’, The Guardian, 3 April 1971293 
 
Throughout the crisis, Foreign Office officials monitored British media coverage of 
events and retained clippings of newspaper articles, the majority of which were entered 
in a file entitled ‘News Items on East and West Pakistan’.294  Their apparent aim in 
collecting this material was not to gain insights into the crisis itself,295 but to ‘gauge the 
temperature’296 of the print media, which constituted the British public’s main source of 
information.  The government’s overall assessment, evinced in various documents, was 
that this ‘temperature’ was moderately to overtly pro-East Pakistani—as articles tended 
to be critical of alleged atrocities committed by all parties, yet those describing state 
terror against Bengalis were notably lengthy and censorious.  This appeared to be the 
case, moreover, across the political spectrum, with both left leaning and right leaning 
newspapers pressuring the British government to show a level of solidarity with East 
Pakistan, short of direct involvement.297 
 Harun Or-Rashid’s essay, ‘British Perspectives, Pressures and Publicity 
Regarding Bangladesh, 1971’, includes a statistical survey of media reports which 
supports the government’s assessment.  Rashid writes: ‘The sheer amount of coverage 
in the British media during the period of 10 months (from March to December) can be 
indicated by their frequent editorials: The Times 29, The Daily Telegraph 39, The 
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Guardian 37, the Financial Times 13 and The Observer 15….the British media did not 
totally favour the idea of complete separation.  Their general preference was a speedy 
political solution within the framework of united Pakistan’.298  Bangladesh Documents 
(Dhaka University Press 1999), a 700-page volume containing scores of British press 
articles on the crisis, illustrates a similar picture.299   
 Both of these sources, it should be noted, are problematic.  Or-Rashid, for 
example, does not state where he obtained the large number of media articles he 
purports to have surveyed, nor does he provide any analysis of the latter.  Meanwhile, 
Bangladesh Documents was originally published in the autumn of 1971 in collaboration 
with the Indian Ministry for External Affairs, as the threat of Indo-Pakistani war loomed 
closer.  The introduction to the original version, and that of the revised and expanded 
edition cited here, is unsurprisingly in favour of Bangladeshi independence both in tone 
and in the selection of clippings.300  Yet upon cross-referencing the articles cited by 
both sources with the British government’s own media files, it was found that all three 
contain a similar selection—thus reinforcing HMG’s assessment that British media 
coverage was indeed largely sympathetic to the East Pakistani cause.  (British officials, 
moreover, claimed to be gathering ‘as a wide as possible a selection’301 of reports on the 
crisis, and none of those they kept on file expressed support for the West Pakistani 
regime.)  
The centre-left Guardian appeared to be at the forefront of this reporting; it 
declared at the outset of the crisis that the Pakistani President was guilty of: 
filling his air waves and press with evasive propaganda, [and] deporting every journalist 
he could find.  But a few independent reporters escaped this net and their stories—just 
emerging—reek with horror: crowds indiscriminately machine gunned, student hostels 
razed by shells, shanty towns burned and bombed, civilians shot dead in their beds. 
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…[W]e…know first-hand and reliably that many unarmed and unready Bangalis [sic] 
have died….Those—like Britain—who retain some prestige of influence [sic] in the 
area, should spend it openly and forcefully.  The fate of Dacca is a crime against 
humanity and human aspirations; no one should stand mealy-mouthed by.303 
 
Those at the Foreign Office monitoring the vigorous press coverage worried about the 
rousing effect it would have on the public.  They promptly informed the Prime Minister 
days into the conflict that public sympathy for Bengalis was building as ‘the press are 
beginning to carry eye-witness accounts of the slaughter in the East Wing and as more 
people leave East Pakistan these reports can be expected to increase’.304  The Foreign 
Office also counted, circulated and filed protest letters on East Pakistan, noting with 
concern how widely-read newspapers say that ‘there is a widespread feeling among 
MPs at Westminster that Britain should “do something much more decisive”.’305   
At the same time, the Prime Minister was informed that sections of London’s 
Bengali community had begun to demonstrate regularly in front of Pakistan’s High 
Commission, as well as in Trafalgar Square, Hyde Park and other public spaces 
throughout the capital.306  Private citizens who wrote to the government directly urged it 
to condemn the violence, warning that ‘continued silence and inaction will ultimately 
prove infinitely more dangerous than definite but wise action’.307  Officials in the South 
Asia Department rarely reflected (at least on record) on the sources of this protest, but 
appeared more concerned with gauging its extent and predicting its effect on public 
opinion.  From what can be ascertained (from signatures or return addresses preserved 
in the files, for example), civil protest in Britain appeared to be coming primarily from 
the East Pakistani migrant population in London, with a minority from white middle-
class citizens of British origin.  The level of organisation and communication between 
those who protested is unclear, although government officials noted the existence of 
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‘pro-Bangla Desh organisations in this country’ of apparently mixed membership.308  
(Or-Rashid, for his part, contends that influential Bengali figures resident in Britain 
attempted with some success to organise the ‘the most amorphous and fragmented 
Bengali community’.309) 
Parliamentarians of the opposition also submitted several motions petitioning the 
government to act more robustly.310  ‘They are indicative,’ the FCO noted, ‘of the 
amount of interest being shown by MPs in Pakistan’.311  Some pressured the Prime 
Minister in Parliament to denounce the violence publicly: ‘Is it not time HMG made an 
outright and forthright condemnation of the bloody outrages now being committed by 
the Pakistani Army on the East Pakistanis?’312  ‘Are not the reports coming out of East 
Pakistan so outrageous that some comment is called for?’313  Others pressed the 
government to raise the matter at the Security Council as a threat to international peace 
and security.  ‘By many standards, this must be a situation which seriously threatens the 
peace of that region…Britain should [be]…taking an initiative and invoking the 
political good offices of the United Nations, working not simply on the relief side 
but…urgently and actively…for the peace and security of Asia’.314  
HMG, while publicly maintaining their neutrality, considered how to respond to 
this pressure—which, to their dismay, intensified as the conflict wore on, as segments 
of the British media, political opposition, and the public began accusing Pakistan of 
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grossly violating international human rights norms, and even of genocide.  The Sunday 
Times, most famously, allotted a three-page spread to Anthony Mascarenhas’ graphic 
article entitled ‘Genocide’ in large bold typescript.  Mascarenhas, an Indian-born 
journalist who lived in West Pakistan, was given leave by Pakistani authorities to 
undertake an army-escorted tour of the Eastern wing in April 1971.  Shocked by his 
experience, Mascarenhas fled to Britain where the widely circulated centre-right Sunday 
Times agreed to publish his account of the violence:  
I saw Hindus, hunted from village to village and door to door, shot off-hand after a 
cursory ‘short-arm inspection’ showed they were uncircumcised.  I have heard the 
screams of men bludgeoned to death in the…civil administration headquarters in 
Comilla.  I have seen truck loads of other human targets and those who had the 
humanity to try to help them hauled off ‘for disposal’ under the cover of darkness and 
curfew. I have witnessed the ‘kill and burn missions’…I have seen whole villages 
devastated by ‘punitive action’.  And in the officers mess at night I have listened 
incredulously as otherwise brave and honourable men proudly chewed over the day’s 
kill. ‘How many did you get?’  The answers are seared in my memory.  All this is being 
done, as any West Pakistani officer will tell you, for the ‘preservation of the unity, the 
integrity and the ideology of Pakistan’.315  
 
The article, with its unsettling descriptions of state persecution (and also, incidentally, 
of massacres committed by Bengalis316), appeared to firmly entrench British public 
opinion against Pakistan’s leadership.   
After its appearance, Toby Jessel, a former Conservative MP for Twickenham 
and member of the July 1971 India/Pakistan parliamentary delegation, recalls receiving 
scores of letters from his constituency requesting more be done to stop the progress of 
violence in East Pakistan.317  The South Asia Department, for its part, recorded that it 
had received ‘76 letters from MPs…, 184 letters and telegrams from the public…, 14 
petitions and 220 copies of a letter which appeared in The Guardian…headed “East 
Bengal Atrocities”,’ as well as a plea to the Prime Minister, ‘Please do not allow Britain 
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to become an accomplice in genocide’.318  These letters variably demanded that Britain 
suspend aid to Pakistan and publicly condemn the government, recognize ‘Bangladesh’ 
or raise the matter at the Security Council. ‘None of the letters,’ the Department noted, 
‘have offered unqualified support for the British Government; they have all asked for a 
stronger line.…demand[ing] that more should be done’.319  
British representatives in Washington also told the Foreign Office that they had 
been ‘flooded with copies’ of a letter decrying West Pakistan’s ‘systematic genocide’ 
against Bengalis.320  ‘We thought it best to consult you, since this letter may be part of a 
world-wide “Bangla Desh” lobbying campaign and you may already have decided our 
line of reply’.321  The Foreign Office responded:  
We have of course been flooded with letters on this subject here from members of the 
public, and it has been our policy not to reply at all.  Sheer weight of numbers would 
have precluded us from sending individual replies, and…a stereotype reply which did 
not answer the points raised in individual letters would do more harm than good.  
  
Hence they instructed Washington to ‘follow our practice of leaving the majority 
unanswered’,322 effectively not reacting to allegations of state-endorsed atrocities (apart 
from defensively) in a manner that was to be characteristic of the Foreign Office 
throughout the affair. 
To the government’s consternation, the opposition, led by former Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, persisted in raising the matter: ‘The whole House and…all our 
constituents throughout the country regard this in terms of sheer scale as the worst 
human tragedy that the world has known since the war, apart from war itself’;323 ‘There 
is some feeling in this country that there seems to have been a lack of urgency over this 
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matter…[and] rather too much concern with “protocolaire”.’324  International observers, 
Wilson had proclaimed earlier, should be sent ‘to provide some guarantee that there was 
no genocide’ and ‘report to the world outside about conditions in East Pakistan and 
about the very grave accusations of murder of civilian populations’.325 
Finally, on 15 June 1971, John Stonehouse, the Labour MP for Wednesbury, 
submitted a motion to condemn violence in East Pakistan explicitly as genocide and a 
threat to world peace punishable under international law.  Signed by 210 MPs (out of 
630), the motion ‘Genocide in East Bengal and the Recognition of Bangladesh’ 
proclaimed:  
the widespread murder of civilians and the atrocities on a massive scale by the Pakistan 
Army in East Bengal, contrary to the United Nations Convention on Genocide signed 
by Pakistan itself, confirms that the military government of Pakistan has forfeited all 
rights to rule East Bengal…; therefore…the United Nations Security Council must be 
called urgently to consider the situation both as a threat to international peace and as a 
contravention of the Genocide Convention.326  
 
The Foreign Office, obliged to heed allegations of genocide in East Pakistan, 
swiftly contacted its UN Economic and Social Department for an analysis.  The 
analysis, which was included in its entirety in the Foreign Secretary’s 23 June East 
Pakistan debate notes, provides several succinct—but only partial—insights into the 
British government’s perceptions of the conflict.327  Pakistan, it begins, ratified the 
Genocide Convention in 1957; the UK ratified in 1970.328  Article V outlines one of the 
signatories’ central duties: “to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of 
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genocide”.329  Britain, Pakistan and all other contracting parties were under this 
obligation in 1971.  
Under Article IX, disputes between states about the Convention, ‘including…the 
responsibility of a state for genocide, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the Parties of the dispute’.330  Before the Convention was 
passed, however, several countries including India (but not the UK or Pakistan) made 
the problematic reservation that ‘the agreement of all Parties to the dispute was 
essential’—including the state accused.331  
If a person (not a state) is charged with genocide, Article VI stipulates that they 
may be tried either by a state tribunal in the territory where the crime was committed, or 
by an international penal tribunal.  However, the analysis pointed out, ‘there is, as yet, 
no international penal tribunal’, and as a British expert had recently noted, ‘the effective 
implementation of the Genocide Convention and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
depended upon the establishment of an international penal tribunal.  No one has ever 
been tried by a Government specifically for a breach of any of these Conventions’.332  
After all:  
genocide was not a crime which an individual could commit, or indeed a small group of 
individuals. It was a crime which could only be committed with the resources available to 
Governments and if genocide was committed within the state of a Contracting Party it 
was…nonsense to suppose…that there would be a trial ‘by a competent tribunal of the 
state in the territory of which the act was committed’.333  
 
In light of these considerations:  
It could be held that events in East Pakistan show that the Government of Pakistan are in 
breach of the Genocide Convention; it would certainly be difficult to argue they are not. 
But the question is academic since the other Government most closely involved, India, 
will not bring the matter to the International Court for the reasons explained above [i.e. it 
is doubtful Pakistan would agree to appear]—and it is highly unlikely that any other 
Government will attempt to do so.334 
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The UN department of the Foreign Office concluded that the Pakistani army’s 
actions in its Eastern province may have constituted a systematic attempt to destroy 
Bengalis—‘it would certainly be difficult to argue they are not’.  However, only 
governments ‘closely involved’ (a category the British apparently did not feel they 
belonged to) could reasonably have been expected to pursue such allegations.  Such 
pursuit was impossible, in any case, in the absence of an international penal tribunal.  
By focusing exclusively on the difficulties of pursuing alleged breaches of the Genocide 
Convention (effectively disregarding other obligations and options open to 
signatories335), this narrow reading provided the British with added justification to 
refrain from acting overtly against the Pakistani administration.  And if parliamentarians 
pressured them to reconsider the matter, the Foreign Secretary’s private notes provided 
him with prepared replies to defend the government’s position: 
Situation in East Pakistan 
1. [If pressed] We cannot, from direct evidence available to me, confirm allegations of 
army brutality against Hindus in East Pakistan. 
 
Genocide 
18. It would serve no useful purpose to raise the matter under the Genocide Convention. 
Under Article VI of the Convention, persons charged with genocide are in the first 
instance to be tried either by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the 
act was committed or by an international penal tribunal. There is as yet no international 
penal tribunal. (We have pointed out that the effective implementation of the Convention 
is dependent upon the establishment of such a tribunal.)336  
 
The government, having concluded that pursuing allegations of genocide was pointless 
under current circumstances, did not analyse the matter from this perspective further, 
apart from on one other occasion (addressed below).  The Labour Party motion, 
according to parliamentary custom, was not debated despite repeated requests to do so 
by the opposition.  ‘An “Early Day” Motion is not normally debated unless the 
Government provide time for it’, the Parliamentary Clerk informed officials who were 
                                                
335 As contained in Article I and Article VIII of the Convention.   
336 FCO 37/888. ‘Notes for supplementaries’ prepared for the Foreign Secretary’s use at the 23 June 1971 
House of Commons debate on East Pakistan. (Appendix Documents 11a and 11b) 
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preparing a brief to the Leader of the House on Motion 592.337  ‘Members who support 
the objects of this Motion are likely to press the Leader of the House…to provide 
Government time for a debate.  He will usually want to refuse politely’.338     
Labour’s pressure on Heath, to be certain, was rooted in opposition party 
politics.  As Peter Catterall points out in the preface to The Labour Party in Opposition, 
1970-1974, parties in opposition are ‘reduced…to reacting to policies they do not make 
with as much intellectual and ideological coherence as they can muster….In the power 
vacuum of opposition,…policy options are frequently the only bones to chew over’.339  
Commenting on this observation, former Labour leader Michael Foot (a member of the 
Shadow Cabinet in 1971), conceded that although the party may have taken advantage 
of the conflict to embarrass and pressure their parliamentary rivals, they did not view 
events (especially alleged atrocities against civilians) in purely instrumental terms.340  
Rather, he maintained, Labour called on the Heath administration to take a stronger 
stance on the crisis because it was keenly felt that there were moral obligations to do so, 
and several party members sympathised with India, a country with socialist leanings, 
then severely burdened by the refugee exodus from East Pakistan.  Many, moreover, 
had been concerned about instability in Pakistan for years, and feared the conflict in the 
East would trigger major regional dislocation extending well beyond the borders of the 
subcontinent.341  
This mixture of motives, it would appear, led Labour MPs to continue urging the 
government to take firm action against Pakistan’s leadership throughout the crisis, and 
John Stonehouse in particular, continued to depict the army campaign as a 
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contravention of international humanitarian law.  ‘I believe that there is an opportunity 
for the international community to play its part in reducing the atrocities which are 
undoubtedly taking place,’ Stonehouse insisted in Commons on 4 November 1971.342  
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to armed conflicts not of an 
international character,343 he went on, provided that “Persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their 
arms…shall…be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, religion or faith, sex…or any other similar criteria”.344 
  ‘We know,’ Stonehouse declared, ‘that the Convention is not being adhered to 
by the Pakistan Army.…From reports coming out of East Bengal, we know that when a 
bridge is blown up or a road is mined or there is an attack on Pakistan Army units, the 
Pakistan Army is going out to nearby villages and destroying them, killing the men, 
[and] raping the women….Every day, 20,000 to 30,000 people are crossing the 
frontier…because of the atrocities perpetrated by the Pakistan Army in its attempt to 
“pacify” the area that it would like to control.  This is illegal conduct’.345  
In response to these allegations, on 16 December, the last day of the Indo-
Pakistani war, the UN Department of the Foreign Office issued a second legal opinion 
‘for the record’: ‘Although the morality of the Pakistanis claim is, to say the least, 
questionable, they can claim that, in November, there was no “armed conflict” in East 
Pakistan and that their army was merely quelling “dissidents”….In these circumstances, 
                                                
342 UKNA: FCO 37/1016 entitled ‘Civil Unrest in Bangladesh: Persecution of non-Bengalis in 
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Parliamentary Debates, Commons, cols. 384-385, 4 November 1971.  
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the answer to Mr. Stonehouse’s assertion “this is illegal conduct”…is “not so, so far as 
the terms of the Geneva Conventions are concerned”.’346  As for Britain:  
The suggestion...that HMG should exert pressure on the Government of Pakistan to 
adhere to the Geneva Conventions might, if pressed, have caused us embarrassment.  
Under Article 1...‘The high contracting parties undertake…to ensure respect for the 
present Convention in all circumstances’....It could…be argued that the words ‘in all 
circumstances’ oblige us to press governments in the way Mr Stonehouse suggests.  
Had Mr Stonehouse pressed his point, we would presumably have refused to intervene 
with the Pakistan authorities, because we lack the power to intervene effectively, 
because we interpret Article 1 more narrowly, and because…[it] would have harmed 
HMG’s interests in Pakistan.  However reasonable this answer may be, it might well 
have precipitated public controversy.347   
 
Such controversy, no doubt, would have been particularly unwelcome in view of the 
Department’s conclusion that:  
it is arguable that the activities of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan constituted 
a form of genocide, as defined in Article II of the Convention….Moreover, Article VIII 
states that ‘any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the UN Charter as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide…’.  It has been open to Mr Stonehouse 
to press HMG to take action against Pakistan in the United Nations under the Genocide 
Convention.  Fortunately he has not asked us to do so.348  
 
The Foreign Office’s second analysis of the question of genocide in East Pakistan 
and other crimes under international humanitarian law refers directly to a state’s options 
and obligations to pursue alleged violations.  In the case of genocide, this was to be 
done by means of the (vague) route of ‘call[ing] upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action…as they consider appropriate’.  This stands in 
contrast to the earlier analysis, which made little mention of (and in fact, seemingly 
ignored) such obligations and recourses.  Regardless of their differences, both analyses 
propound a similarly narrow reading of the duties required of signatories in the face of 
state-endorsed atrocities, which in the case of East Pakistan, both agree likely 
constituted a form of genocide.  
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The Foreign Office’s restrictive interpretation of international humanitarian law 
supported the Heath government’s basic unwillingness to acknowledge crimes 
committed by the Pakistani state.  The government’s refusal to do so was largely based 
on an attempt to legitimize their commitment to non-interference, fuelled by concerns 
for national interests, a general sense of impotency, and fear of adverse consequences; 
yet it was also linked to their perception of the crisis as a civil war or armed struggle on 
‘both sides’.  For the conclusion that the Pakistani government may have been guilty of 
genocide was simply not enough to counteract the impression made by multiple 
intelligence reports that described not only systematic violence by the army, but also 
spontaneous violence committed by and against various parties in East Pakistan.   
Indeed, according to some of these reports, even the initial crackdown on East 
Pakistan (arguably the most methodical portion of the repression) was particularly 
ruthless because it ‘was more revenge than purely military action’ for earlier atrocities 
committed by Bengalis during periods of political agitation.349  Thus, notwithstanding 
the Foreign Office’s two incriminating assessments of the situation, the official 
explanation remained both publicly and (for the most part) privately:  
A punitive campaign of some brutality was waged in which the intention was clearly to 
cow the Bengalis into submission and to impose complete and direct army control over 
the province. Atrocities have since been committed by both sides and communal violence 
has been rife; old quarrels between Muslims and Hindus, and between Bengalis and the 
Bihari Muslims…have been revived.350   
 
Variations of this description of civil war—similar to that of the Foreign Secretary’s to 
Cabinet351—appeared regularly in British files throughout the crisis.  It also appeared, 
nearly verbatim, in a Foreign Office brief to the British parliamentary delegation which 
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toured Pakistan and India from June to July 1971, and to the British delegation to the 
September 1971 Inter-Parliamentary Conference.352   
In light of this interpretation, openly condemning the systematic aspects of the 
army’s actions, reprehensible as these may have been, would not only have jeopardised 
British interests, it would have promoted a distorted picture of the conflict and placed 
undue emphasis on the actions of a sovereign government.  As former British civil 
servants contend: a diplomat has the responsibility to judge what the best means are to 
achieve a desired outcome, and the most effective tool is usually discreet diplomacy, 
that is, soft approaches and subtle messages.  How useful would accusations, sanctions, 
or legal action under the Genocide Convention have been to resolve brutality for which, 
at the time, there was no clear responsibility?  Ultimately, what the British did not 
acknowledge was that casting the crisis as primarily a civil war promoted an equally 
distorted account of events. 
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iii. AID 
Intent upon maintaining distance and not interfering, the Heath administration’s 
principal (publicised) activity with regard to the East Pakistan crisis was in the fields of 
development aid and charitable humanitarian relief.  Needless to say, the two while 
overlapping in some respects, are distinct activities.  All the same, Meghna 
Guhathakurta notes that long-term development aid is often mistakenly viewed as a 
form of charity the basic purpose of which is humanitarian.  ‘Although it is possible to 
conceive of an element of humanitarian concern in British aid policy to Bangladesh, 
especially in cases of immediate response to disasters and natural calamities where the 
negotiations and mediation of different interests are kept minimal due to the immediacy 
of the need, most long-term aid cannot be termed humanitarian’.353  The following 
section describes and analyses Britain’s aid-related activities in 1971 with these 
distinctions in mind. 
 
Humanitarian relief aid  
British intelligence in May indicated a major refugee crisis was gathering on East 
Pakistan’s borders with the Indian provinces of Tripura, Assam and West Bengal.  The 
Foreign Secretary told Cabinet that according to Indian estimates, over three million 
East Pakistanis had already fled: ‘Nearly all the refugees were Hindus; and the flow to 
West Bengal would not be reversed until the fear of persecution had subsided….There 
was considerable concern in this country about the[ir] plight’.354   
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MAP B:  
Location of Refugee Camps in Indian provinces bordering East Pakistan, November 1971355 
 
 
HMG officials, under public and parliamentary pressure to respond to one of the era’s 
greatest population displacements, debated what to do.  Should they send relief aid to 
India?  Would such an undertaking offend Pakistan’s leadership?  Finally, would aid 
create refugees?  Would it, as the High Commissioner in Islamabad feared, ‘act as a 
magnet to induce very large population movements which may leave the international 
community saddled with a refugee responsibility comparable to that in the Middle 
East’? 356  
                                                
355 Source: UNHCR, ‘Rupture in South Asia’, Chapter 3, in The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty 
Years of Humanitarian Action (UNHCR: 2001), 61.  
356 PREM 15/568. Telegram 759 ‘Relief’, Islamabad—FCO, 6 May 71. 
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British officials in India disagreed: ‘Aid provided in camps is only bare 
minimum at best and is unlikely to attract refugees not under further compulsions of 
fear of fighting, army retaliation or sheer destitution.  Those who have seen camps say 
they are places of utter human misery, with Indian administration unable to cope and on 
verge of collapse’.357  British Oxfam workers similarly described how a ‘high 
proportion of refugees in areas visited appeared to be women and children including 
many Hindus.  Some refugees had been shot and others looted by Pakistan Army while 
making for the border.  Primary motive of flight appeared to be continuing fear of 
massacre by Army.  Certainly none could have been attracted by meagre relief available 
in Indian camps’.358  
Satisfied that sending relief aid would not aggravate the crisis, HMG began 
discreetly assisting British charities in the region with transport, medical supplies and 
trained staff.  In June, they donated £1 million in cash and £750,000 worth of food to 
the UNHCR, the focal point of a newly mounted ‘strictly humanitarian’ UN-NGO 
operation, which aimed to assist the Indian government in caring for the millions 
crowding its borders.359  India ‘faced with a problem of refugees which distorts her 
economy and stretches her resources to the limit and beyond,’ declared Douglas-Home 
in support of the operation at the UN General Assembly, ‘….[had] rightly asked for 
international help’.360  By the end of the month, HMG’s relief contributions totalled 
£8m which represented 30-40% of total donations at the time; this, the FCO noted, far 
exceeded that of any other Western European country.361  
The UN Secretary General, also in June, managed to establish a counterpart 
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operation in East Pakistan—UNEPRO (UN East Pakistan Relief Operation)—to 
distribute international aid to the internally displaced.  This system of twin centres of 
relief, one in the crisis zone and another on the periphery, apparently set a precedent for 
United Nations refugee assistance operations and would come to be known as the ‘dual 
agency’ method.362  Britain extended contributions to this project as well, carefully 
reiterating at the UN that the international community’s responsibility to the region was 
strictly humanitarian, not political: ‘Reconstruction of the constitution of Pakistan must 
be an internal matter for the people of Pakistan.…Meanwhile, let the United Nations do 
the humanitarian work.  It must never be said of the politicians that we met here and 
argued about who was to distribute food, while millions of innocent people starved’.363 
By September, just three months after the inception of both relief drives, the 
government had contributed £14.75 million to the UNHCR and £2 million to UNEPRO 
for food, medicine and transport in East Pakistan, representing nearly one-fifth of the 
total world contribution.  
Foreign Office officials recommended the government adopt this relatively 
generous relief aid policy after regularly assessing Britain’s ‘chance of feeding, housing 
and generally caring for the population’364 affected by violence on the subcontinent.  
Indeed, officials frequently expressed the hope that the Prime Minister’s diplomatic 
representations to India and Pakistan might help to stabilise the political situation, so 
that Britain could focus on the enormous humanitarian tasks at hand.  ‘If we could do 
that,’ officials told Downing Street, ‘at least we would be dealing with two separate and 
distinct problems: a) the care of the refugees in India b) the relief and rehabilitation of 
the population of East Pakistan’.365 
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While it is evident that officials were concerned for the basic life conditions of 
civilians, it is also true that their relief efforts were a strategy to appease public opinion 
and placate elements of the domestic sector that were pressuring for stronger action.  As 
the Foreign Secretary alerted Cabinet early on in the conflict, the refugee crisis was 
worsening and ‘public opinion in this country would expect the Government to be 
taking some action to alleviate their suffering’.366  Similarly, after Britain’s first 
donations to international relief efforts in the middle of the year, officials worried 
intensely about how to:  
stimulate the United Nations into more rapid and visible assistance measures. It is a 
week since we made our contribution of £1m to U Thant’s fund and so far there is very 
little public sign of any action. Public and Parliamentary concern for evidence of 
effective steps is growing. Unless the United Nations can plainly be seen to be playing 
its part, there is bound to be pressure on us to act unilaterally, which we are not anxious 
to do.367  
 
If we could indicate quickly that we should be prepared to make further substantial 
contributions to relieve the impact of the disaster on a once and for all basis, the Foreign 
Secretary told Cabinet, the pressure of public opinion would be reduced.368  
 
Fortunately for the government, the concern was a passing one—attempts to 
publicise its efforts, including television appearances by relevant ministers, were a 
success.  ‘Bearing in mind the smallness of our contribution in relation to the scale of 
the problem’, one official proudly reported to the Prime Minister, ‘we have in fact been 
getting good credit including repeated mention in the radio and television 
bulletins…and the newspapers are very well aware of what we have done’.369  
And what the government did, at least in terms of relief aid, appeared 
significant.  The British were one of the largest donors in 1971, and so felt satisfied with 
their efforts.  In all frankness, Douglas-Home communicated privately to British 
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diplomats, ‘[w]e regard that as more than our fair share of the burden. Many other 
countries have not pulled their weight’.370  
 
Development aid 
HMG, apart from charitable relief donations, decided to use long-term development aid 
as a power lever with which to exercise pressure on the Khan government.  Britain, in 
1971, was a member of the ‘Aid to Pakistan Consortium’, an association created a 
decade earlier by the World Bank to foster coordination between the country’s major 
development aid donors.371  The body was widely acknowledged by Foreign Office 
officials to ‘possess the greatest influence’372 on Pakistan, but the UK and other 
members had remained hesitant to wield it until the gravity of the crisis and related 
public pressure rendered it seemingly necessary.  So it was that at their next meeting in 
June 1971, members collectively agreed not to renew funding (Britain had pledged £10 
million the previous year) until the emergency in the Eastern wing had abated.  ‘There 
can be no question of new British aid to Pakistan,’ announced the Foreign Secretary in 
Parliament, ‘until we have firm evidence that real progress is being made towards a 
political settlement’.373  
Many parliamentarians and members of the public applauded the decision. 
‘Even in normal circumstances, this would have been a very serious blow to the 
Pakistan economy’, declared a former Labour Minister for Overseas Development and 
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member of the June-July 1971 India/Pakistan parliamentary delegation.374  ‘The group 
of generals who run Pakistan know very little about economics, but sooner or later the 
hard facts of the situation may compel them to change course.  It is our only hope…it is 
wrong to attach political conditions to aid in 99 cases out of a 100—but this is the 100th 
case. Any power lever must be used which might help to bring about a political 
settlement’.375  
The suspension, combined with the British media’s critical coverage and 
disparaging statements made by MPs in Parliament, damaged Anglo-Pakistani relations. 
The Pakistani Foreign Ministry sent British officials indignant notes ‘invit[ing] attention 
to the persistent anti-Pakistan activities being conducted in Great Britain’.376  Britain’s 
announcement to withhold aid, the Ministry argued, ‘cannot be reconciled with the 
officially stated attitude of the British government that the situation in East Pakistan is 
an internal affair of Pakistan’.377  ‘The sum total of all official and non-official 
statements and activities taking place in Great Britain, directed against the very 
existence of Pakistan, leave one wondering whether there is any meaning and substance 
left in Commonwealth association’. 378   
Edward Heath had been aware that Britain’s decision on aid was likely to 
provoke a negative reaction in Pakistan—although not necessarily to this degree.  He 
swiftly refuted the ‘anti-Pakistan’ accusations by writing to President Khan: ‘I 
am…disturbed by the gap which seems to have been opening between our two 
governments.  It is particularly disappointing that our policy on aid to the people of 
Pakistan is criticised as an attempt to encroach on the internal affairs of Pakistan’.379  
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‘To say that we cannot launch new development aid programmes until the political and 
economic framework for them exists is no more than a matter of common sense, it is 
certainly not an attempt to “interfere” in your internal affairs’.380  
Anglo-Pakistani relations, already strained by the crisis, reached ‘an all time 
low’.381  British officials tried to repair the damage, and even considered resuming 
development aid unilaterally.  The Foreign Secretary, for his part, sought to ‘reassure 
the Pakistan Government that there had been no recent change in HMG’s policies’, 
namely that ‘the nature of a political settlement is a matter for the Pakistanis 
themselves’.382  ‘The trouble is psychological,’ Prime Minister Heath wrote on internal 
communication.  ‘Saying no further aid without a political settlement looked like public 
pressure.  We cd [sic] just have gone on considering new projects—which were unlikely 
because there is so much unused’.383  Officials, however tempted they may have been to 
reverse the decision, were under significant public and parliamentary pressure to sustain 
it.  Moreover, they believed that the measure, controversial though it was, stood a 
chance of facilitating a return to peace on the subcontinent: ‘One of the few effective 
levers on the Pakistan Government…is economic aid,’ the Foreign Secretary 
underscored to Cabinet, ‘and…the Pakistan Consortium should…maintain its stand on 
no new commodity aid’.384  Accordingly, HMG did not renew allocations to the country 
that year.  Britain’s withholding development assistance during the crisis was the most 
overt action it took to exercise influence on the Khan administration and respond to 
public opinion.  
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Summary: limitations to British aid policy  
Britain withheld development aid and donated relief aid to assist civilians affected by 
the crisis, to advance the prospect of a political resolution in Pakistan, and to reduce 
pressure on HMG to take stronger (potentially unilateral) action.  These measures, it 
would seem, were generally successful in appeasing the British public and the Heath 
administration expressed satisfaction with its courses of action—particularly its 
commendable position as a major relief donor. 
Yet it should be noted that neither Britain’s charitable relief contributions, nor 
those of other states, were enough to effectively alleviate the suffering of civilians 
affected by the crisis.  In fact, refugees from East Pakistan and the internally displaced 
continued to struggle under dire living conditions throughout the year, precisely because 
governments around the world, including those of Pakistan and India, did not fully 
support the UN relief efforts in place.  Indeed, the issue became a frequent matter of 
debate amongst British parliamentarians.  In East Pakistan, some pointed out, martial 
law authorities were refusing entry to international shipments.  Once inside the 
province, distribution depended on the Pakistani army, which the international 
community knew was otherwise engaged.  Finally, aid personnel could not move freely 
because of the ruinous state of the province’s infrastructure.385  Indian representatives, 
meanwhile consistently rebuffed international assistance, preferring to run the camps 
themselves.  As one Foreign Office official put it, ‘both the Indians and the Pakistanis 
are reluctant to accept a larger international presence, the Indians because it would 
inhibit them from helping the guerrillas, the Pakistanis because it would inhibit the 
army’s activities in East Pakistan’.386  Finally, UN member states, as with many matters 
related to the Pakistan crisis, could not agree (in this case, on what type of humanitarian 
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effort should be mounted), and therefore refrained from acting decisively.   
In reaction to the paralysis, a Sunday Telegraph journalist who toured West 
Bengal during the summer of 1971, lamented having witnessed: 
an endless sodden column [of refugees] tramp silently past….They will still be 
marching during the British Sunday breakfast, the British Sunday lunch and the Sunday 
evening snack in front of the television feature film.  Hindu and Moslems mingled, their 
only sin being that they were Bengali Hindus and Bengali Moslems….[T]he west has 
condemned and deplored, but has largely stood aloof.  Even the well-intentioned relief 
efforts of the West have become bogged down in the monsoon mud.  The sterling from 
London, the dollars from Washington and the tonnages from Geneva look fine on paper.  
It is simply that there is not a Bengali refugee in India who is better fed, more 
adequately sheltered or healthier than he was two months ago.387  
 
Against the background of international apathy, it was in fact the UN Secretary 
General, U Thant, who took it upon himself to establish both UNEPRO and the 
UNHCR operation using his good offices.388  In an account by an aid-worker who 
participated, ‘U Thant emerges as a heroic figure, refusing to be neutral on humanitarian 
issues, constantly searching for a way over or around political obstacles, receiving little 
support from the great powers’.389  Once the relief operations were finally in place, 
however, most states feared that supporting either of them could be misinterpreted as 
sympathy for India, or criticism of Pakistan.  Thus UNEPRO ‘by no means ended the 
political difficulties.  In fact, it was not until December…that the way was open to 
mount the operation that the situation called for.  The best that can be said for the 
stumbling and frustrated efforts of UNEPRO was that it laid the basis for its successor, 
the [1972] United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca (UNROD) and its impressive 
achievements….The contribution which U Thant had pleaded for in vain now came 
pouring in’.390 
The UN-led humanitarian relief and rehabilitation drive, in other words, began 
during 1971, but operated freely—and with full collaboration—only after the conflict, 
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when nearly $1.3 billion of humanitarian aid and “as many as 72 foreign relief groups, 
including UN agencies, contributed to what observers considered the largest single and 
most successful emergency relief endeavour of…[the] era”.391  While these efforts 
deserve due recognition, the sequence of events in which they occurred lay bare the 
geopolitical complexities of international humanitarian aid in emergency situations, and 
put Britain’s self-lauded role as a leading contributor of such aid in perspective.  They 
support the impression that HMG acted, not only to help the millions whose lives were 
disrupted by violence on the subcontinent, but also to a great extent, to appease public 
opinion by being seen to act, exhibiting less concern about whether those actions were 
solidly beneficial than whether they had furnished the government with ‘good credit’.392 
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iv. NEUTRALITY & NON-INTERVENTION 
‘There was never any question…of outside interference in the internal affairs of an independent 
Commonwealth country’.                                                     
          — Edward Heath393 
 
British officials, whatever assistance they offered or pressure they sought to exert 
during the conflict, were always careful to demonstrate that their ultimate allegiance 
was to the international norms of neutrality and non-interference.  Hence the narrow 
interpretation of their obligations under the Genocide Convention and the Foreign 
Secretary’s repeated declaration: ‘Her Majesty’s Government have no intention of 
interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs, and I wish again to emphasise that this is our 
position…intervention from outside will only complicate a very difficult and distressing 
situation’.394  
Internal notes prepared for senior ministers reflect the government’s 
preoccupation with non-intervention. Before the last debate on East Pakistan, for 
example, as Commons prepared to adjourn for the summer, the Foreign Office worried 
that some MPs might claim that the explosive situation on the subcontinent warranted 
staying in session.  The South Asia Department advised the Leader of the House, 
William Whitelaw, to dismiss all such demands with a premptory ‘Line to Take’.  ‘In so 
far as events in Pakistan are concerned,’ the line ran, ‘Her Majesty’s Government has 
no standing to intervene directly’.395  The Foreign Secretary’s draft statements and 
preparatory notes for Commons contained particularly colourful replies to defend the 
government’s position: 
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The Crisis in East Pakistan is no Longer Solely a Matter for the Pakistan Government  
(a) Insofar as events within Pakistan are concerned HM Government has no standing to 
intervene directly. 
(b) I am sure that the Hon Member is not suggesting that we should invade Pakistan; 
but that is what his question implies.396  
 
East Pakistan and the Security Council 
There is no indication that a situation exists in the area in which it would be appropriate 
for the United Nations to intervene in a peace-keeping role.397 
 
To propound the theory that there should be unilateral intervention by outside powers in 
the affairs of a sovereign country is to open a Pandora’s box which would be to the 
advantage of none of those most closely concerned.398 
 
The Heath administration, it would seem, keenly sought to pre-empt any attempt at 
pressuring the government to intervene (multilaterally or otherwise) in the crisis.  
During discussions on the subject, they never defined the term ‘intervention’, 
commonly associated as it is with the use of force.  Yet it can be assumed that the 
government referred not only to intervention by military means, but also to intervention 
by economic, diplomatic and legal means, given that they avoided engaging in these as 
well.  Of course, it is open to question whether some of HMG’s actions, particularly the 
decision to withhold new development aid to Pakistan could be construed as a form of 
interference, although there is no evidence in internal records that the government 
perceived of the act in such terms; on the contrary, they were noticeably dismayed when 
Pakistani officials did just that.   
The government’s decision to remain neutral and resist calls for potentially 
invasive action rests, most obviously, upon prevailing Cold War constraints and the 
state-centred climate of the era—and also upon the practical realities that confronted 
British officials, both in London and on the subcontinent, as they sought to understand 
and respond to mass violence in East Pakistan.  These topics are addressed in the 
following subsections. 
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Cold War climate and constraints 
HMG, amidst the struggle for supremacy between East and West and its threat of 
Mutually Assured Destruction, was plainly not the only government to dread the 
‘Pandora’s box’ of international intervention. ‘No state has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State,’ stated the UN General Assembly unequivocally in 1965.399  This echoed 
the original ban on force formulated in the 1945 United Nations Charter: ‘All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state’.400  By the time Pakistan sent 
its soldiers to contend with nationalism in its Eastern province in March 1971, non-
interference and respect for state sovereignty were categorically affirmed as inviolable 
foundations of peaceful international relations.401 Hence, geopolitical divisions 
notwithstanding, the major powers agreed with Pakistan at the beginning of the crisis 
that the matter was an internal affair, within its ‘domestic jurisdiction’.402 
The consensus was short-lived; East-West tensions at the Security Council 
swiftly materialised after the millions of refugees poured over the border into India 
effectively internationalising the conflict.  The United States tilted towards Pakistan, a 
potential intermediary to China and an ally against the Soviet Union.  In contrast, the 
Soviet Union sided with India, as the British Defence Ministry reflected, ‘in support of 
its political aim of gaining influence among the non-aligned countries at the expense of 
Western interests’.403  Britain, as described earlier, considered possible avenues for UN 
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mediation, but did not pursue any of them, aware that such initiatives would probably 
incur the ire of one bloc or the other, and be disposed of by veto.  
Edward Heath, it turns out, was frustrated by Britain’s inability to reduce tension 
on the subcontinent.  He blamed President Nixon for intransigently backing Pakistan at 
a time when, the Prime Minister believed, the West needed to retain influence over non-
aligned India.  As a result, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war ‘caused a considerable cooling 
in Anglo-American relations’.404  This cooling, according to Heath himself, began when 
the USSR and India signed a ‘Friendship Treaty’ in August 1971, to the surprise of the 
international community.  The Americans interpreted the pact as overt provocation from 
India and believed the Soviets were ‘stirring up trouble’ on the subcontinent.405  
Britain’s assessment, to the contrary, was that India had signed a ‘treaty of convenience’ 
to counter-balance relations developing between Pakistan and China—it was not a step 
towards the USSR, but a basic defence strategy which could have been tempered by 
warmth from the West.406  
As Heath’s biographer, John Campbell explains, ‘Heath had established a good 
relationship with Mrs. Gandhi, sympathised with India’s support for Bengal and hoped 
to play a mediating role.  To his annoyance Nixon and Kissinger—regarding India as a 
Soviet puppet and just at that moment preparing to reopen relations with Pakistan’s 
protector, China—branded India the aggressor and vigorously supported Pakistan’.407 
Yet, however much the Prime Minister was ‘bitter’ about the barriers to mediation and 
Nixon’s ‘bungling’ of the affair, his administration never attempted to alter American 
policy;408 nor did it seek to organize a joint overture to India from the West, as Heath 
would have liked, to counter Soviet friendliness.  Fenced in by the political paralysis of 
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the era which had reduced ‘Britain to a kind of no-man’s land between the two opposing 
super-Powers’,410 the government instead sought to maintain an equidistant position 
between India-USSR and Pakistan-USA by advocating the ‘most uncontroversial 
action’411 throughout most of the crisis, and eventually tilting towards India, refraining 
from voting expressly against the latter’s military intervention in contrast to the 
majority of the Security Council.  
Heath, in his autobiography, recalls discussing the affair with Nixon and 
Kissinger in late December 1971, following the conclusion of hostilities: 
Nixon: Well, Henry, we had our differences of opinion over the Indo-Pakistan War.  
Will you explain to Ted why we pursued the policy we did?  
 
Kissinger: In that war, Pakistan was supported by China, and India by the Soviet Union.  
Pakistan was weaker than India, and China weaker than the Soviet Union.  You had the 
two weaker countries lined up against the two stronger ones.  We supported the two 
weaker nations so as to restore the balance and prevent them being overwhelmed, which 
would have been against our own interests.  That, if I may so…has been British policy 
throughout the ages.  
 
Heath: Henry…is of course historically correct, with one exception.  We never 
supported the weaker partners if we thought that all three of us would lose.  This is what 
would have happened in this last Indo-Pakistan War.412 
 
This exchange, while confirming the division of powers and related Anglo-American 
tensions, is primarily interesting in that it is representative of how senior British 
officials and their biographers tended to recall the crisis—that is, in terms of 
geopolitical alliances and how subcontinental war may have affected those alliances.  
There is no reference to Pakistan’s military repression of political opponents in, for 
example, D.R. Thorpe’s biography of Alec Douglas-Home (1996), the memoirs of 
former Defence Secretary, Peter Carrington, and those of Heath’s Political Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, nor even in the work of well-known parliamentary biographer, Andrew 
Roth, Heath and the Heathmen (1972), published while the administration was still in 
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office.413  The tendency to emphasise the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the violence that 
preceded it, well expresses the climate of the era, when foreign affairs were widely 
viewed within the prism of East-West geopolitics, and relations between state actors 
ranked among the most memorable events.  
Edward Heath, in fact, is the only senior British official to refer to the original 
incident that eventually lead to international war in 1971—the Pakistani government’s 
crackdown on its eastern wing.  He recalled that: 
The trouble started in March after the Pakistani army had acted to quell disorder in what 
was then the Province of East Pakistan.  As a result, an estimated 10 million people left 
the province for the Indian state of West Bengal, creating enormous problems for the 
Indian government….Given the links between Britain and the sub-continent, it was 
inevitable that strong feelings were aroused in this country.  There was never any 
question, however, of outside interference in the internal affairs of an independent 
Commonwealth country.414   
 
Heath’s reference to the repression, while unusual amongst his peers, is vague; the 
emphasis plainly rests on the British policy of non-interference, a policy the government 
adopted and maintained from the outset.  Accordingly, Cabinet began to discuss events 
on the subcontinent at length only when international war appeared imminent, after 
which officials began urgently assessing how Britain could defuse the situation with 
other Security Council members.  In contrast, Cabinet rarely deliberated state terror in 
East Pakistan, in terms of UN intervention, geopolitical alliances, or otherwise.  Foreign 
Office assessments of Britain’s policy options regarding the East Pakistan crisis, 
meanwhile, tended to focus on diplomatic and aid-related courses of action.  
Intervention was mentioned repeatedly—in terms of what Britain would not do.  There 
was indeed ‘never any question…of outside interference’.415  
For some analysts today, the Security Council’s failure to react to Pakistan’s 
oppressive campaign, and its reluctance to support India’s military intervention, points 
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to the ‘moral bankruptcy of cold-war international society’416 and the unethical 
exclusion of human rights from foreign affairs.417  Such criticism, however, appears 
somewhat anachronistic.  ‘Human rights wasn’t a guiding light of British foreign policy, 
or any country’s foreign policy at the time,’ underscores Nicholas Barrington, a veteran 
diplomat in Pakistan who, in 1971, worked in Heath’s Foreign Office.418  Britain’s 
concern at the time was international peace and stability—‘We are a trading country.  
Britain’s interest is always in peace to preserve trade’.419  Douglas Hurd, referring to his 
later role as Foreign Secretary during the Bosnian civil war (1992-1995) which 
witnessed NATO involvement, concurs: ‘Intervention on behalf of human rights is now 
very well-mentioned.  Before the mid-1990s, it simply wasn’t an issue’.421 
 True as this may be, it is worth noting that India justified its recourse to force at 
the Security Council in 1971, precisely in terms of a human rights rescue operation.  
The ‘complete domination, complete subjugation, and complete military butchery’ of 
East Pakistanis by their own government, declared Shri Sen, India’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN, constituted acts that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ and 
contravened international conventions on genocide, human rights and self-
determination.422  What is more, he continued, India’s numerous pleas to the 
international community throughout the conflict to stop the ‘human tragedy’ had 
received no response.423  Hence, proclaimed Sen, ‘We are glad that we have on this 
particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of 
intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.  If that is a 
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crime, the Security Council can judge for itself’.424  India’s comments provide a 
thought-provoking example of how a government openly espoused the rhetoric of 
human rights and international humanitarian norms during the Cold War, although what 
its precise motivations for doing so were, remain a matter of debate. 
For authentic as India’s humanitarian concerns may have been, it is without 
doubt that the Gandhi administration also had various ‘off-the-board’425 interests for 
resorting to war.  Of these, domestic electoral politics, West Bengal’s commercial trade 
with East Pakistan and, most obviously, the desire to debilitate its historic rival, 
Pakistan, were significant.426  The British Foreign Office, in an internal policy note 
written months before the war, agreed: ‘Indian motives are a mixture of a desire to see 
Pakistan disrupted and weakened, a genuine humanitarian concern about the loss of life 
and horror at the flood of 5 million refugees from East Pakistan and the burden they 
impose’.427  Hence, international legal scholars Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley 
concluded in 1973, while India’s ‘motive of rescue was probably genuine, so were the 
self-interested political goals achieved’.428  As such, the intervention failed to ‘pass the 
“clean hands” test’ in the eyes of the global community who feared it would set a 
dangerous precedent in which a more powerful state, under the guise of 
humanitarianism, could endanger international stability at will.429  The Nixon 
administration, represented by its Ambassador to the UN, George H. Bush, conceded 
that while events in East Pakistan were “tragic”, this did not “justify the actions of India 
in intervening militarily and placing in jeopardy the territorial integrity and political 
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independence of its neighbour Pakistan”.430  Most members of the Security Council 
concurred in principle, and apart from the Soviet Union, either clamoured for an 
immediate cease-fire, or like Britain, abstained from expressing an opinion.  
 Peter Smith, a former diplomat at the High Commission in Islamabad, reflecting 
on these events, sympathises with the international community’s reactions.  ‘I’m 
temperamentally entirely in favour of not speaking out, because I regard these things as 
an internal affair….What good does it do, for us or anybody else, to go charging in?  
These are internal affairs…and they [the country in question] must fix it.  The only 
sanction you should take is to withhold help, trade, prayers, whatever you like.  But 
don’t intervene.  I’m sure the world would be much better if we didn’t’.431  ‘….It was 
technically an internal affair of Pakistan.  In those days, that factor was even more 
limiting than it is now, rightly or wrongly’.432  In any event, ‘what could you do?  We 
tried to do something at Suez and Iraq….And in both cases, it’s been wrong, which has 
merely strengthened me in my innate, idle, but totally genuine belief that, almost 
always, things are best left alone….You don’t know, so you’d better not act, unless you 
absolutely have to’.433  
These views, however personal, reflect to some degree the mindset of a 
generation.  Political leaders opposed intervention ‘directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever’434 on the grounds that it threatened the notably fragile international order of 
the era.  For them, commitment to the norm of state sovereignty and the non-use of 
force was therefore not necessarily a cold or ‘bankrupt’ concept; it could also be viewed 
as a commitment to the bedrock of cultural self-determination and peaceful co-existence 
‘in an age when the human race…was threatened by extinction at its own hand’.435  For 
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Britain, the constraints upon its international relations imposed by this forbidding 
strategic climate, inevitably strengthened the government’s resolve to remain on the 
periphery of the Pakistan crisis and seek to exert influence from afar. 
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Diplomats in the fog of war 
‘In the present fog of war and atrocity, one thing stands out all too clearly.  It is that Yahya 
Khan’s terrible mistake, and its terrible consequences, have created a new area of instability in 
Asia and the world’. 
                —Editorial, The Sunday Times, 13 June 1971436 
 
Notwithstanding the Cold War constraints on British foreign policy, civil servants who 
served under Heath agree that the Conservative government sought to obtain a detailed 
image of violence on the subcontinent in 1971.  Understanding conflicts beyond 
Europe’s borders, whatever the government’s priorities, remained a matter of standard 
intelligence procedure aimed at protecting British national interests.  The style of crisis 
reporting emerging from the High Commissions in Pakistan was therefore customarily 
thorough.  ‘In a civil war situation...the way we were reporting was normal practice,’ 
confirms Arthur Collins formerly of the Deputy High Commission in Dacca.437  ‘It’s 
part of the job of any high commission or embassy to keep London fully informed.  
London has to know, London has to talk to people, and people expect the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to be well-informed on what’s going on in the world, so it’s our 
job, in the field, to inform them’.438  
Notwithstanding their efforts, officials explain that intelligence gathering and 
assessment during the conflict was complex and, inevitably, limited by the ‘fog of war’ 
common to military situations.  As Clausewitz reflected in his monumental On War 
(1832):  
The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, 
to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—
like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and 
unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must 
discover, or must be left to chance. It is therefore again talent, or the favour of fortune, 
on which reliance must be placed, for want of objective knowledge.439 
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This section, which comprises my interviews with British civil servants of the era 
serving in Islamabad, Dacca and London, illustrates the precise difficulties imposed by 
the Pakistan crisis that rendered intelligence gathering and assessment problematic for 
the British.  These difficulties and various practical aspects of the diplomatic service 
reinforced the Heath administration’s inherent preference for neutrality and non-
interference.   
 
Diplomats in Pakistan: a question of neutrality 
British diplomats, regardless of the country to which they are posted, are instructed to 
protect and promote British interests, report objectively on local events, and provide 
London with dispassionate regional assessments and policy advice.440  Total 
impartiality, however, is impossible; diplomats, to some degree, generally assume a 
‘country angle’.441  ‘You can’t but be influenced,’ Peter Smith formerly of the 
Islamabad High Commission recalls, ‘.…at least I can’t, by what people tell you, and 
talk in the papers and that sort of thing.  Neutrality, in my opinion, is best measured in 
relative terms’.442  In the case of Pakistan in 1971, of course, there was no single 
country angle, but two, often conflicting, provincial angles.  Officials in Dacca reported 
the Pakistani army’s ‘kill and burn’ campaign in the province, while those in Islamabad 
frequently cast the military action as quashing a ‘rebellion’ or conducting a 
‘counterinsurgency’.  
Many foreign diplomats in East Pakistan, not only the British, viewed the crisis 
differently from their counterparts in West Pakistan over a thousand miles away.  
Certainly, this was the case with staff at the American Consulate in Dacca, with whom 
the British Deputy High Commission occasionally conferred.  While the precise content 
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of their exchanges rarely appears in British government records, when it does, it reflects 
a friendly working relationship between American and British representatives in 
Pakistan, rather than sensitive diplomatic discourse aimed at influencing each other’s 
respective government policies.  When, however, the American Consul General Archer 
Blood, appeared to be taking a provocative position on the conflict, British 
representatives did not hesitate to convey to London that: ‘[Blood has] consistently 
maintained that the Army has overstepped the mark.  His opinions have been in direct 
conflict with those of the Ambassador in Islamabad….[His] views are also shared to a 
large extent by seasoned diplomats [in East Pakistan] and to some extent by their Home 
Offices, if not by their opposite numbers in Islamabad’.443  Staff at the American 
Consulate, it turns out (although this was not recorded in British files), took the 
exceptional step of cabling Washington directly to protest their government’s slant 
towards Pakistan and refusal to intervene “even morally” in a conflict “in which 
unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable”.444  
Following these acts of dissent, Archer Blood was recalled.  Interestingly, in his 
2002 memoirs, Blood claims that he was not alone:  
I left Dacca on June 5….My comrade in arms, Frank Sargeant, the British Deputy High 
Commissioner, departed the same day, and for basically the same reason.  Sargeant’s 
superior, Sir Cyril Pickard, had told me that Sargeant was being removed because of his 
‘emotional and rumor-laden reporting’.  That same charge had probably been levied at 
me, but I always found Frank a model of those validly attributed signs of British 
character—coolness and steadiness under fire.  I was proud and grateful to have had 
him as a colleague in those trying days.445   
 
To be sure, Frank Sargeant left the post of Deputy High Commissioner to East Pakistan 
soon after mass violence in the region broke out.  However, according to British 
records, Sargeant was recalled due to ill health.  That, at any rate, is what the Foreign 
Secretary and Minister of Defence told MPs a few months into the violence when asked 
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to ‘explain why, at this stage, it is apparently proposed to withdraw Her Majesty's 
representative in Dacca’;446 ‘many of us are very concerned….[and] would be grateful 
if…there could be confirmation of the fact that in no way has there been pressure from 
the Pakistan Government for the withdrawal of Mr. Sargeant’.447  ‘He is being 
withdrawn,’ responded the Foreign Secretary, ‘because he has been under severe strain 
and must have a short rest’.448  Minister of Defence, Lord Balniel, concurred: ‘Mr. 
Sargeant had returned home because of illness through pressure of work, and…was 
being replaced immediately’.449 
Britain’s Deputy High Commissioner did not condemn the Pakistani army and 
protest his government’s non-interventionist stance in as direct a manner as that of his 
American counterpart.  Nevertheless, a few of his telegrams implicitly did just that:  
We know…that the Army is acting in unrestrained fashion, wantonly killing and 
destroying, and generally comporting itself like an Army of conquest.  Its policy, in so 
far as one can be determined, is the systematic elimination of prominent Bengali 
politicians and intellectuals.…Student leaders and their teachers have also been singled 
out as being in urgent need of destruction….Those arrested ‘disappear’; there is no 
indication that any trials are planned….And each day of killing, of non-Bengalis by 
Bengalis, of Bengalis by non-Bengalis, merely stores up a darker future of more 
atrocities.  From these the British community cannot for ever expect to remain immune, 
if its Government overtly supports a Government of Pakistan ready to pursue in Bengal 
the policies it is today.450  
 
The Deputy High Commissioner’s reference to the British government ‘overtly’ 
supporting Pakistan is exaggerated; yet it is to be remembered that he was writing at the 
beginning of the campaign, when state leaders had publicly agreed that the crisis was 
Pakistan’s domestic affair—a sentiment he clearly did not share.  Sargeant, on occasion 
also used inflammatory terms to describe the military campaign in East Pakistan.  After 
suspending the activities of the British Council in Dacca, for example, he explained his 
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decision to London in the following terms: ‘since it is our function to cultivate and 
identify with local academics, educationists and intellectuals, IE those who are 
apparently suffering pogrom regardless of political affiliations...the Council can no 
longer operate in a territory in which its leading contacts are being shot down’.451  The 
Deputy High Commissioner’s choice of ‘pogrom’—originally a reference to violent 
attacks on Jewish minorities in the 19th century Russian Empire—to describe the 
Pakistani army’s campaign is clearly provocative; it suggests the risk of moral 
complicity in what may be a clear violation of international humanitarian norms. 
  However, telegrams with this blatantly critical tone are rare.  Most British 
diplomats in Pakistan did not explicitly protest Britain’s policy, nor did they 
categorically condemn Pakistan’s military campaign.  Disapproval of the latter was 
normally tempered by references to violence committed by other parties (as, in fact, is 
the case with most of Sargeant’s messages).  All the same, officials at London’s Foreign 
Office, responsible for reading and interpreting reports from the region, soon expressed 
the ‘feel[ing] that our H/C reporting has at times been less than “objective”.’452  What is 
more, former South Asia Department officers today can remember sensing that 
diplomats on the subcontinent were becoming ‘partisan’, ‘too involved’, or ‘not 
dispassionate’.453 They confirm that the neutrality of Britain’s Deputy High 
Commissioner may very well have been in question—‘We were getting very gory 
reports from Dacca’.454  Moreover, it was standard practice to replace diplomats who 
had intimate knowledge of the region with those who ‘had no previous experience of 
the subcontinent, and therefore no prejudice’.455  ‘It’s the nature of diplomacy,’ John 
Birch, then head of the India desk, remarks.  ‘London wants balanced and objective 
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reporting.  There is a difference between reporting and commentating or passing 
judgement’.456  
Peter Smith agrees that a concern for neutrality may also have factored in to the 
change of leadership at Britain’s High Commission in Islamabad.457  Lawrence 
Pumphrey, the replacement High Commissioner, arrived in June 1971.  According to 
Smith, he differed significantly from his predecessor, Cyril Pickard.  Pickard had served 
in India before assuming the post of High Commissioner to Pakistan, and consequently 
had considerable knowledge of the region and its leaders.  Indeed, as recounted, he 
expressed his disapproval of the ‘massive reprisals’ and the ‘state of complete 
lawlessness’ in East Pakistan, towards the end of his tour, in person to the country’s 
most senior authorities.458  While this airing of opinion may have been somewhat 
routine of diplomatic leave-taking, Smith recalls that London plainly welcomed that the 
replacement High Commissioner was not likely to engage in such blunt diplomacy.  For 
the latter, he states, arriving in Pakistan was like ‘a journey by a blind man into fog’.459  
‘He had absolutely no knowledge of Asia at all.  He came in with a total ignorance 
which is typically Foreign Office.…I don’t believe our government gave him any brief 
before going—he wasn’t told to do this or that’.460  Interestingly, Smith does not recall 
the new High Commissioner and Pickard ever speaking about the East Pakistan crisis in 
any depth during the handover.  ‘They didn’t talk much really, and when they did, it 
was mainly about administrative stuff—“is your head-bearer reliable?”—and that sort 
of thing.  I suspect they shouldn’t have agreed on many things…they weren’t on the 
same wavelength at all, Cyril and he, it was quite clear’.461 
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British diplomats in Pakistan 1971 were expected to remain neutral when mass 
violence against civilians was committed by leaders of the country to which they were 
posted—state terror in the context of civil war was strictly an internal affair.  To 
describe such terror with disapproval was to risk being labelled “emotional”,462 and 
therefore, unfit; to directly protest the non-interventionist stance of the British 
government was, for the most part, unacceptable.  Indeed, as former officials recall, 
there was no system in place to express internal dissent with regards to foreign policy, 
and there was always the risk of damaging one’s reputation by protesting one’s 
‘masters’ too stridently.463  Even today, acknowledges one official, regardless of how 
uncomfortable diplomats might feel about a given policy, ‘most people just go with the 
flow’ and seek to at least appear neutral.464 
 
Dacca: the British Deputy High Commission 
Frank Sargeant was not replaced until September 1971; the post of Deputy High 
Commissioner in East Pakistan, amidst state terror, civil war and communal violence, 
remained vacant for nearly four months.  Arthur Collins, the Commission’s Political 
Secretary, on his first overseas posting, became acting Deputy High Commissioner in 
the interim.  The following section is based on excerpts from personal interviews with 
him.465  
 
The provincial angle 
Collins confirms that British officials in East and West Pakistan did not always agree on 
matters related to the crisis.  ‘We had somewhat different perceptions than the High 
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Commission in Islamabad.   Normally, you have an embassy or high commission in a 
country which has consulates scattered around which do commercial work, look after 
interests of nationals, and so forth; they do a little reporting, but they’re not really 
politically active.  In our case it was different.  Because East Pakistan was so very 
different in nature than West Pakistan, because it was 1500 miles away, because 
communications in those days were not like today at all…because there was that 
physical, and cultural, and political gap, we in Dacca, were regarded as a semi-
independent post. We acknowledged the High Commissioner in Islamabad as our 
nominal head, and copied everything that we sent of any significance to Islamabad, but 
we reported directly to London.  That’s not the activity of a consulate, which reports to 
its embassy’.466  
According to Collins, Islamabad’s direct sources of information on East Pakistan 
were severely limited.  Instead, the High Commissioner relied on officials who had 
extensive regional knowledge of the Western wing, but whose contacts in the East 
consisted mainly of central government sympathisers. Officials in Islamabad, moreover, 
rarely visited East Pakistan during the crisis.  ‘I don’t think they got particularly good 
insights into the situation in the East.  It did not compare with the kind of reporting that 
we were able to do’.467 
 
Priority: nationals 
Collins remembers that when mass violence appeared imminent in East Pakistan, the 
Deputy High Commission’s main objective was not to defuse regional tension, but to 
protect British nationals: ‘I went to Dacca in 1970.  That was a year in which political 
tension was building steadily.  One of the first things I did was tour the country.  Under 
the cover of that tour, I made careful contact with all the British citizens who we 
                                                
466 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 18 June 2009.   
467 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 18 June 2009.   
 135 
regarded as our semi-official correspondents.  They were people like tea planters, bank 
managers or shipping agents—people who had good contacts, and knew both the local 
people and the British living there.  Normally, they kept lists of all the British citizens in 
their area, and had short-wave radios, so they could get in touch with the High 
Commission.  They were going to be responsible for running an evacuation locally, if 
the people in the area had to get out of the country quickly.  That was the kind of thing 
we had to give our attention to’.468   
‘We took quite a number of steps in readiness for the possibility that violence 
would break out.  The big event, of course, was the elections’.469  After Khan suspended 
the National Assembly at the beginning of March 1971, tension grew considerably. 
‘The Bengalis had a form of strike—hartaals—which were rather frightening.  
Everything shut down, anyone who moved on the streets was likely to have a brick 
thrown at them.  When Yahya Khan made the announcement, the Bengalis all rushed 
out into the streets, armed with long staves and sticks, running here and there, knocking 
things over.…It was an unsafe situation.  One could see that there was a position of 
great confrontation’.470 
‘….We did not know when the crackdown might come.  We did anticipate that 
at some point there might well be a military crackdown, because of the extreme political 
tension, and the strikes, and the general disturbances that were taking place.  But we had 
a responsibility for the safety of British citizens if there was a general breakdown in law 
and order.  It was more that that we had to fear than any kind of structured conflict’.471 
Indeed, as is evident from government records, diplomats in both wings of the 
country—whatever their private assessments of the military campaign—strove to 
maintain good relations with Pakistani authorities largely in order to protect British 
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nationals, and they entreated London to do the same.  ‘Please alert Ministers to the 
probable grave consequences for the British communities here if any official criticism 
of the conduct of the Pakistani Government is voiced at this time,’ cabled Frank 
Sargeant at the beginning of the crisis. ‘…[This] will enrage the Army which is in 
control here and with which we must maintain best possible relations’.472  
In particular, it was feared that the BBC’s critical coverage of events might 
expose Britons to mob violence.473  Officials thus distanced themselves from the 
broadcasting agency and requested London to announce that, ‘HMG have no control 
over the content or tone of BBC broadcasts’ and ‘have no axe to grind whatever as 
regards Pakistan’s internal affairs.  They have watched recent developments with 
sympathy and concern.  It is because of the close interest in Pakistan of the British 
people fostered by the presence in Britain of 200,000 Pakistanis that the British news 
media are giving events wide coverage’.474  
Clandestinely, however, representatives continued to report the violence, search 
for British nationals scattered throughout the province and work on an evacuation plan, 
which they concealed from Pakistani authorities lest it invoke their ire.  Protecting 
nationals was a priority that, under the circumstances, was as sensitive and time-
consuming as it was vital. 
 
Multiple responsibilities  
British officials in Dacca, in addition to protecting nationals, had multiple 
responsibilities: they were obliged to represent Britain to local authorities, report 
regularly on the political crisis to London, provide situation assessments, protect 
Britain’s commercial interests and oversee immigration services.  
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‘You have to understand, our minds are not solely focused on what might 
happen,’ states Collins.  ‘We had daily preoccupations, people from all over coming in 
and out, seeing us about this that and the other’.475  What is more, by the middle of 
1971, the prospect of mass famine loomed threatening the lives of millions. ‘The whole 
world was concerned with sending aid, and the UK had particular concern,’ recalls 
Collins who was requested by the Foreign Office to assess the province’s food 
supply.476  ‘It’s all very well to get food into the country, but what do you do with it 
once you’ve got it there?  Unless you’ve got the trucks to move it around (which East 
Pakistan did not), you can’t do much with however much food you’ve got.  This is the 
kind of practical thing that diplomats have to spend a lot of time doing.  And, it takes a 
lot of work—going to see people, getting facts, drawing your own conclusions, and 
testing them out’.477  
‘I was kept busy from morning until night, and so were the other few who were 
still there.  We were under a lot of pressure, dealing on a hand to mouth basis with all 
kinds of situations, day to day’.478  ‘It was a very intense period.  All one could do was 
work day and night’.479 
 
Coping amidst chaos 
Collins was away from Pakistan on leave when military operations in the East began on 
25 March 1971.  He returned—upon being informed by the Foreign Office that his 
Deputy High Commissioner, Frank Sargeant, was ill—and, as the crisis deepened, 
carefully went over plans to evacuate the approximately 1000 British nationals living in 
the province.  Major evacuations took place in April, followed by a further dramatic set 
from both wings in December.  
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John Graham, former Principle Private Secretary to Douglas-Home, keenly 
recalls the efforts made by regional representatives during the December evacuations 
from East Pakistan.  ‘I…remember a rather remarkable effort by the Royal Air Force 
and the local expatriate community.  It had been decided to evacuate foreigners and we 
were to send in a C130 to lift them out.  However the airfield had been bombed.  Men 
of the local foreign community went out early in the morning to fill some of the bomb 
craters.  The C130 landed successfully on the still rather short runway and loaded more 
than 100 men, women and children, including members of other countries’ diplomatic 
staffs.  The pilot held the overloaded aircraft at the end of the runway, revved up the 
engines to the maximum, released the brakes and got it off.  I remember a letter of 
congratulations and thanks from the Russians, and I think some others, for what we 
thought at the time was rather a splendid feat of initiative and skill’.480  
According to Collins, the difficulties of organizing such complicated 
evacuations and carrying out his other duties at the same time were substantial; all the 
more so, given the chaotic conditions which reigned in East Pakistan, with its damaged 
roads, random violence, and later, Indian air raids that left unexploded bombs strewn 
about the province.481  Officials, not surprisingly, also worried for their own safety.  
Collins, working late at night in the Deputy Commission offices, was shot at (by whom 
he does not know), presumably because it was after curfew and he had forgotten to turn 
out the light.  ‘That was the kind of thing one had to live with as a possibility,’ he 
exclaims. ‘….It was a bizarre somewhat crazy scenario, in which there was a degree of 
normality against a backdrop of fundamental instability’.482   
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Impediments to intelligence gathering and assessment  
Collins is satisfied with the quality of the Deputy High Commission’s reporting in 1971.  
However, he explains, a number of obstacles complicated their task.  Firstly, they had 
limited sources of information—just a few foreign nationals and East Bengalis ‘in the 
know’; ‘There was an active Bengali press, much of it in the local language, and we did 
have useful local people reading the press.  We also had contacts with a small number 
of highly intelligent East Pakistani middle-class engaged in the media.  These people 
had their fingers on the pulse.  But to get really reliable information on which you could 
base a careful assessment to London of what was going to happen was really quite 
difficult’.483  ‘[T]here wasn’t any information coming out of official sources.  Martial 
law had been introduced—there was a complete crackdown on information, and the 
press was not operating’.484 ‘It was amazingly difficult for us to get reliable 
information’.485 
Secondly, officials had limited mobility.  ‘There was a curfew so it was very 
dangerous to move around.  But we had to be able to communicate with each other, so 
there were times when one had to risk going out after curfew, but you had to be very 
careful, because the Pakistan Army had patrols and had set up road blocks, and the 
Bengali guerrillas were moving around with weapons, so it was a question of who shot 
first basically’.486  
East Pakistan’s marshy topography and poor infrastructure further complicated 
the situation.  Collins vividly recalls how ‘[w]e couldn’t get out to the great mass of the 
country—the flat, watery, network of thousands and thousands of simple little 
villages—which was exposed to military punitive action.  There were no means of 
access.  It was extremely hard to get around, there were few vehicles, petrol, and the 
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roads were in a terrible state—they were being blown up by the guerrilla forces, and 
there were Pakistani soldiers everywhere. We could sometimes see smoke rising, even 
from Dacca, and you could ask someone what they thought was going on, but one 
always had to be careful about whether they really knew, or whether they were just 
telling us they did’.487  
As it was, British officials rarely witnessed extreme violence, and instead relied 
on second-hand accounts.  Referring to two telegrams he sent detailing a ‘policy of 
extermination of Hindus’ and ‘indiscriminate killing…still in progress’,488 Collins 
states: ‘These were good factual reports, based on very reliable informants.  The 
church’s information was always given in very good faith, and they gave it to the best 
of their ability.  But, they were dependent on information from their own sources.  They 
didn’t necessarily witness it themselves.  I don’t recall any of the clergy saying to me, 
“I’ve seen—I’ve seen men with bayonets in their backs”.  But of course, it was 
happening.  It was going on, just largely out of sight’.489 
‘I remember our Defence Attaché in Islamabad came over once, and while I was 
driving him round at night near the Army cantonment, he said “that’s a strange smell of 
burning. Those are human bodies burning.  I recognize the smell of human flesh 
burning, it’s a very distinctive smell”.  He was convinced.   And, it wasn’t for me to 
question it’.490 
  ‘We also got many reports concerning Hindus being taken off buses….It was 
repeatedly reported to me that, sometimes, buses were stopped, and all the men were 
                                                
487 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 18 June 2009.   
488 FCO 37/887. Telegram 379 ‘Conditions in East Pakistan’, Dacca—Islamabad and FCO, 14 June 1971; 
Telegram 390 ‘Army Operations in E.P.’, Dacca—Islamabad and FCO, 19 June 1971. (Appendix 
Documents 6 and 7) 
489 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 18 June 2009.   
490 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 18 June 2009.   
 141 
taken off and checked.  Those who were not circumcised were shot.  Those who were, 
got back on the bus’.491 
 ‘Before, when the country was relatively peaceful, there were villages and small 
towns which were solidly Hindu.  My wife and I visited some of these places.  All those 
places were eliminated.  Of course, I couldn’t get back there and check whether there 
were any ashes, or not.  So, a lot of this reporting was secondary reporting, but it was 
consistent’.492 
 Overall, Collins maintains, ‘[t]here was very little blood on the streets.  The 
horrors did not happen in front of us—they happened out of sight’.493  British officials, 
hampered by incomplete information and generally confined to their own circumscribed 
spheres of activity, found it very difficult to assess the acts of violence that were taking 
place throughout the province.  Of course, Collins continues, the Deputy High 
Commission was not completely removed from the conflict.  ‘I didn’t want to leave you 
with the impression that I didn’t see or know anything firsthand.  I had contacts in 
Dacca—middle class people, lawyers, activists, etc—who just disappeared.  When I 
went away on leave, they were there sitting happily at their desks.  When I came back, 
they were not there, and there was no information about them.  These people just 
disappeared.  Without doubt, they were killed.  The authorities really had it in for 
them—they were marked men’.494   
‘My driver at the High Commission was a Hindu, and his father was taken in on 
that first night.  So, he [the driver] went to the police headquarters to try to get his father 
released, saying he worked for the British High Commission.  He never got his father 
released; he never left the police station.  So yes, people we knew, people we dealt with, 
just disappeared. And we couldn’t find anything out about them.  We kept making 
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representations to the authorities who took notes, and promised to make enquiries, but 
no satisfactory information ever came back.  I remember the driver’s elderly mother 
came later to the High Commission seeking news about her son.  She was a very simple 
old peasant lady….We just couldn’t give her any comfort at all’.495  
 This aspect of the violence that Collins refers to—the alleged targeting of the 
Bengali middle classes—was one, he recalls, that officials during the crisis had notable 
difficulty verifying. The news that the Pakistani army had murdered students and 
professors during the first days of the crackdown in March 1971, for example, appeared 
somewhat incredible, and more likely to be the product of media misinformation.  This 
impression began to recede only after the Deputy High Commission ‘received reports 
from trustworthy sources that five members academic staff Dacca University and many 
students have been killed and others wounded.  Other reports speak of thirty-five 
professors dead’.496  
Weeks later, the number two at Britain’s High Commission in Islamabad, 
Reginald Burrows, met with the Pakistani High Commissioner to the UK [Salman Ali] 
who persisted in ‘quer[ying] whether there had in fact been any killing of teaching staff 
in Dacca University….He [the Pakistani High Commissioner] said that while the 
academic world had been much stirred by reports of such killings, those reported killed 
had turned up one by one still alive.’497  Following the series of reports from Dacca 
indicating the contrary, including a list with several of the victim’s names, Burrows 
remarked, ‘I realize now that he [the Pakistani High Commissioner] was taking part in a 
worldwide propaganda exercise. We are pretty sure of our facts and…follow these 
matters closely and coolly’.498  Pakistan’s official version of events, it is evident, often 
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differed dramatically from Britain’s regional intelligence.  This, as will be discussed, 
added to the complexities of intelligence gathering during the crisis. 
 
Conservative death toll  
When informed that many sources, academic and otherwise, have alleged that over a 
million East Pakistanis died during the conflict, Arthur Collins responds: ‘I doubt that it 
was as many as a million.  If you have a million deaths, you have an awful lot of bodies 
to dispose of.  Dead bodies were being thrown into rivers, or burned.  But I use to move 
around Dacca at night.  It was completely empty.  There were roadblocks, but there 
wasn’t obvious killing or fighting going on—there was no small arms fire, let alone 
machine gun fire.  Of course, it was all very unpleasant, but there is a natural tendency 
to inflate figures.  It simply would not have been easy to have a million people dead 
without more obvious evidence of it’.499  
‘….After all, my own direct experience was spasmodic, and the reports of mass 
killings which we received were difficult to evaluate, and there is a tendency to 
exaggerate numbers.  I never came across evidence of huge funeral pyres or thousands 
of bodies floating down rivers—you’ve got to get rid of bodies.  If you kill an awful lot 
of people, it’s not really practical to bury them.  If you do, they get buried in shallow 
graves.  There was no exhumation of mass shallow graves in Bangladesh’.500  
Former officials at the South Asia Department agree, adding that estimates 
approaching one million did not reach the Foreign Office at any point during the crisis; 
it was only the Indian press, they recall, that occasionally raised such numbers, and 
given that country’s involvement in events, this was immediately presumed to be 
propaganda.501  
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Historical analogies: the Nigerian Civil War  
Before being posted to East Pakistan, Arthur Collins worked at the West African Desk 
of the Foreign Office during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970).  In 1967, the Ibo 
population in the country’s eastern regions sought to secede, declaring independence as 
the state of Biafra.  The federal military government responded with military repression 
and a rigorous blockade that prevented basic necessities from reaching the East, 
extending to international humanitarian relief aid distributed by the Red Cross; 
hundreds upon thousands reportedly died, many from starvation, leading to widespread 
accusations of genocide.502   
The British had granted Nigeria independence only a few years earlier, in 1960.  
Confronted by a secession crisis in the recently independent country, Harold Wilson’s 
administration controversially supplied arms to the Nigerian federal government, 
effectively assisting to reassert the authority of the state.503  Britain’s motives in this 
case are generally traced to oil interests,504 although Wilson himself implied that the 
British retained a moral responsibility towards a region to which it had only recently 
granted independence—“it was undoubtedly right to help an ex-colony and fellow 
Commonwealth country when it faced secession”.505  
Arthur Collins, when asked to comment on his experience of these events in 
comparison to those of East Pakistan, responded that although the forms of violence 
may have been comparable, the contexts in which they took place and the reactions each 
evoked from HMG were notably distinct.  He states: ‘What was British policy in the 
Nigerian civil war?  It was to maintain the integrity of Nigeria—to prevent the country 
splitting up.  While we had sympathy with the Ibos at the human level, we did not agree 
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with independence for Eastern Nigeria.’506  ‘…similar things [as in East Pakistan] were 
happening there, possibly on a larger scale.  There was mass starvation, and there were 
mass killings.  A lot of people certainly died in the Biafran civil war—I’m just more 
cautious about the war in which I was actually present….In any case, our government 
was subjected to a great deal of criticism for supporting the “wrong side”….this did not 
happen with East Pakistan’.507 
During the 1971 crisis, Foreign Office officials (including Collins) did not make 
explicit comparisons to Nigeria in internal records.  In contrast, parliamentarians from 
both sides of the floor did so on a number of occasions—the Conservatives, generally as 
a reminder to the House of the controversies inherent in post-colonial civil wars and 
also as an endorsement of HMG’s commitment to non-intervention, while Labour 
evoked Nigeria to demonstrate why the government should take action short of 
unilateral intervention, such as multilateral initiatives through international 
organizations, or public condemnations of the military campaign.  Both political parties, 
while supporting HMG’s humanitarian relief contributions to East Pakistan, also 
brought up Nigeria as a reminder to the government of the complexities of distributing 
aid during a civil war, particularly as regional authorities who were responsible for (and 
indeed often insisted on) distributing aid were themselves parties to the conflict.508  
Beyond such statements, however, the two cases did not appear to have been 
considered analogous; Pakistan did not harbour key material (oil) interests which might 
require protection by unilateral measures, and Britain’s sense of responsibility towards 
the region from which it had withdrawn a quarter of a century ago appeared to be much 
diminished in comparison to that towards Nigeria.  Hence, as Richard Wood stated 
during a debate on East Pakistan:  
                                                
506 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 30 June 2009. 
507 Arthur Collins, Interview by author, 30 June 2009. 
508 See, in particular, the 14 May, 8 June and 9 June 1971 House of Commons debates (Hansard 
transcripts in FCO 37/887 and FCO 37/889). 
 146 
There are many dissimilarities between this conflict and that in Nigeria, but there is one 
formal and legal similarity which has some importance.  It is that in both cases this is a 
civil war in a Commonwealth country….the problem facing the United Kingdom 
Government is—how can we do anything useful without simply being subjected to the 
charge by Pakistan that we are interfering in its internal affairs and possibly finding that 
anything we do is counter-productive?509   
 
Nigeria, in other words, was primarily interpreted as a deterrent to direct involvement— 
‘Here is an instance where the Nigerian parallel is of importance.’510     
Collins agrees that HMG’s experiences with Nigeria may have bolstered its 
commitment to non-intervention in 1971, seeing as the former created enormous 
controversy, not only within Britain but around the world—‘we took a bashing in the 
media’.511  The memory of such tumult would have been fresh in the minds of those 
working for the Heath administration during the South Asia crisis, although they did not 
vocalize the connection.  Meanwhile, those parliamentarians who did, reminded the 
government of the perils of interference, or alternatively, chided it for not being open to 
the advantages of less robust but arguably more effective measures.  Both framings of 
the Nigerian civil war, openly or implicitly, supported HMG’s core policy of non-
involvement in East Pakistan.  
 
Responsibility to act: Islamabad and London 
Turning to the issue of whether anyone in the British government was responsible for 
acting on reports of state atrocities in East Pakistan—reports which Arthur Collins and 
his colleagues in Dacca had written themselves, Collins responded: ‘Who was 
responsible? You can see from my telegrams, Whitehall knew about the [Pakistani] 
Army campaign….I’m sure the High Commissioner in Islamabad would’ve talked 
matters over, possibly with the head of state.  He would have taken—should have 
taken—any opportunity he had to express concern.  Certainly he would have been able 
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to, at least, to the most senior levels of the Pakistani government.  What the High 
Commission in West Pakistan was doing, however, was not reported to us in the East.  
We were responsible to them, they were not responsible to us’.512 
 Collins continues, ‘We also went occasionally to the cantonment to see the 
Pakistani military people, and on occasion you could see young Bengali resistance men 
brought in, and they looked pretty miserable because they knew what lay ahead of them.  
But one couldn’t turn to a Pakistani officer, and say, “Don’t shoot that man!”  It would 
have been quite useless for us to make appeals to Pakistani officers.  And if we had said 
anything, it wouldn’t have affected their actions, because they were just carrying out 
orders from their superiors’. 513  ‘It was our business to report what was going on, and 
for other people to put the pressure on’.514  
As for the Dacca High Commission, he explains, ‘the problem any Deputy 
Commissioner had in trying to get a message to the top level of Pakistani government, 
was that the military were then in charge.  There was no longer any civilian 
government.  In 1970, when life was more or less normal, I or the Deputy High 
Commissioner would meet with senior civilian officials posted in Dacca.  After the 25th 
of March, there was one general there who was in charge of the crackdown—Tikka 
Khan—and he wasn’t interested in talking to anyone.  He was a military headquarters 
man making his military dispositions’.515  ‘But, in the end, what was of particular 
concern to us?  Our own people.  A policy of intervention has to be decided by 
headquarters.  It was a matter for London, and for our High Commissioner in Islamabad 
to make representations to the people who really mattered, the people who actually 
controlled it all’.516   
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Reflecting on whether the High Commissioner in Islamabad had in fact 
expressed concern about the violence to Pakistani authorities, Collins declares: ‘I’m not 
convinced that we were doing all that we could do.  I simply do not know.  These things 
are not necessarily divulged to the lower levels.  There’s a general policy in the Foreign 
Office that you’re told what you need to know; you’re not told what you don’t need to 
know.…In such sensitive conditions, these things have to be done with a high degree of 
discretion, otherwise they’re ineffective.  It may have been done, but it wasn’t the High 
Commissioner’s responsibility to report to us.  He was responsible to London.  So if the 
Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, was giving instructions to that effect, then the 
High Commissioner would have carried them out.  If Edward Heath, the Prime 
Minister, wanted something done, the High Commissioner would have obeyed his 
instructions’.517 
 
Islamabad: the British High Commission 
No instructions during what appeared to be a civil war 
According to Peter Smith, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Office gave the 
British High Commission in Islamabad any directions during the 1971 crisis in 
Pakistan—‘we were left alone’.518  The only exception was when London asked the 
High Commissioner to make ‘personal representations’ to the Pakistani President on 
Sheikh Mujib’s behalf—‘not because they actually cared so much,’ Smith clarifies, ‘so 
much as, you have to be able to say you’re doing these things to Parliament’.519  
As for the violence, ‘[o]bviously there were nasty things going on, but in any 
civil war, very nasty things go on.  However, I didn’t get the impression of any mass 
cruelty going on.  It was just the reaction of a central government to a rebellion.  Now, 
whether they used too much force is another question.  All I can say is, looking back 
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with a very deficient memory, it seems to me unlikely that there would have been any 
organized “genocide” (if we have to use that term), but undoubtedly, a certain 
carelessness about who and how many were killed.  I mean, as the Pakistanis said, 
“they’re nothing but bloody Bengalis!”  Probably, if I had seen the text of that 
resolution [Parliamentary Motion 592 ‘Genocide in East Pakistan’520] in 1971, I would 
have thought it was overstating the case’.521  
 
Impediments to intelligence: discerning facts from official representation 
Not only was it challenging to understand what was happening during the crisis, Smith 
continues, diplomats are actively prevented from knowing.  ‘One of the difficulties of 
being in the foreign service is you go to a place, and the first people you meet are the 
officials, or the politicians, and if you are in a place that is only nominally a democracy 
like Islamabad, then you find it very difficult to get at the truth, or the truth about the 
other side’.523  ‘You have to remember that the people we met were selected.  You can’t 
ever believe anything as a diplomat!’524  ‘I went to Dacca in the summer of 1971.  My 
route was known.  So I wouldn’t have seen any horrors, they would’ve been kept away 
from me.’525  ‘It’s difficult for government representatives.  They are in a state of 
“impotence”.  I wasn’t in a position to see or say; it’s very hard to get at the truth’.526  
 
The parliamentary delegation’s experience 
James Ramsden and Toby Jessel, members of the British parliamentary delegation who 
visited India and Pakistan from 21 June to 3 July 1971, confirm the difficulties of trying 
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to establish responsibility for the mass violence then occurring in East Pakistan.527  Both 
former Conservative MPs describe the experience as one that marked them deeply.  
They have retained numerous documents relating to the delegation’s visit, including 
tape recordings, photos and notes they made at the time.  
In West Pakistan, the delegation met with senior government officials, including 
Yahya Khan, who declared they were free to go where they pleased.  In the East, 
however, Martial Law Authorities insisted on guiding them through the province, 
pointing out areas where Bengali insurgents had committed acts of sabotage and, on 
occasion, atrocities against non-Bengalis.528  At the delegation’s request, they were also 
shown other areas—large swathes of land and (usually Hindu) villages destroyed ‘out of 
necessity’529 by the Pakistani army during counter-insurgency operations.  Afterwards, 
they were escorted to functioning villages where, they were told, the army was 
mounting a ‘win the hearts and minds’530 campaign to restore confidence.  
The delegation was then introduced to local British businessmen who, for the 
most part, supported the military operations.532  They watched a parade of ‘Civil Armed 
Forces’ or reconstituted police forces made up of non-Bengalis.  They met with ‘Peace 
Committees’ of Bengalis who supported the central government and who complained 
that their relatives were being forcefully detained by India in the so-called refugee 
camps in order, they believed, to stoke international opinion against the Khan 
government.533  During the delegation’s final days in the province, they toured a 
hospital sheltering non-Bengalis, who had allegedly been attacked by nationalist mobs.  
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‘We felt the government’s purpose in getting us to go to these places was to make us see 
that the violence had not been all one sided,’ recorded Jessel in his tour notes.535  Yet 
‘surreptitious questioning of reliable local people indicated that: (i) Hindu villages in 
surrounding country…had recently been attacked by the army. (ii) People taken into 
custody by the army were taken into a compound close by one of the missions and were 
never seen again.  About 20 shots a day had been heard, until a few days previously 
when they had stopped.  A number of corpses had been floating about in the river 
nearby’.536  
In the Indian provinces of Tripura and West Bengal, after meeting with Indira 
Gandhi, as well as refugee camp authorities and NGO representatives, the delegation 
was presented with a contrasting picture.  Hundreds of thousands of East Bengali 
refugees, mainly Hindus, many shot or mutilated, were crowded into makeshift camps 
suffering from malnutrition and disease.538  Thousands more continued to arrive by boat 
or foot.  According to Jessel, ‘This was the shocking part’ where they were finally able 
to make sense of what they had seen in East Pakistan.539  ‘We each asked many 
refugees, selected at random, where they had come from, why they had come, and if 
they would return.  Overwhelmingly they said they had come because their villages or 
others nearby, had been attacked by the Pakistani army; people (often relatives) had 
been shot, girls raped, and houses burned or knocked down.  They had fled for their 
lives; and would return only when it was safe, or when Mujib said it was safe or if the 
Army left.  A large proportion of recent refugees were Hindu….Naturally we were 
shocked by what we encountered’.540  
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Arthur Collins, of the Dacca Deputy High Commission, recalls that another 
parliamentary delegation which had visited Pakistan earlier that year had undergone a 
similar experience: ‘They’d been briefed in London, they’d been briefed in Islamabad, 
then they came to Dacca, and I told them what was happening.  They were then taken 
by their West Pakistani hosts on a tour of Dacca, after which, they said they’d been 
shown everything, and the place looked pretty nice!  So I said, “I’ll show you things 
you perhaps haven’t seen yet”.…I took them to Old Dacca and showed them the central 
area, which had been burnt to the ground.  They were absolutely shocked, and said “we 
were shown nothing of this, why were we not shown this?”  There was, most certainly, 
a contrast between the official line—and what actually happened’.541 
 
Britain was not responsible    
Peter Smith, in Islamabad, states that he could not have understood the various 
dimensions of violence, including that of state terror, characterising the crisis in East 
Pakistan.  He appeared sincerely surprised and troubled when shown reports of 
atrocities allegedly committed by government forces, which he admits he would have 
read in 1971.  ‘I have little memory of that time—not only little memory of the facts, 
but also of the feelings’.542  ‘But you couldn’t have done anything about it, of course.  
They were addressed to London, for one thing, and we had no power to do anything 
anyway’.543 
 ‘…and those telegrams,’ Smith continues, ‘naturally, would have gone to the 
government in London, and they would have known.  But what could they have 
done?’544  The problem is that ‘Britain has an inherited responsibility which it cannot 
exercise. She’s like a grandmother—she can tell her grandchildren what to do, but of 
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course they’re not going to listen.  Why should they?!’545  ‘So did we know?  Yes, I 
think we did know, but we didn’t know where the responsibility lay.  Awful things were 
happening (possibly on both sides, but certainly by the Pakistani Army), but who was 
responsible for it?’546 
 
British diplomats: ‘the realm of the possible’ 547  
‘Diplomacy is a subtle kind of life.…You just do what you can within the realm of the 
possible,’ remarks Arthur Collins.548  Military intervention, he notes for example, 
simply ‘wasn’t feasible.  During the November 1970 cyclones, Britain sent a military 
taskforce to East Pakistan from Singapore.  Royal marines arrived at Dacca airport with 
insufficient technical clearance and were surrounded by the Pakistani Army, until we 
sorted out on what basis these British troops had arrived in East Pakistan.  We probably 
had a small brigade in Singapore.  The Pakistan Army was a huge Army—many, many 
thousands.  If the British had tried to siege Dacca, it could have erupted into a big 
affair’.549 (Ian McCluney agrees: Britain could not, and would not, have considered 
militarily intervening in a conflict between two major sovereign countries, each with 
their own sophisticated military forces—‘It was not like a conflict in some 
underdeveloped African country.’550)  All the same, Collins emphasizes, ‘I wouldn’t 
wish you to draw the conclusion that we were in any way indifferent to what was going 
on.  We were not indifferent’.551 
When asked to comment on the fact that the British government did not publicly 
(nor, for the most part, privately) acknowledge reports of state terror which he himself 
compiled, Collins responded: ‘I believe there was a strong case for telling the Pakistani 
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authorities that “reports had reached us of atrocities, and we sincerely hoped they were 
not true, and if they were true, that steps would immediately be taken to ensure that the 
humane rules of war were followed.”  There could be no justification for such acts, 
particularly within the Commonwealth context.  But we had to be careful because it was 
internal—it was their business.  It was purely internal business, and we would not have 
wanted to disrupt the Commonwealth relationship’.552  
‘As a diplomat, one is aware of the possibility of peaceful resolution of most 
differences of view; one is aware of the answer lying in political accommodation.  One 
could see that the answer was not in military repression.  To that extent we felt a natural 
affinity with East Bengalis, but we had to keep that in check because we were 
accredited to Pakistan.  On the other hand, we understood West Pakistan’s desire to 
preserve the integrity of the country’.553  Diplomats on the subcontinent, it would 
appear, felt themselves powerless (physically and politically) to affect the situation.  
They considered themselves, in Collins’ words, ‘in a bit of a bind’554—unable and 
unauthorized to change the course of violence in the region, yet sympathetic to its 
human consequences. 
 
London: the Foreign Office 
The role of historical analogies during the crisis 
At a conference in 2009 on Britain and the Cold War, Douglas Hurd (Heath’s former 
Political Secretary and later Foreign Secretary from 1989-1995), was asked to comment 
on his oft-quoted statement that, “Widely used, history can give pleasure and provide us 
with a useful tool; but we should not become its slaves”.555  Hurd responded that this 
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was indeed his point of view—policy makers should and do make decisions according 
to contemporary concerns, and while these decisions are certainly informed by past 
events, this should be kept to a minimum or one risks losing grasp of present realities.556  
Hurd continued by remarking on the fact that researchers constantly ask him to explain 
why he and other officials chose to adopt one policy over another towards a given 
external affair.  Regrettably, he tells them, isolating the various motivations behind 
foreign policy is virtually impossible.  Government ministers have heavily-laden 
schedules in which world events are lodged together: ‘The life of a foreign secretary is 
chaotic….Individual issues are handled in a situation of pell mell.  You can rarely get 
away and think about any issue for twenty-four hours—decisions are taken within a web 
of other concerns’.557  (He declined my request for an interview, writing that while he 
‘usually liked to help Ph.D. students…this time it is beyond my power….I do not recall 
becoming involved at any time in the secession of Bangladesh’.558) 
Ian McCluney, Assistant Private Secretary to Douglas-Home in 1971, agrees 
with Hurd that foreign policy decisions are often taken hurriedly.  While he does not 
recall how this may have affected decision-making during the East Pakistan crisis, he 
remembers how FCO officials of the era were faced daily with a great pile of telegrams, 
which they had to select, read, write an assessment of, and get to the Foreign Secretary 
(ideally before other colleagues did).559  The Foreign Secretary, in turn, was confronted 
nightly with this mass of information relating to events around the globe, and had to 
then decide what position to take by morning.560  
There was, in consequence, little time to craft policy based on an informed 
understanding of the situation in question—or relevant circumstances in the past.  
Hence Peter Beck, in his study on the functionality of history at the Foreign Office from 
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1950 to 1976, explores ‘the use, more frequently the non-use, of history by 
administrators and policy makers’.561  There is a gap between history and policy 
making, he contends, with public policy having an ‘erratic, often detached, relationship 
with…historians’.562  Policymakers of the period, it may even be said, ‘ignored’ history, 
and past precedents no matter how pertinent, were rarely consulted.563  As Lord Strang 
observed, ‘Decisions on foreign policy have often to be taken at short notice on 
incomplete information and with not much time for thought.  Ministers are very busy 
and harassed men.  They cannot…bear to read long and elaborate disquisitions.  Their 
orders to their advisers are almost invariably: “Do please try to keep it short”.’564  
With regards to East Pakistan, it is true that, the Heath government did not 
appear to use (nor misuse) history to any great extent.  Foreign Office files on the crisis 
rarely referred to past events that were arguably linked—namely Britain’s (divisive) 
imperial rule of the subcontinent, its subsequent departure and role in drawing the 
boundaries of the successor states, the widespread communal violence between Hindus 
and Muslims after partition, as well as the two Indo-Pakistan wars that were to follow.  
(Indeed, it was during these events that Britain set a firm precedent for non-intervention 
in the subcontinent in the post-independence era, a fact that will be related in the next 
chapter.)  The Heath government’s lack of reference to them implies that its reactions to 
the break-up of Pakistan were not conditioned by an overt sense of historical 
consciousness.  The recent past by comparison—the Nigerian civil war—was evoked 
much more often (by parliamentarians, not by government officials) as a reason to 
refrain from acting in Commonwealth civil wars.  
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Yet while the government may have ‘used’ history only to a marginal degree—
namely, as a deterrent to direct involvement—it was not because it was wilfully 
ignoring it.  Rather, officials (particularly in the South Asia Department) appeared to 
have been wholly absorbed in analysing the daily flow of information emerging from 
the subcontinent, as well as monitoring British public opinion, and adjusting their policy 
recommendations accordingly.  Senior officials, for their part, relied heavily on these 
summaries and recommendations (there is no evidence that either Heath or Home ever 
scripted anything independently on the crisis) in order to gain a basic understanding of 
what the Prime Minister described as an ‘area…so racked by confusion, fear and 
lawlessness, as well as having to contend with great natural disasters’.565  This 
understanding, moreover, needed to be constantly updated.  As the Prime Minister 
admitted to his Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs six months into the crisis: ‘I find it 
very difficult to follow in detail the course of events concerning the refugees from East 
Pakistan, the activities of the voluntary agencies, the United Nations effort and where 
each of these stand in relation to the Indian and Pakistan governments’.566  HMG’s 
policy in 1971 was, in other words, primarily a reactive one—grounded in the then 
current events on the subcontinent—which officials, both at the time and since, repeat 
were markedly difficult to grasp. 
Former South Asia Department officials (some of who had obtained 
undergraduate degrees in South Asian studies prior to assuming their positions and were 
thus versed in the region’s history) confirm that past precedents could factor only 
minimally into their assessments during the Pakistan crisis owing to their heightened 
workload during the period.  Indeed, they say, their tasks were so onerous, they barely 
remember the nature of the crisis itself, but instead those aspects in which the Foreign 
Office was directly involved: meetings with leaders from the subcontinent, and the 
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drama surrounding British evacuations from the region.  Andrew Stuart, for example, 
formerly stationed at the Pakistan desk, admits that:  
The only two actions which I remember…were when HMG decided…to fly British 
nationals away from West Pakistan, out of the way of Indian bombing and secondly 
when Mr. Bhutto decided to release Sheikh Mujib from imprisonment in West Pakistan 
and fly him to London.  In the Foreign Office we received the (totally unexpected) 
information when he was already in the air and I, and the relevant FCO minister 
Anthony Royle [the Under Secretary of State], went to Heathrow to meet him.  There 
we asked him what he wanted to do and he said he wished to return to Bangladesh as 
quickly as possible.  We therefore borrowed an RAF plane and sent him 
eastwards….We held no formal or informal discussions with him as he was obviously 
extremely tired and somewhat disorientated.567   
 
This, according to Stuart, compromises the extent of his memories of the crisis. 
Richard Fell, a junior officer at the Pakistan desk responsible for assessing 
reports from the region, recalls precisely the same events.568  The only other aspects he 
says he remembers with clarity were the stream of constant paperwork in the office and 
the fact that reports from diplomats in East and West Pakistan could be fairly 
perplexing; they described different forms of violence and often contradicted each 
other, indicating to London that there was no single guilty party per se—or that regional 
intelligence itself was flawed.  (Interestingly, Fell, who was twenty-five at the time, has 
no recollection of the Foreign Office’s December 1971 legal opinion pertaining to 
genocide in East Pakistan, despite the document being addressed to him.569)  
John Birch, of the India Desk, agrees that there was a tangible sense of disarray 
in the South Asia Department at the time. ‘We spent our days reading telegrams and 
making thorough assessments which we then sent to the Cabinet Joint Intelligence 
Committee.  During that time, there was so much going on in East Pakistan we were 
just trying to cope with events as they happened’.570  From the cyclones in 1970 
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onwards, ‘it was all a blur’, leaving little time to reflect on the past.571 
 
Perception: civil war  
Avoid discussing systematic state terror  
Owing to the intense departmental flurry, the standard ‘pell mell’572 of the Foreign 
Office, and the rather contradictory depiction of events emerging from the region, 
London’s dominant perception of the crisis remained that of a civil war, involving 
atrocities on ‘both sides’.  The inconvenient possibility that systematic state terror, 
possibly constituting genocide was transpiring at the same time—despite two Foreign 
Office legal opinions indicating it likely was—was seemingly not discussed.  Not 
surprisingly, mention of this provocative term caused the government considerable 
agitation.  In early July, for example, word reached Whitehall that John Stonehouse was 
going to personally appeal to the Security Council to condemn Pakistan’s actions as a 
breach of the 1948 Genocide Convention—and that he had the support of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  ‘Stonehouse,’ British officials in India reported, ‘was now 
considering whether, how and when to explore this particular bomb’.573  
A cluster of alarmed telegrams followed, assessing whether the MP, ‘armed with 
such ammunition’, would also pursue ‘the genocide question’ in London, and whether 
the UNHCR did in fact support his efforts.574  India’s English-language daily The 
Statesman, it was noted with concern, was publicising Stonehouse’s controversial 
actions, including his plan to allegedly petition for ‘a UN task force…to Bangladesh to 
stop the genocide being committed there by the Pakistani Army.  Mr Stonehouse also 
wanted an international commission of jurists sent…to consider the case of genocide’ 
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and promised ‘to put pressure on the British Government to move these proposals 
at…the Security Council’.575  ‘Mr Stonehouse felt that world conscience had at last 
been stirred,’ the newspaper enthusiastically concluded.576  
Stonehouse, and the parliamentarians who supported him, continued to push the 
House of Commons to debate ‘Genocide in East Bengal’577 and the possibility of 
multilateral intervention through the United Nations.  Throughout the conflict, however, 
Britain refrained from acknowledging those aspects of the crisis that would have 
potentially validated such pressure.  Instead, having agreed that pursing the question of 
genocide was futile and would ‘serve no useful purpose’,578 the conflict was described 
as a civil war, because that is what it appeared to be in the main, and because 
acknowledging other aspects would likely have ‘precipitated public controversy’,579 
causing the government unnecessary embarrassment.  These sentiments, of course, were 
not explicitly expressed outside of the two confidential legal opinions, but they were 
implied by what was, for the most part, a non-discussion of the issue of systematic 
violence. 
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Summary: diplomats and the East Pakistan crisis 
 
The experiences of British officials on the subcontinent and in the Foreign Office 
during the East Pakistan crisis reflect an array of political priorities and practical 
realities, which generally reinforced the government’s preference for neutrality and non-
interference.  
In Pakistan, diplomats in both wings of the country aimed to document the crisis 
as accurately as possible, yet limited sources of information and restricted mobility 
under the ‘fog of war and atrocity’580 impeded their efforts.  British representatives, 
furthermore, were occupied with various duties (of which protecting nationals took 
priority), and frequently in the company of local authorities.  They, and other British 
observers who toured the region, had to constantly discern reality from the state-
endorsed interpretation of events that, at best, conveyed only partial information; most 
often, ‘the horrors’ were kept away.581  Compiling sound situation assessments under 
such conditions was exceedingly difficult.  Of no small significance in this regard, was 
the unusual territorial structure of the country, which meant that diplomats in East and 
West Pakistan frequently held differing provincial angles on the crisis, and framed 
events to London in a manner that was, at times, contradictory.  
Foreign Office officials receiving these varied interpretations of the crisis, some 
dispassionate, others implicitly critical, suspected those who submitted the latter were 
partial or ‘less than objective’,582 particularly if they had intimate knowledge of the 
region, or described events in what could be regarded as an “emotional”583 manner.  
This suspicion effectively undermined the credibility of their reports and possibly 
underscored the change of leadership at High Commissions in both wings of Pakistan.  
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Officials in London, it is to be remembered, made decisions on these issues at short 
notice with little time for reflection amidst the ‘web of other concerns’584 at the Foreign 
Office, seeking to meet the heightened workload imposed by the distant crisis.  
Officials at all levels of government appeared to be in a dilemma; none 
unequivocally supported the Pakistani military campaign against suspected Bengali 
dissidents, yet it was accepted that a state threatened with a nationalist insurgency, 
would take measures to preserve its territorial integrity (albeit Britain directly 
supporting such a state, as in the recent past, was not viewed favourably, given the 
controversy that involvement had generated).  However brutal these measures may have 
been, nationalists and locals in East Pakistan also appeared to be guilty of gratuitous 
violence, effectively blurring the line between perpetrator and victim.  Attributing 
responsibility for the crisis was thus no straightforward task.  Responsibility to express 
concern to the Pakistani government about events, meanwhile, was considered to be the 
domain of superiors.  Finally, reports from the region did not indicate victims 
numbering in the millions; there was no knowledge whatsoever, officials repeat, of such 
high figures. 
These testimonies, overall, provide insights into the diffusion of responsibility 
within the British government, the compartmentalization of duties, the sense of distance 
the British felt towards events, why dissent (if felt) was difficult to express and, finally, 
how government perceptions were shaped.  The conclusion that policy-makers 
ultimately drew from this situation was that East Pakistan was embroiled in a bitter 
medium-scale civil war fuelled by reciprocal atrocities; such a complex communal 
conflict not only justified but required neutrality on the part of external governments, as 
the experience of the Nigerian civil war had apparently demonstrated.  Anything which 
challenged this interpretation, be it regional officials who meticulously documented acts 
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of state terror, parliamentarians who demanded to debate whether these acts constituted 
genocide, or the conclusions of internal legal opinions, was generally disapproved of or 
disregarded. 
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IV. HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
Britain’s responses to the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 were largely shaped by 
circumstantial factors described in the last chapters, particularly: the reports compiled 
by diplomats working amidst the conflict, the Foreign Office’s interpretation and 
perception of these in the context of other world affairs, public and parliamentary 
pressure, and finally, the government’s numerous practical and humanitarian priorities 
vis-a-vis the subcontinent.  All of these influencing elements unfolded against the 
geopolitical divisions and international paralysis characteristic of the Cold War era, and 
taken together, led the government to adopt an approach that incorporated both reserve 
and initiative. 
Notwithstanding the significance of the above, this chapter illustrates how 
British responses to the crisis were also conditioned by an array of other circumstances, 
overlapping between the contextual and the historical.  These affected the crisis only 
indirectly, but nevertheless constituted the backdrop for the government’s choices in 
1971, and relate largely to Britain’s bumpy post-war transition into a secondary 
European power that, as it receded from former spheres of activity, employed both 
intervention and retreat to manage crises in its former colonies.  By the 1970s, the latter 
(non-intervention) appeared to be the strategy of choice, leading experienced observers 
to conclude:  
The British public, having shed the Empire, tends to concentrate its attention somewhat 
narrowly on its own back garden…External affairs tend to be regarded as a succession 
of crises, which we would be as well to keep out of if we can; and, as our imperial past 
recedes, this feeling of non-involvement is more easily sustained.586 
 
With regards to the subcontinent, it will be demonstrated that this proclivity towards 
non-intervention was exhibited immediately following Indian independence, and in the 
decades subsequent, when time and again the Commonwealth proved ineffective as a 
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forum of resolution and Britain turned to bilateral diplomacy to cultivate its regional 
interests.  This broad overview, starting at partition and ending with the crisis, while 
again not immediately related to the latter in all of its details, permits a holistic 
understanding of Anglo-Pakistan and Anglo-Indian relations in the post-independence 
era—providing key insights into the subtext for Britain’s reactions to the 1971 crisis in 
the context of its wider post-war historical trajectory.  
The Eurocentric vision of the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, was of 
course pivotal in this trajectory, and as the Commonwealth and other external priorities 
receded into the background, Europe dominated the government’s foreign policy, 
absorbing the greater part of its attention.  As the former Deputy High Commissioner in 
Dacca ruminated: ‘Could we have done more [during the crisis]?  Should we have done 
more?  At the end of the day, you have to ask yourself what were the main concerns of 
the British Cabinet?  At that time, it was becoming members of the European 
Community.  That was Edward Heath’s main preoccupation’.587  
This ‘preoccupation’, it is important to point out, did not prevent the Heath 
government from remaining moderately active in international affairs, as demonstrated 
by their diplomatic and aid-related initiatives during the crisis.  Their efforts with 
regards to the latter are, in fact, but one example amongst several small-scale overseas 
endeavours, described below, that the government undertook during the period; these 
endeavours, while rarely achieving their intended aims, demonstrate that HMG’s focus 
in the early 1970s was not exclusively on Britain’s ‘back garden’, at least to the extent 
previously assumed.  Europe and the domestic sphere, of course, remained the highest 
priority, surpassing relations with both the USA and the Commonwealth, and implicitly 
conditioned policy making during the crisis; as such, they merit description along with 
the government’s activities further a field.  The broad post-war context in which the 
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Heath government functioned—the domestic and foreign policy initiatives and 
challenges that, for the most part—indirectly shaped its responses to the East Pakistan 
crisis, is thus the subject of the following chapter. 
  
i. 1970-1974: THE HEATH GOVERNMENT 
Foreign policy: Europe 
British foreign policy under Edward Heath, it is widely acknowledged, had one primary 
aim: joining the European Economic Community.  On 30 June 1970, only 11 days after 
the Conservatives took office, UK-EEC negotiations began.  For Heath, entering Europe 
was the best way to avoid another European war, stimulate British industry, and find a 
role for Britain after two decades of decolonization had rendered the Empire all but a 
memory.588  The Foreign Office agreed: Europe “lies at the centre of our policies”.589  
Failure to develop links “would leave Britain increasingly on the margins of events—
both political and economic”.590  
The prospect of European entry, of course, was not novel—Britain, since the end 
of World War II, had been drawing closer to the continent, attracted by the promise of 
collective European security, economic stimulus, and counter-balancing American 
power.  Indeed, Churchill had indicated the path which post-war British politics would 
take in 1946 with his entreaty to continental leaders “to re-create the European family, 
or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in 
peace, in safety and in freedom.  We must build a kind of United States of Europe”.591  
Between 1948 and 1949, Britain became a founding member of a number of 
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organizations aimed at fostering European integration, including the Western European 
Union (1948) and the Council of Europe (1949).  It was also a co-founder of NATO 
(1949), the transatlantic defence organization considered vital to Western Europe’s 
post-war security.   
Finally, in 1961, Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan submitted 
Britain’s first European membership application.  The act vexed a number of MPs, both 
on the left and the right, who still believed Britain’s interests lay further abroad, and that 
European entry threatened a loss of identity, sovereignty and economic independence. 
Possibly in order to assuage such concerns, Britain’s participation in the Western 
European Union and the Council of Europe turned out to be somewhat half-hearted, 
suggesting to some leaders on the continent that ‘London would never concede any 
effective supranational power in partnership with other European nations’.592  
After the French vetoed Britain’s 1961 bid, Parliament continued debating 
European entry, and those in favour gradually increased.  However, it was not until 
Edward Heath’s premiership that Britain’s crawl towards Europe transformed into a 
decisive march.  Heath was a ‘well-known Europhile’.593  During the 1930s, he was 
staunchly against appeasement, having accused Chamberlain of “turning all four cheeks 
to European dictatorship”.594  His service in the British Navy during WWII reinforced 
his commitment to collective European defence.  ‘Heath’s decade as a military man, on 
active and reserve service, was an important part of his life,’ states Denis MacShane, 
Labour MP and author of a slim (unauthorized) biography of the Tory leader.  
‘.…Heath knew a Europe of war and worked for a Europe of peace’.595   
Indeed, Heath’s maiden speech to the House of Commons in 1950 centred on 
the benefits of European unity, at the time, through the proposed European Coal and 
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Steel Community.  A decade later, as Macmillan’s Minister of Labour, Heath negotiated 
vigorously for a year and half to get Britain’s EEC bid accepted, earning him the 
reputation of his Party’s ‘most dedicated European’596 or, as political commentator 
Hugo Young declared, “the most qualified ‘European’ in Tory politics”.597  
 Heath was, moreover, an enthusiastic party policy-maker who ‘had his hands 
firmly on the tiller of policy making’598 before and after taking office. The strong ‘style 
and personality of the Prime Minister [was]…central to the government’s working’599—
“In public and in private, it was a Heath government throughout”.600  Under such 
leadership, British foreign policy in the early 1970s was, in many respects, a Europe 
policy.  This for many analysts, constituted the ‘most profound revolution’601 in British 
official thinking in the twentieth century.   
Other traditional spheres of external activity became somewhat secondary—
even Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the USA (although, to what extent, is 
debateable).  From the perspective of Heath’s biographer, John Campbell: ‘The most 
radical aspect of Heath’s foreign policy—differentiating his Government sharply from 
every previous post war administration, Conservative or Labour, and from all his 
successors over the next sixteen years as well—was his determination not to have a 
special relationship with the United States’.602  Hugo Young agrees: Heath was “by the 
standards of post-war convention, a less convinced Atlanticist than any other British 
leader”.603  For Kissinger, it was remarkable how “[p]aradoxically, while the other 
European leaders strove to improve their relations with us…Heath went in the opposite 
                                                
596 Martin Holmes, The Failure of the Heath Government, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), 
3.   
597 Quoted in Benvenuti ‘Southeast Asia’, 7. 
598 John Ramsden, ‘The Prime Minister and the Making of Policy,’ in 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, 22. 
599 Ramsden ‘Prime Minister’, 21.   
600 David Butler and David Kavanagh (1974), as quoted in Ramsden ‘Prime Minister’, 21; Lewis Baston 
and Anthony Seldon also describe how Heath’s personality influenced policy in ‘Number 10 under 
Edward Heath,’ in 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, 47-74.   
601 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, 2nd ed. 
(Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 224. 
602 Campbell Heath: A Biography, 341. 
603 Quoted in MacShane Heath, 76. 
 169 
direction.  His relations with us were always correct, but they rarely rose above a basic 
reserve that prevented—in the name of Europe—the close co-operation with us that was 
his for the taking”.604  These comments imply that Heath shied from the traditional 
closeness of Anglo-American relations as a matter of policy, a policy that was at once 
pro-European and subtly anti-American. 
In contrast, historians Christopher Hill and Christopher Lord, while accepting 
that Anglo-American relations during the period were discord-ridden, believe that ‘the 
argument that the Heath government represented a consistent and well-thought-out 
effort to wean British foreign policy away from the “special relationship” with the US 
can…be taken too far’.605  Indeed, early talks demonstrate a ‘determination to play the 
classic British foreign policy role of staunch and supportive ally’.606  This, they 
continue, was subverted by disagreements over America’s withdrawal from the Bretton 
Woods fixed-currency system and Kissinger’s unannounced visit to China in July of 
1971.607  Anglo-American friction, as illustrated here, also extended to the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani war, when Heath and President Nixon openly admitted to having “differences 
of opinion”.608  For Simon Smith, these were not the product of ‘any ostentatious 
attempt by the Heath government to distance itself from Washington in order to herald 
its European credentials’,609 but were contiguous with each country’s diverging 
perspectives of Asia since 1945, where Britain’s emphasis on regional relations 
contrasted with American’s Cold War-oriented calculations.  This appears to be 
correct—Anglo-American relations under Heath during the crisis, while not wholly 
antagonistic, simply did not reflect the close collaboration one would expect of states 
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professedly sharing a special relationship, a distance made all the more apparent by the 
Prime Minister’s concerted endeavours to draw nearer to Europe.   
 The government’s rapport with the Commonwealth during this transition suffered 
similarly, as Britain’s trade with states outside of the organisation far exceeded that with 
its members.610  Relations had begun to flag in the preceding decades, when it became 
evident to the British that the association was unlikely to sustain the kind of vital 
strategic collaboration between members that had originally been hoped for (a 
phenomenon which will be examined in detail with regard to India and Pakistan).  
Indeed, already by 1965, a Cabinet Office deputy had concluded that, ‘The old concept 
of the Commonwealth as a cohesive body with common interests in defence and trade, 
meeting from time to time for secret and informal discussion, and recognising the 
Queen as its head, had…disappeared’.611   
 Conversely, even as its perceived practical values diminished, the Commonwealth 
continued to grow, as Britain granted ten territories independence between 1964 and 
1971, swelling membership to its highest level ever.612  Its chief attraction, it would 
appear, lay in its ‘human’ value, as an association of states whose common link 
consisted in a shared social and historical heritage, having been once being under the 
dominion of Britain.  As Heath’s Defence Minister, Peter Carrington, put it:  
a human connection…[is] probably the most significant element of the 
Commonwealth….It is not a power bloc.  It is not a preferential trading partnership as 
once it was.  It is not an Empire.…it consists not of governments but of peoples; and 
those peoples have at some period in their histories been touched by similar influences.613   
 
Indeed, from the Prime Minister’s perspective in 1971, which he readily voiced at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore from 14 to 22 January, the 
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group had become merely “a body of friends brought together by history, free to come 
and go as they wish, to contribute as much or as little as they can”.614   
 The Singapore meeting was one of the first high-level Commonwealth gatherings 
ever to be held outside of London, and as John Young points out in his analysis of 
diplomatic practice during the period, the Prime Minister’s office were aware that the 
new PM was “rather gloomy about finding something useful to talk about”.615  To make 
matters worse, it was feared that Britain’s recent proposal to resume arms sales to South 
Africa (to counter Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean, it was claimed) would be greeted 
with antagonism, which it was.616  Afterwards, Heath felt compelled to express on 
record his opinion that these lengthy meetings merely for “a general chat” were 
“useless”—“there was no excuse at all for this old-fashioned type of prolonged 
jamboree”.617  So it was that his government placed only marginal importance on 
retaining authority over the institution, and while basic respect for the its history and its 
value as a “concert of convenience”618 may have endured, Britain’s shift towards 
Europe meant that the Commonwealth ‘whatever its merits might be, ceased to be the 
“British” Commonwealth in the 1970s’.619 
 Having distanced himself somewhat from these standard spheres of British 
foreign policy, by 1971, Heath began preparing vigorously for EEC entry, aware that he 
and his ministers had little time to win the support of France, the Labour party, and 
several members of their own party.  In other words—precisely as state terror and 
nationalist insurgency took hold of Pakistan’s eastern wing—‘the British had to 
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move’620 on Europe.  After a series of talks between Heath and Georges Pompidou in 
late May 1971, the French President agreed not to veto Britain’s bid.  At the end of 
October, Parliament began officially debating the issue, and soon voted on the terms of 
entry; the government won with a clear majority.621  Months later, the Prime Minister 
signed the Treaty of Accession and Britain formally joined the European Community.622  
For Heath, “It was a wildly exciting moment.  Just forty years after my first visit to 
Paris, I had been able to play a part in bringing about the unity of Europe.  It was an 
historic occasion”.623  So it was that the crowning moment of Heath’s premiership, and 
one of the most vigorous periods of government activity, coincided with international 
disturbances such as the East Pakistan crisis, which although they certainly caused the 
government concern, did not approach the priority given to matters closer to British 
shores.   
 
Domestic policy: modernisation  
Joining Europe was intimately tied to Heath’s chief domestic aim: modernising Britain.  
European entry was widely considered to be a key step towards the modernisation of 
British industry, eventually putting it on par with the more advanced economies on the 
continent.  According to Martin Holmes, Heath’s domestic policies of reducing taxes, 
reforming government machinery and industrial relations law, as well as entering the 
EEC, were all geared towards ‘a regeneration of British industry….For Mr. Heath, the 
commitment to reinvigorate the economy was a strong personal one’.624  
The Conservatives had already publicised their commitment to European entry 
and British industry in their 1966 Manifesto, ‘Action not Words. The New Conservative 
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Programme’.625  ‘Britain must be part of a wider grouping if she is to exert her full 
influence in the world,’ the Manifesto proclaimed. ‘British industry must have far 
bigger markets if it is to develop on the scale required in so many cases by modern 
technology.  This can best be achieved by Britain becoming a member of an enlarged 
European Economic Community to which she herself has so much to contribute’.626  
Widely acknowledged as one of the most prepared British governments ever to enter 
office, the manifesto became the ‘core’ of the Conservatives’ 1970 political plan upon 
taking office.627  ‘For ten years as Tory leader Heath was unwavering in his belief that 
the twin themes of Europe and modernisation were all that really mattered, or at least 
that anything else came a long way behind them in importance,’ so concludes John 
Ramsden. ‘The policies and policy making mechanisms of the Heath government 
cannot be adequately understood unless this is constantly borne in mind’.628 
Britain’s pronounced focus in the early 1970s on Europe and domestic affairs 
indicated to many foreign policy observers at the time that the country was no longer an 
international power—and that government was finally prepared to recognize this.  ‘For 
three decades, the perceptions of British governments of their power and status had 
lagged behind the changing realities of their international situation, and much substance 
had been dissipated on nostalgic attempts to rediscover great power status,’ remark Hill 
and Lord in reference to Joseph Frankel’s influential study of post-war Britain in 
1975.629  ‘Now, UK foreign policy was at last taking a form more appropriate to a 
middle-ranking state whose interests were concentrated on its own immediate region of 
west Europe’.630  
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At the same time as Britain’s external arena contracted, there was no shortage of 
international conflicts erupting forth from its colonial past—including, of course, 
violence in East Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistani war.  ‘As the British Empire faded into 
history books, Heath was faced with intractable left-overs from the heritage of white 
British occupation and denial over centuries and decades of core human rights like self-
governance,’ reflects Denis MacShane.631  ‘These foreign problems provoked anger 
from the liberal-left in Britain but were not first-order priorities.  For Heath there was 
only one international question that mattered: taking Britain in to Europe’.632 
This widely held view of the Heath government may be valid considering the 
energy the administration expended on EEC entry and domestic renewal.  Yet the 
assertion that ‘Europe and modernisation were all that really mattered’633 overlooks 
several of the Heath administration’s early promises and international initiatives 
(including its activities during the East Pakistan crisis), which indicate that the 
government did not make as ‘clean’634 a break as supposed with internationalism.  
Rather, as contended here, the Heath government’s renunciation of ‘Pax Britannia’ was 
‘untidy’635 and transpired in a more uneven manner than is generally acknowledged.   
Indeed, Britain’s varied efforts to influence events on the subcontinent in 1971 
act as a prime example of how the government were not blinkered in their focus on 
Europe and the domestic sphere, but rather sought to exert influence and cultivate 
British political, commercial and defence interests abroad.  The fact that many of these 
initiatives rarely achieved their objectives, as soon became apparent, points not 
necessarily to a lack of will on the government’s behalf, but rather to the constraints 
impinging upon British foreign policy that, at least in part, shaped the government’s 
variegated approach towards the subcontinent in 1971.  
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The government’s international orientation  
While in opposition, Heath’s Conservatives strongly disapproved of Harold Wilson’s 
decision, taken in January 1968, to withdraw British forces from Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East, slashing Britain’s international commitments ‘East of Suez’ (nineteenth 
century political parlance for the British Empire east of the Suez canal).  The Tories 
were not the only ones to protest the act, which had been carried out in the context of 
Britain’s severely declining manpower and resources, and exacerbated by the 1967 
currency crisis and Arab oil embargo.636  Many MPs, on both sides of the floor, agreed 
with Heath’s protestation: “Never before has a British government exerted less 
influence on overseas affairs”.637 
Britain’s presence in the region had been notoriously sensitive since 1956, when 
the Eden government and France militarily intervened against Egypt in the Suez region 
(having engineered an Israeli incursion as an alibi), only to be slapped down by the 
United States and forced to withdraw.638  After the debacle, commonly described as a 
watershed in British history signalling the embarrassing end of Britain as a great 
power,639 Britain accelerated decolonization, a process that had effectively begun with 
its withdrawal from India a decade earlier.  With its self-image as ‘global policeman’640 
battered, many during the Wilson era simply could not accept the decision to relinquish 
Britain’s last source of international prestige.  Thus Heath promised Parliament in 1966, 
“When the time comes…we shall ignore the time phasing laid down by the Prime 
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Minister and his Government for the Far East and the Middle East.  We shall support 
our friends and allies and we shall restore the good name of Britain”.641 
Heath also took pains to link European entry with enhancing Britain’s global 
status; his overtures to leaders on the continent were, he intimated, not an admission of 
Britain’s decline but rather a ‘diplomacy of manoeuvre’.642  As Thomas Bridges (the 
PM’s future Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs) affirmed in 1970, “Mr. Heath does 
not regard British policy in Europe…as regionalism…it is the Government’s view that a 
joint effort with our partners in the E.E.C. is the best means we have of fulfilling a 
number of worldwide objectives”.643  The new Prime Minister was, in other words, 
‘quite as vociferous as his predecessors in rejecting the notion that Britain was merely a 
regional power, confined in its roles to its own corner of the world’.644  His Foreign 
Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, supported him: the Conservatives “have always 
insisted…that British interests can be identified far beyond the horizons of Europe”, he 
declared at a party conference in October of 1970.645  Indeed, according to his 
biographer, ‘Home always believed that Britain, present at the creation of the post-war 
world, should punch above its weight’.646  
Policy papers commissioned by the government from 1970 to 1971 also reflect a 
dedication to international activity.  The 1970 White Paper on defence, for one, 
‘reaffirmed an “east of Suez” commitment’647 and declared that the new 
administration’s objective was ‘to enable Britain to resume, within her resources, a 
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proper share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and stability in the world’.648 
The 1971 Defence Paper reiterated this intention:  
British interests and responsibilities do not lie exclusively within NATO.  Britain’s 
political and trading interests are world-wide and they can flourish only in stable 
conditions.  She must also, therefore, be willing to play her part, though on a scale 
appropriate to her resources, in countering threats to stability outside Europe.  For 
British territories overseas, and for those to whom Britain owes a special duty by treaty 
or otherwise, there is a direct responsibility to provide protection.649  
 
Having forthrightly declared an intention to act overseas, the Conservatives rejected the 
controversial 1969 Duncan Committee Report on overseas representation, which 
maintained that Britain should limit itself to operations within Europe and the North 
Atlantic—its appropriate “area of concentration”.650  They openly expressed ‘important 
reservations about the Committee’s recommendations, in particular the distinction 
drawn between the so-called area of concentration and the “outer-area”—a concept 
which it rejects’.651  The report clearly proposed a ‘retrenchment which many felt 
profoundly misguided.  It was shelved after the general election’.652  
Government policy papers and Heath’s open criticism of Labour’s retrenchment 
in the late 1960s certainly imply that the Conservatives, at least at the start of their 
tenure, intended Britain to play a visible role in upholding international peace and 
security outside of Europe.  When violence erupted in Pakistan in 1971, it was not 
inconceivable that Britain, as a supplement to their efforts in diplomacy and aid, might 
have considered taking stronger action (perhaps by publicly acknowledging the 
existence of state atrocities against civilians, in addition to civil war, or by urging for a 
multilateral approach through the UN).  However, Heath’s overseas ventures on the 
whole turned out to be quite constricted.  Confronted by a barrage of domestic and 
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international impediments, the government—despite its stated intentions—was simply 
unable to influence events beyond Europe and the Atlantic to anywhere near the extent 
to which Britain was previously accustomed.  Hence according to Hill and Lord, ‘Much 
of the first half of the Heath government was…taken up with managing a graceful 
retreat from its early promises in matters of foreign policy’.653  While this state of 
affairs may be said to reflect poorly on the government—accused as it frequently has 
been of ‘U-turning’ both on ideological and practical matters, it in fact speaks more 
pointedly to Britain’s limited material capabilities following decolonization, and 
establishes that by the time of the East Pakistan crisis, Britain had effectively become a 
second-rank power whose international initiatives were necessarily going to be 
circumscribed—although not altogether terminated. 
 
The government’s ‘non-Europe’ foreign policy 654  
During the summer of 1971, the Conservatives strove to fulfil their promise to reverse 
Labour’s withdrawals from Southeast Asia by negotiating a Five Power Commonwealth 
Defence Agreement (FPDA) with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, 
committing Britain militarily to continue defending the region.  According to Heath’s 
Minister of Defence, Peter Carrington, ‘The Five Power Pact was a signal that we in 
Britain had not shrunk to sole and solitary preoccupation with our own home concerns 
and domestic security, and I think it was worth negotiating’.655  The pact, in essence, 
embodied what was originally intended for the Commonwealth association, namely a 
strategic kinship, capable of protecting the regional security interests of its members.   
The FPDA, however, turned out to be primarily a political and consultative 
accord after Heath was forced to acknowledge it could not maintain anything but a 
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token force in the region—90% of its defence budget had already been spent on 
Western Europe, while the crisis in Northern Ireland had absorbed 6 troop battalions.656  
To worsen matters, the Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities compiled 
each year by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, demonstrated that the 
percentage of Britain’s GNP spent on defence from the 1960s was rapidly declining and 
its manpower between 1951 and 1971 fell far behind that of other powers.657  Simply 
put, ‘the Heath government had little more to offer’.658   Strengthening the North 
Atlantic alliance and reinvigorating the British economy, while retaining an influence 
East of Suez, was as ambitious as it was impractical.  Thus, while Heath was ‘eager’659 
to hail the FPDA as proof that Britain still held sway outside of Europe, he ended up 
doing essentially what the previous government had planned, and shifted Britain from 
being the Far East’s ‘main provider of security’ to a mere ‘facilitator’.660  
The Conservatives also intended to reverse Labour’s withdrawals from the Gulf 
and continue providing protection to several small states there.  However, as in the Far 
East, the Defence Ministry quickly realised that the cost and complexity of such a role 
outstripped its capacities.  Meanwhile, the states in question, disenchanted with shifting 
British security guarantees, were anxious to begin their own rearmament program.661 
Heath, however fervently he tried to convince Gulf leaders to accept a limited British 
presence, found the policy was irreversible—‘They all responded in the same terms.  
They were very sorry, but all of their plans for the future were now based on the 
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assumption that Britain would be withdrawing’.662  Unable to negotiate a ‘penny-packet 
commitment’ like that in the Far East, the government exchanged ‘its intended role 
from security provider to external federator’.663  
Britain’s inability to retain a foothold in the region is significant considering ‘the 
Middle East filled Heath with foreboding’664 throughout his premiership.  Just months 
after assuming office, in September 1970, Heath faced his first international emergency 
when members of the Palestine Liberation Organization hijacked five aircraft.  One of 
them landed in London, bringing the Middle East conflict uncomfortably close to home.  
What is more, the British constantly feared that Arab states would cut off Western oil 
supplies, as they had during the Six Day War (5-10 June 1967)—‘a recent memory’ for 
all in government.665  Given these anxieties, it is not surprising that the Middle East was 
high on Western Europe’s political agenda.  Britain’s withdrawals at such a time 
illustrate its shrinking capacity to maintain influence in those regions it considered most 
important, as well as the manner in which external circumstances complicated its 
overseas ambitions.  
Quite apart from its concerns in the Middle and Far East, the Conservative 
government was also determined to settle with Ian Smith’s minority white government 
in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), which, in 1965, had 
unilaterally declared independence from Britain. Douglas-Home, for his part, firmly 
believed that Harold Wilson’s declaration of “no independence before majority rule”666 
had been a “terrible mistake”.667  Indeed, both the Prime Minister and Home agreed that 
resolving ‘one of the last of the great colonial problems’ was a ‘high priority’.668  The 
incentives to settle, it would seem, were many: British sanctions in place since 1965 
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were having little effect on the Rhodesian economy, and they were unpopular with 
many Conservatives just when Heath needed party unity to negotiate European entry.  
The use of force was not an option, moreover, as Britain had long ago reduced its 
military presence in the area.669  British officials thus intently sought to negotiate with 
Smith bilaterally (the Commonwealth was not considered to be a viable forum of 
mediation, particularly as the issue had ignited considerable controversy amongst its 
members670), and although an agreement was almost reached in November 1971, the 
issue remained unresolved until 1979-1980 under Margaret Thatcher’s premiership.  
Of course, Britain’s chief non-European foreign policy concern of the era, like 
that of other Western powers, was the Soviet Union.  ‘Western security,’ the 1971 
Defence Paper stressed, ‘remains under the shadow of the present and potential threat of 
the vast military resources of the Soviet Union’.671  Hence internal documents such as 
the 1970 government ‘War Book’, a chilling series of secret ‘transition-to-war’ 
exercises in the event that a Soviet nuclear attack precipitated World War Three.672 
Nuclear warfare was not the government’s only preoccupation with regards to the 
Eastern bloc.  In 1971, Britain’s internal security intelligence agency, MI5, discovered 
industrial spies were posing as staff at the Soviet Embassy in London.  Rarely had 
national security been under such a direct threat, and the Soviet agents were expelled in 
September 1971.  According to Heath, ‘The expulsion of 105 spies was the most 
important security action ever taken by any Western government’ at the time.673  For 
Douglas-Home, the spy incident was ‘one of the most important episodes of his second 
spell at the Foreign office’.674  
                                                
669 Hill and Lord ‘Foreign Policy’, 294-295. 
670 See Ashton ‘Commonwealth, 1964–71’, 73-94. 
671 Government White Paper on Defence, 23 February 1971, in Current British Foreign Policy, 131-143.  
672 UKNA: Cabinet 134/2880 entitled ‘Home Defence Committee: War Book Subcommittee 1970’; Peter 
Hennessy, ‘ “Inescapable, necessary and lunatic”: Whitehall’s Transition-to-war Planning for World War 
III’, lecture delivered at Britain and the Cold War: 23rd Summer Conference of the Centre for 
Contemporary British History at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, 23 June 2009. 
673 Heath Autobiography, 476. 
674 Thorpe Douglas-Home, 415. 
 182 
East-West relations, of course, were not exclusively antagonistic.  This was the 
era of détente, when Western governments including Britain, recognized that their 
national security interests could also be enhanced by dialogue with the Soviet bloc.  As 
the Defence Ministry declared:  
Western policies must…be based on the twin concepts of defence and détente.  The 
military strength of the Alliance must be maintained at levels sufficient to deter 
aggression, whatever form it may take, at the same time as the Western countries are 
seeking to engage the Soviet Union and her allies in discussions which could lead to a 
real and lasting relaxation of tensions between East and West.675 
 
Concerned as the government may have been, however, this aspect of Britain’s foreign 
policy should not be overemphasized.  For whatever Heath officials declared, they did 
little to open dialogue with the USSR, unlike other post-war Conservative 
administrations; nor did they emulate West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Neue 
Ostpolitik (postulating ‘change through rapprochement’) and try to achieve détente with 
Eastern European countries on an individual basis.  On the contrary, Heath believed a 
reopening of relations must be achieved multilaterally, or risk ‘competitive détente’ 
between Western powers, each ‘out-bid[ding] one another in the concessions they were 
prepared to make to the Soviet Union’.676  Yet, his government did not promote any 
concrete multilateral approaches either.   
For some observers, it is unclear why the administration’s feeble efforts at 
détente were so ‘strangely under-developed’.677  Seen in perspective, they appear to fit a 
pattern in which the government’s initiatives in the Middle East, the Far East and 
Africa, whatever the underlying intention, ended in compromise.  Britain’s courses of 
action during the crisis in East Pakistan were arguably more successful, despite their 
being formulated within the same context, in which the government’s international aims 
were consistently tempered by external and internal constraints.  
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Domestic disarray  
As Heath’s non-European ventures displayed increasing frailty, at home, he was 
assailed by troubles.  EEC entry had created major divisions within the Conservative 
party, with numerous backbench dissenters questioning whether the incentives for entry 
were truly sufficient, or whether Heath was simply ‘desperate to join the EC at any 
price’.678  Indeed, in early 1971—just six months after taking power—public support for 
the Conservatives dropped below 20%, as Labour steadily overtook them in opinion 
polls.679   
Britain in the 1970s, moreover, was fraught with race tensions following the 
waves of immigration in the previous two decades from Commonwealth states—with 
the highest ratio of immigrants, by far, having been born on the Indian subcontinent.680  
This had fundamentally altered the complexion of many British urban areas, posing a 
challenge to the original residents who now ‘had to share space, housing, and welfare 
benefits with new people who had different languages, religions, cultures and behaviour 
patterns’, often unwillingly.681  Such was the context for Enoch Powell’s infamous 
‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968,682 which sparked a series of heated debates over the 
issue of immigration in public and parliament, and ultimately led to his ejection from 
Heath’s shadow cabinet.  These debates continued well into Heath’s premiership, 
absorbing a good part of the government’s attention, and resulted in the Immigration 
Act of 1971 (enacted in 1973) that did indeed contain tighter controls on ‘new 
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Commonwealth’ naturalisation.683  During the East Pakistan crisis, there is no evidence 
on record that the Powellites or any other parliamentarians who opposed large-scale 
Commonwealth immigration sought to exert pressure on the government, fearing 
perhaps, that the crisis would cause a massive influx of refugees into Britain.  Likewise, 
those on different parts of the political spectrum, such as backbench Empire Tories, the 
British Indian Chamber of Commerce or members of the All Parliamentary Indo-British 
group, did not openly appear to have made demands on HMG to refrain, for example, 
from condemning India’s recourse to force.  This may have been because Britain’s 
position was from the outset to avoid direct involvement—a position that would likely 
have satisfied each group, notwithstanding their diverse political sympathies.   
Further complicating domestic affairs, was the fact that trade unions were at the 
height of their power, and Heath was soon beset by a succession of strikes in different 
industries over rising unemployment and wage inflation.684  Between late 1970 and 
mid-1971, Heath and his advisors set about devising a new industrial bill, aimed at 
reducing unofficial strikes.  The highly unpopular Industrial Relations Act was passed 
in the summer of 1971, by which time Heath had already called two states of 
emergency.685  Indeed, during his short three and half years as Prime Minister, Heath 
called a total of five states of emergency out of ‘only twelve since governments were 
given this weapon by the Emergency Powers Act of 1920’.686  Given the domestic 
struggles that the government had to contend with, its activities with regards to the East 
Pakistan crisis thus appear all the more notable.  
Then there was Northern Ireland, where violence and political unrest between 
Protestants and minority Catholics had been on the rise since the previous decade.  In 
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1969, Protestant police and militia had opened fire in Catholic ghettos.  ‘For the 
dormant Irish Republican Army,’ states Denis MacShane, ‘…it was a rebirth and 
validation of violence against the British’ and the pro-British Protestant government.687   
By the beginning of 1971, 174 had died in the violence.  In August, Heath 
responded by interning suspected terrorists without due process.   
The internment was a disaster.  Like a throwback to the 1930s or events in some British 
colony, the world watched with consternation as camps were opened to take the sleepy, 
bewildered, often quite elderly men….Some were terrorist organisers.  Most, if not all, 
active IRA leaders and gunmen slipped across the border to Ireland.  The lists provided 
by the provinces’ intelligence services were badly out-of-date.688   
 
Burdened with its own issues of separatist conflict in 1971, it is possible that the Heath 
government had little desire to speak out about those in other countries, including 
Pakistan.  The two were not explicitly compared by government officials, although they 
were in West Pakistan, where the British High Commissioner reported, ‘the equation of 
Ulster with East Pakistan’ meant that the British were occasional objects ‘of the hatred, 
ridicule and contempt of the press’.689  While London chose not to comment on this 
equation, one wonders whether the issue of Northern Ireland may have fallen into the 
category of the ‘elephant in the room’—the decisive affair that was at the forefront of 
official thinking, and which formed the background (even subconsciously) to the 
government’s reluctance to express an opinion on secessionist crises abroad.690  
Whatever the case may be, if according to MacShane, ‘Heath headed a government that 
could not maintain peace, let alone democratic law and order in a corner of Europe’,691 
it is understandable that their efforts to do so elsewhere were, at best, restrained. 
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Britain as a second rank military power  
The Heath government’s modest, and in some cases, abortive international efforts, 
rendered all the more unachievable in light of domestic crises, illustrate how British 
foreign policy of the era was indeed somewhat ‘untidy’,692 reflecting elements of 
initiative and retreat.  Britain’s restricted defence profile under Heath, as it were, 
contrasts starkly with the intense period of military activity between 1949 and 1970, 
when successive British governments—both Labour and Conservative—intervened 
unilaterally across the globe and took part in a series of UN peacekeeping operations.693  
Indeed, according to Neil Briscoe, the British military played a pioneering role in such 
operations, a majority of which were initiated to manage crises in former colonies.  
Peacekeeping as a form of conflict mediation, he suggests, at least in its early stages, 
was directly related to the former imperial power’s ‘process of decolonization…, post-
colonial spasms…or post-colonial commitments’.694  So Brian Urquhart, Britain’s long-
serving official at the UN and Assistant Secretary General in 1972, observed: “Britain 
was, albeit unwittingly, the parent of United Nations peacekeeping”.695  
This vigorous military record gives a rather misleading impression of a state 
with relatively undiminished power and resources. ‘The United Kingdom intervened 
abroad with military force more than thirty times in the quarter century following World 
War II,’ recall John Van Wingen and Herbert Tillema.696  ‘She used arms in more than 
twenty countries in nearly every world region.  Britain turned to force more often than 
any other major nation….[and] intervened in more places than any other state’.697  Yet, 
the authors contend, it is evident that this flurry of activity occurred within a set of 
clearly prescribed circumstances—namely, when the British were requested by 
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authorities (in colonies or ex-colonies) to quell internal violence and a British military 
base was nearby.  ‘Military action,’ moreover, ‘nearly always supported that constituted 
authority’.698  Thus the factors of request, violence, imperial links and military 
proximity (or time, place and circumstance) were almost always present—‘Among 
reluctant warriors, specific circumstances may be necessary for intervention’.699 
Britain’s post-war interventions were therefore not necessarily related to 
protecting or pursuing national interests, as is normally the case in great power 
campaigns; it did not choose to intervene, but was compelled to do so on select 
occasions when threats to regional stability (usually in the form of local insurgency) 
endangered their overseas interests (as in for example, the Nigerian civil war but not in 
East Pakistan).  Briscoe concurs that it was Britain’s decline, not capabilities nor even 
political will, which ‘predisposed it to peacekeeping as a mechanism for managing 
limited conflict at a minimal cost .rather than a conversion to international 
communitarianism’.700  In other words, Britain’s frequent recourse to force during the 
era of decolonization was not an anachronistic throwback to the imperialist age, as it 
may appear, but in fact, confirmation of its secondary post-war status.  ‘Where, when, 
and why Britain intervened reveal that she used force to cope and not to 
conquer….Military force was one of the instruments of statecraft Britain used to 
manage orderly decline.  Once the Empire was gone she no longer had frequent reason 
to use this tool’.701  Indeed, it would seem that after the Heath government negotiated 
Britain’s entry into the European Community, ‘the era of frequent military intervention 
ended’.702  Meanwhile, the objective fact of Britain’s second-rank capabilities combined 
with a basic desire to remain active overseas, continued to condition the government’s 
shifting responses to international affairs.   
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Summary: the Heath Government’s foreign policy concerns and constraints  
In 1970, upon taking office, Heath announced the beginning of a ‘new era in British 
diplomacy which would leave behind years of retreat’.703  In 1971, Britain declared it 
had ‘a direct responsibility to provide protection’ outside of Europe to those it ‘owes a 
special duty’.704  At first glance, such statements could conceivably have meant taking a 
stronger position on state terror in East Pakistan—a political entity created by Britain.  
However, as events show, they did not.  When the government referred to ‘outside 
Europe’,705 they intended small parts of Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia; 
the Indian subcontinent did not feature in these pronouncements.  Moreover, Heath’s 
seemingly earnest yet ultimately feeble initiatives in the aforesaid regions were 
overshadowed by the energy he and his government expended throughout 1970 and 
1971 on their twin goals of entering Europe and modernizing Britain.  
In consequence, the administration’s promise to uphold Britain’s reputation as 
an international power, as some scholars argue, may have partly been false rhetoric to 
carve out an ideological position different to that of Labour’s and appease those who 
were apprehensive about ‘excessive Europeanisation’ during Heath’s premiership.706 
Heath’s internationalist declarations, in other words, may well have been a political tool 
to appease the Eurosceptic elements of the Conservative party and the British public—
the government was, without doubt, ‘careful not to cast Britain’s post-imperial future in 
purely European terms’.707  Still, their various efforts to influence the crisis in East 
Pakistan, measured though they were, indicate that this was not entirely the case.  As 
Simon Smith accurately observes: 
The Heath government’s approach to developments in South Asia…demonstrates that 
despite shift to Europe, Britain in the early 1970s still possessed substantial interests in 
the non-European world which could not be ignored.  Indeed, the seriousness with which 
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705 Government White Paper on Defence, 23 February 1971, in Current British Foreign Policy. 
706 Hill and Lord ‘Foreign Policy’, 289; Benvenuti ‘Southeast Asia’, 20. 
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the British government took the crisis, and the close involvement of its key members, 
including the Prime Minister himself, served to underline this point.708  
 
Heath’s professed international orientation was thus likely genuine, at least in part.  
Rather than an absence of will, it appears that it was Britain’s reduced economic and 
military capacity, as well as the multiple international and domestic crises that 
confronted the government upon taking office, that definitively foiled any intentions the 
Heath administration may have had of ‘resum[ing]…a proper share of responsibility for 
the preservation of peace and stability in the world’.709 
The early 1970s was most certainly a ‘turning point in Britain’s international 
position’—‘a time of movement’;710 a period of ‘immense change in Britain’s entire 
world position’.711  Britain’s domestic situation, in the interim, was in striking disarray.  
Indeed, ‘no government since 1945 has been in office at such an awkward time’;712 
Heath was in a ‘pressure-cooker situation’; ‘overwhelmed by one damn problem after 
another—industrial relations, inflation, immigration, and Northern Ireland’.713  As 
Patrick Bell concludes, ‘Heath proved an unlucky Prime Minister’.714 
The Conservative government was thus consigned to uphold its predecessor’s 
legacy, and continue downscaling Britain’s international responsibilities.  They may 
have ‘shelved’715 the Duncan Report and its recommendations for downsizing, however 
the report’s conclusion that Britain was a power in decline could not be as easily 
dismissed.  The Heath government was effectively confined by the reality that Britain, 
unable to retain Suez fifteen years earlier, by the 1970s, could no longer viably remain 
East of it.  From F.S. Northedge’s perspective in 1974, it appeared that “it was at this 
point that British governments found that there really was nowhere else to go except 
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into the Europe of the six”.716  True as that may be, this did not prevent the government 
on occasion from actively seeking to protect Britain’s international interests within its 
circumscribed means, including those on the Indian subcontinent. 
                                                
716 Northedge as quoted in Hill and Lord ‘Foreign Policy’, 287. 
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ii. 1947-1971: ANGLO-PAKISTANI & ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS 
‘For the last twenty-five years the British people have been adjusting themselves to a new role 
in world affairs.  The record of the British Empire was one of which we could justifiably be 
proud.  But it is now a matter of history.  We have almost entirely divested ourselves of our 
former imperial responsibilities’.  
             — Edward Heath, 5 April 1971717 
 
Britain’s varied responses to violence in East Pakistan in 1971 (and, it would seem, to 
foreign affairs in general) were indirectly conditioned by the Heath government’s focus 
on Europe, by national economic and political crises, and generally, by the country’s 
steady transformation into a secondary power, as evident by its diminished military 
capabilities and restricted overseas initiatives.  Yet without doubt, this transformation 
was well underway before the Heath era, having manifested itself with the loss of India 
when the British reluctantly agreed to withdraw and partition the subcontinent.  
Following Indian independence, Britain retained relations with the successor states that 
waxed or waned depending on circumstances and leadership.  Many of the elements 
characterising the post-independence phase were the precursors of British responses to 
the East Pakistan crisis, and will thus be described here, ending with a detailed analysis 
of Anglo-Pakistani and Anglo-Indian relations in 1971 that points to an overall 
coherency in Britain’s post-war foreign policy towards South Asia. 
 
1947: Indian Independence  
The British East India Company ruled the Indian subcontinent unofficially from 1757 to 
1858, after which the British Crown governed directly until 1947—the year in which 
the British finally ‘quit India’.718  It seems they had little choice—two World Wars and 
decades of struggle by Indians for independence had placed a strain on Britain’s 
resources that it could no longer sustain.  As their last act, British officials partitioned 
                                                
717 ‘Speech by Mr. Edward Heath, Bonn, 5 April 1971,’ in Current British Foreign Policy, 231-234. 
718 The Indian National Congress Party had launched a ‘brutally smothered “Quit India” campaign’ five 
years earlier (Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: the Last Years of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 9).  
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the subcontinent according to the ‘two nation theory’ that religion determined identity 
and borders; at midnight, on 15 August 1947, ‘Hindu’ India and ‘Muslim’ Pakistan 
came into being.  
The resulting violence was unprecedented: over ten million abandoned their 
dwellings in a desperate attempt to reach the designated new homeland; hundreds of 
thousands never arrived, many falling victim to vicious atrocities perpetrated by rival 
communal groups.  Death toll figures range from 200,000 to as many as 1.5 million,719 
although as Paul Brass notes, ‘sources that are most likely closer to the truth…range 
between 200,000 and 360,000 dead’.720  The tragedy of partition has rendered it, to 
many, less a political event than a ‘fratricidal sundering of a country’721—a ‘holocaust 
of pain, looting, rape, and murder’.722 
 In brief, the debate over why India was partitioned pits those who believe 
division was an inevitable result of an ideological impasse between Hindus and 
Muslims—the ‘essential difference thesis’—against those who argue that precipitating 
political and social factors fostered a contrived, rather than intrinsic, sense of 
division.723  The ‘contrived’ argument typically indicts Britain.  Some contend that the 
British Raj724 employed ‘divide and rule’ policies to stir Hindu-Muslim rivalry and 
prevent unified opposition to colonial rule.725  Others argue that sectarian provincial 
politics in the 1930s and 1940s in addition to the high politics of British authorities and 
Indian leaders generated the communal tension that manifested itself so murderously 
after independence.  Hindu and Muslim class rivalries driven by fear of ‘the other’ 
                                                
719 See, for example, Butalia The Other Side, 3; Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, 7th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 352; Ali Understanding Bangladesh, 11.     
720 Brass ‘Retributive Genocide’, 75. 
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723 Mookherjee cites the debate’s main proponents in ‘A lot of History’ (Ph.D diss.), 44-45.  See also 
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dominating in an independent India and alluring opportunities to seize (or retain) 
bureaucratic postings, land and seats of power are considered to have both 
complemented and fuelled these narratives of power politics.726  
Yet it would seem that the British, while having exacerbated communal 
cleavages during their rule, did not willingly partition India.  Before and after World 
War II, officials tried to convince regional politicians to coexist in a single federation, 
seen as vital to future British defence considerations.727  By 1947, as each effort failed, 
‘preoccupied as they were with Britain’s own growing post-war domestic problems and 
diminishing resources, Labour’s cabinet all but lost interest in India’s problems’.728  The 
British finally (and reluctantly) accepted partition when it appeared that their own 
representatives and Muslim and Hindu political leaders in the region were never likely 
to agree on fundamental questions, such as how power would be shared in a united 
Indian federation and minority rights could be protected.729  Britain is not, therefore, the 
sole architect of India and Pakistan’s making, as often alleged.   
Narendra Singh Sarila, a prominent Indian diplomat during the era, argues 
otherwise in The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition.730  
According to Singh, British officials consciously employed religion to partition India 
and create Pakistan, a pro-West state, from where Britain could defend its regional 
interests against the USSR.  What the author dubs as Britain’s ‘Pakistan Strategy’731 
emerged in 1945 when, following India’s indication that it would control its own 
foreign policy, Clement Atlee’s Labour Party ‘swung around to support the partition of 
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India basically to ensure the defence of Britain’s vital interests after the war’.732  Even if 
the British did view partition as a geopolitical stratagem, the idea that they 
masterminded events is unconvincing and diminishes the influence of other contributing 
factors, particularly the role of regional authorities who, some argue, eagerly took 
advantage of the growing divisions to consolidate political support.733  Theses that 
vigorously support the ‘contrived’ explanation of India’s partition are, as historian 
Philip Ziegler says of Singh’s work, ‘thoughtful, interesting, if essentially wrong-
headed’.734  
Yet, for all this, it is true that the British did not properly execute their final 
duties on the subcontinent: they left too quickly, with little regard for the safety of their 
former subjects. Peter Carrington, Britain’s Defence Secretary in 1971, recalls the 
emotional February 1947 House of Lords debate on the Indian Independence Bill: many 
felt the date fixed for independence was ‘terrifyingly early in view of the state of India 
and the threat of violence and chaos’.735  Lord Halifax’s verdict helped to assuage 
dissention: “The truth is that for India today there is no solution that is not fraught with 
the gravest dangers.  And the conclusion I reach is that I am not prepared to condemn 
what His Majesty’s Government are doing unless I can honestly and confidently 
recommend a better solution”.736  It was, concludes Carrington, ‘immensely effective on 
all who heard it.…The Government Bill passed’.737 
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Britain’s “shameful flight, by a premature hurried scuttle”738 from India took 
place only ten weeks after the last viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, was appointed in mid-
1947.  The Atlee Cabinet had given him until June 1948—one year—to withdraw 
Britain’s ‘air and fleet cover, as well as the shield of British troops and arms, from 
South Asia’s 400 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs’.739 Yet an impatient 
Mountbatten, declares historian Stanley Wolpert, contracted this already narrow time 
frame into a matter of weeks and almost single-handedly botched the undertaking.740  
Wolpert does not hold Mountbatten’s ‘hyperactive frenzy’ wholly responsible 
for the violence at partition: World War II, personal ambitions, domestic concerns, and 
ignorance played their part in ‘a combination of historic causes that contributed to that 
tragic error of judgement, only the most immediate of which was Mountbatten’s 
incompetence’.741  Brass agrees that partition ‘was a consequence of a long list of both 
deliberate actions and failures to compromise on the part of the three principle parties 
who created the political present of India and Pakistan’.742  Recent scholarship, which 
incorporates both the high politics of Indian and British officials and the experiences of 
ordinary individuals, takes this line of argument even further:  
The events of 1947…were neither foreseen nor intended by anyone.  India and Pakistan 
were the accidental products of rapidly shifting contingencies, whether in the high and 
provincial politics or in the complex grassroots of the subcontinent.…No one—no 
leaders or civil servants, viceroys or chiefs of staff, and certainly not the general 
public—had any inkling of what partition would entail.743  
  
India and Pakistan, one might say, were ‘insufficiently imagined’.744  (And, as Philip 
Oldenburg adds, the eventual rupture of Pakistan itself may have been all but inevitable: 
                                                
738 Winston Churchill to Clement Attlee during Parliament’s first debate on the Indian Independence Bill 
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739 Wolpert Shameful Flight, 1. 
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East and West Pakistanis did not spend enough time merging their visions of Pakistan 
before its creation to imagine how the state would function in reality.745)  
‘In one month the accumulated possessions of centuries of imperial hoarding, 
building, and creating were torn apart, severed as though by caesarean section to permit 
the two new nations to be born,’ laments Wolpert.746  ‘The hastily and ineptly drawn 
lines of partition of North India’s two greatest provinces, Pakistan and Bengal, slashed 
through their multicultural heartlands…drawn by an English jurist who had never set 
foot on the soil of either province’.747  ‘[It was] a division,’ Ritu Menon and Kamla 
Bhasin note, ‘that was remarkable for having been decided almost in the blink of an 
eye’.748  The ‘butchered boundary lines’ cutting into Punjab and Bengal were kept 
‘under lock and key on Mountbatten’s orders, hidden from any other eyes’ until after 
India’s Independence Day festivities were over.749  Governors of both regions had no 
idea what to expect; no time was spent planning for feeding, housing, and medical 
needs of refugees; no British troops were left to maintain stability. ‘What a glorious 
charade of British imperial largesse and power “peacefully” transferred’.750  
 
Post 1947: erratic bilateral relations / India tilt 
Britain’s abrupt departure from its Indian Empire did not mean immediate 
disengagement from the region.  Indeed, Britain retained close ties with India and 
Pakistan following independence, and both chose to join the Commonwealth to nourish 
political, cultural, commercial and military links with the former colonial authority. 
‘Ironically,’ notes historian Naseem Bajwa in Pakistan and the West: The First Decade, 
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‘the British emerged in 1947 in an influential position in both successor states, as their 
dislike of each other, as well as the need for a powerful ally, meant that the raj was 
wound up with official popularity in both India and Pakistan’.751 
Britain’s favourable position is somewhat curious considering the Atlee 
government did little to allay the violence and atrocities at partition—its ‘first major 
diplomatic headache’752—despite pleas to do so from regional leaders.  According to 
international relations analyst, Anita Inder Singh, in her seminal study The Limits of 
British Influence:   
In October 1947, Jinnah appealed for Commonwealth intervention to clear up the 
manifold problems resulting from the partition riots.  His request embarrassed officials 
in London.  Reluctant to act as umpire in an Indo-Pakistani scrimmage, the Labour 
cabinet observed that Jinnah had not defined the kind of intervention desired….In any 
case, India would not be amenable to any foreign intervention.  Investigations would 
only rake up the past bitterness…solutions were unlikely to emerge and links between 
the new dominions and the Commonwealth might be strained.  Clearly the Labour 
government did not want to intervene….The matter would be left ‘to peter out in its 
present untidy state’.753 
  
Notwithstanding Britain’s apparent apathy towards the subcontinent’s political struggles 
in the post-independence period, India and Pakistan, it would seem, valued an alliance 
with the former ruler—and the interest was mutual.  For Britain, Pakistan offered 
multiple advantages: defence of the ‘free world’ against the Soviets, access to Middle 
Eastern oil and China, and the Pakistani Army, assiduously trained by the British, was 
the largest army in Asia with bases near the USSR.754  Britain’s relationship with India, 
meanwhile, appeared to continue with nearly as much vigour as it had under the Raj, 
particularly with regards to trade and education.755  Unable to conclude a defence 
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agreement with either country prior to independence, Britain hoped that the 
Commonwealth might provide a conduit to strategic cooperation in the post-colonial 
era. 
However, the Indo-Pakistani war over the province of Kashmir (October 1947-
December 1948) abruptly deflated hopes of meaningful regional collaboration.  The 
British, already embarrassed by the recent carnage in their former Empire, were 
sensitive to the possibility of being held responsible by both sides for the Kashmir 
conflict.756  The Cold War geopolitical web enmeshing the subcontinent, in addition, 
was particularly complex; ‘British diplomacy had to work through several currents and 
cross currents: Anglo-American, Anglo-Indian, Anglo-Pakistani, Indo-US, Indo-
Pakistani, and more broadly, Asian and Middle Eastern’.757  HMG, as a result, chose to 
remain silent and urged the UN instead to mediate in the conflict. 
From Pakistan’s perspective, ‘the British were a disappointment as they made it 
clear that they would not get involved in an inter-Commonwealth conflict’ and it was 
becoming ever more apparent that ‘Britain was not the power she had been’.758  In 
contrast, the United States had been extending regular overtures in a bid to cement 
relations with what was considered a lynchpin to Cold War containment in Asia.  
Steady warmth from successive US administrations gradually dislodged Britain’s 
lingering foothold ‘as the new superpower moved worldwide to fill the vacuum left by 
the collapse of the British empire’,759 with Pakistan as its most ‘allied of ally’.760   
Wishing to maintain strategic relations nevertheless—‘a pro-West Pakistan 
…was a prize worth retaining’761—both Britain and Pakistan, in 1955, entered into two 
collective defence treaties establishing the South East Asia Treaty Organization 
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(SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), both of which aimed to 
contain Soviet influence in the Far and Middle East.762  It soon became evident, 
however, that the stronger members of both organisations, Britain included, were 
reluctant to commit the military resources required to endow them with the ‘teeth’ to 
enforce decisions.  What is more, members were rarely able to decide on strategy when 
conflicts arose in their respective areas of interest.763   
By the mid-1960s, the Wilson government began to seriously reconsider 
Britain’s membership in SEATO, and as recounted, ultimately set a schedule to cancel 
the last of its troop contributions by the spring of 1971.764  Heath’s government, in 
accordance with its promises to continue defending the region, did not fully execute 
these plans—but neither did they actively participate in the organisation.  Indeed, as 
Lord Carrington reassured the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee in February 
1971, while retaining a military presence in the SEATO area helped to ensure political 
stability and preserve Western interests, membership was mainly ‘consultative in 
character’.765  In the event of a conflict, members were not ‘unconditional[ly]’ obliged 
to commit forces—the decision to participate rested with individual signatories.766  
Similar remarks were expressed about CENTO;767 both organisations, as one Heath 
official recalled, never moved beyond being ‘paper lions’, and were to be dissolved in 
the late 1970s.768 
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Superseded by the Americans (arguably as early as the 1950s), and ‘unwilling 
and unable’769 to assist Pakistan in subcontinental disputes, Britain had clearly placed 
the “bigger and more important neighbour”770 at the core of its regional foreign policy.  
According to Bajwa, this was a step that it had intended to take in any event:  
The British could not hope to compete with what the Americans could offer Pakistan 
militarily and economically, nor did they really wish to try.  The British had decided 
early on that India was the far more desirable ally of the two and, although Pakistan’s 
air bases and raw fighting material made her useful, she was simply not in the same 
league as India.771   
 
Yet Anglo-Indian links post-Empire, however robust, similarly began to display signs 
of erosion.772  This was due partly to Britain’s evident reluctance to mediate in major 
conflicts following on the heels of partition, but also to the challenging economic 
relations between the two sterling area countries (related, for example, to the mutual 
imposition of extremely high import tariffs), which were never fully resolved.773  In the 
meantime, India had shifted to non-alignment, and while external powers would always 
view the region from the perspective of geopolitics to some extent, to the British, ‘the 
subcontinent was not a major theatre of the cold war;….Britain could not provide large-
scale military aid to India and Pakistan—but these countries did not need it since they 
were not menaced by the Soviets’.774 
By the time India and Pakistan clashed once again over Kashmir from August to 
September of 1965, the British had demonstrated that they still retained a degree of 
influence in the region by successfully mediating a dispute over the Rann of Kutch area 
flanking both countries earlier that year.775  Soon into the second Indo-Pakistan war, 
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however, the Wilson government lost favour in Delhi following a number of statements 
made by the Prime Minister in Commons critical of Indian aggression.  Wilson swiftly 
attributed his remarks to the misguided recommendations of his advisers rather than any 
personal proclivity for one side over the other, but was unable to recover the political 
authority necessary to mediate between the belligerents.776  
To complicate matters was the unavoidable fact that all three held lowered 
expectations of the Commonwealth as a vehicle for concrete collaboration.  For India 
and Pakistan as described, this occurred soon after independence, when the inertia 
surrounding clashes on the subcontinent indicated that the alliance was generally 
incapable of extending serious strategic or political assistance.  Britain, for its part, had 
also clearly begun dealing less with the forum, whose intended strategic function as a 
‘substitute for Empire’777 was gradually giving way to a somewhat more intangible 
‘family of nations’,778 rarely able to agree on practical matters.779  Thus unable to 
exercise influence either multilaterally or through bilateral negotiations, Britain was 
consigned to stand aside, once again, during the second major war between the 
successor states of its former colony, and relations with both deteriorated perceptibly.  
In light of events, Britain is considered to have entered a period of active 
‘disengagement’780 with the Indian subcontinent beginning shortly after independence 
and continuing well into the Wilson era.  Indeed, some consider that by ‘the late 1960s, 
the talk of maturity in Indo-British relations seemed to be a euphemism for the loss of 
ardour and of emotional ambivalence, for disenchantment and quiet disillusion, for 
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reappraisal of each other’s needs and priorities with mutually lowered expectations’.781  
Without doubt, Britain’s interactions with India and Pakistan following independence 
may appear remarkably diminished by comparison with what they had been under the 
Empire, or immediately afterwards, when all three hoped to foster strong associations 
bilaterally and through the Commonwealth.  Yet, while the course of Anglo-Pakistani 
and Anglo-Indian relations did not meet the expectations of any party following 
independence, these were not as negligible as they may have appeared.  For Britain, 
however erratic political relations between leaders may have been, remained reasonably 
active on the subcontinent, rarely losing sight of the region’s basic value in terms of 
security, trade and development. 
 
1971: modest bilateral relations / India tilt 
So it was that in the year leading up to the secession of East from West Pakistan, Britain 
continued to harbour a variety of interests in both wings.  HMG was one of Pakistan’s 
main trading partners, receiving on average nearly 12% of the latter’s exports and 
providing the same proportion in imports.782  In addition, a total of 2000 British 
nationals lived in both wings of the country—business owners, development workers, 
missionaries, and in the Eastern wing, raw material producers and tea plantation 
owners.783  After cyclones devastated coastal areas of the eastern province in November 
1970, Britain mounted a series of major military aid operations in East Pakistan, 
assisting local authorities to restore stability.  As the 1971 White Paper on Defence 
recalled, British air and naval forces—at the request of Pakistani authorities, had 
distributed relief, provided medical care, and repaired regional infrastructure in East 
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Pakistan for three weeks from November to December of 1970.784  On 2 March 1971, 
Edward Heath proudly informed Parliament, ‘The Services [in 1970] reacted with 
immense speed and efficiency, and during my visits to Pakistan…I heard…warm thanks 
and much praise for the work of the British forces’.785   
 ‘Ideally,’ the Foreign Office commented, following the outbreak of state terror 
and regional insurgency, ‘the continued existence of a united Pakistan would best serve 
our interests and the stability of the area….We should like to see the restoration of 
peace and stability in an area in which we have considerable investments and political 
interests’.786  The Cabinet subsequently agreed to avoid making critical statements in 
public—‘care should be taken to say nothing which might cause embarrassment to the 
Government of Pakistan’ or which might be construed as ‘interference’.787   
This caution extended to the sensitive matter of arms sales.  In the early 1970s, 
Britain supplied arms to Pakistan on a small-scale basis.  They had not signed any major 
arms contracts since 1967, and the Foreign Secretary reassured Commons during the 
crisis that ‘[t]here is none in prospect’.788  When Pakistan’s military action in its Eastern 
province began, Britain was caught between preserving these minor revenues and 
safeguarding Anglo-Pakistani relations, on the one hand, and on the other, not 
assisting—or at least not being seen to assist—the Army’s violent campaign.  ‘If we do 
not permit the delivery of arms already ordered, the Pakistan government would realise 
very quickly that we were withholding supplies as a matter of policy,’ reflected 
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Douglas-Home on internal communication in April 1971.789  ‘This might be represented 
as a form if [sic] interference in Pakistan internal affairs, which we have publicly said is 
not our intention, and could be construed as evidence of British support for the quote 
rebels unquote in East Pakistan.  If on the other hand we permit unrestricted arms 
supplies to Pakistan in present circumstances, HMG will certainly be subject to 
criticism in Parliament and from the public’.790 
Douglas-Home resolved the conundrum with a semantic somersault; he limited 
arms sales to the unofficial category of ‘non lethal’:  
I have decided that military equipment and supplies which are not by themselves lethal, 
such as mortar cartridges, fuses for artillery shells and chemical compounds for the 
manufacture of ammunition, may be delivered against existing orders.  As most of our 
military sales to Pakistan come into this category [i.e. non lethal] I hope that the need 
for an obvious change of policy will not arise.…I do not at this stage wish to lay down a 
rigid distinction between lethal and non lethal weapons: the distinction is only a broad 
one in our own minds and should have no publicity at all.  Any requests from the 
Pakistan government for arms will be considered as they arise in the light of the 
circumstances at the time.791  
 
In this manner, Britain continued in its role as a small-scale (non-lethal) arms supplier 
to Pakistan; it met the aforementioned orders and successfully shielded this aspect of 
the Anglo-Pakistani relationship from controversy, while at the same time, discreetly 
refraining from entering into discussions on future orders. 
Anglo-Pakistani relations under Heath were, in other words, mutually beneficial 
at the beginning of 1971, and the British sought to retain this state of affairs by assuring 
regional authorities of their neutrality.  However, as public pressure mounted and it 
became clear that violence in the Eastern wing was becoming an international affair 
generating millions of refugees across the borders of India—Britain’s chief interest—
the government position began to harden.  This hardening manifested itself most clearly 
in the British decision to suspended development aid along with other Aid Consortium 
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members.  Anglo-Pakistani relations, as recounted, reached an ‘all time low’792 and 
although this was disagreeable, London accepted that its interests in the region would 
have to suffer marginally.  Indeed, ‘that need not necessarily be a wholly bad thing,’ the 
British High Commissioner in Pakistan remarked, considering where Britain’s prime 
allegiance lay.793 
Britain’s tilt towards India in 1971, a classic component of post-war foreign 
policy, is unsurprising: India, with its larger economy, weightier regional political status 
and longer history of democratic government, was where Britain’s chief commercial 
and development investments on the subcontinent were situated, and where 12,000 
British nationals lived and worked.794  Edward Heath, in addition, had established 
relatively warm political relations with the Gandhi government during a series of 
meetings between the two leaders in 1971, Heath’s January trip to India being the first 
made by a British prime minister for over a decade.795  This positive state of affairs, 
both external observers and former civil servants agreed, stood in some contrast to ‘the 
coolness of the Wilson era’.796  Thus British officials advised early into the crisis, ‘we 
must not prejudice our long-term interests, and offend the Indians, in seeking unwisely 
to defend short-term interests in West Pakistan’.797  ‘In the last analysis, our stake in 
India is much greater’.798  
Former officials in the Heath government agree on the primacy of India over 
Pakistan within the Foreign Office: ‘India would always be the favourite’, confirmed 
Peter Smith of the Islamabad High Commission, ‘there was never any doubt that Delhi 
                                                
792 PREM 15/569. Telegram 1416 ‘British Commercial Interests in Pakistan’, Islamabad—FCO, 8 July 
1971.  
793 PREM 15/569. Letter ‘First Impressions of Pakistan’, Islamabad—FCO, 21 September 1971.  
794 CAB 148/117. ‘India/Pakistan: Note by the Secretaries’ (Part II: ‘British Interests Likely to be 
Affected by War’), 24 November 1971. 
795 Young British Practice, 1963-1976, 139-140. 
796 Roth Heathmen, 227; John Birch, Interview by author, 23 September 2009; Richard Fell, Interview by 
author, 16 July 2009. 
797 PREM 15/568. Telegram 488 ‘My Tel No 485: East Pakistan’, Islamabad—FCO, n. d. April 1971. 
798 FCO 37/890: Letter, SAD—FCO, 28 July 1971. 
 206 
had the ear of London’.799  Meanwhile, at the South Asia Department, the India desk 
was by far the most influential in shaping regional policy.800  As the British 
parliamentary delegation to the subcontinent in the summer of 1971 were told pointedly 
by the Foreign Office before their departure, ‘India is a British interest. Always 
remember that’.801 
What is more, the Heath government appeared to commiserate with the burden 
imposed upon India by the refugee exodus, a burden that Indian representatives avowed 
was endangering the country’s national security, social fabric and economic stability. 
The International Commission of Jurists, in their 1972 legal study of the conflict, noted 
that the refugee stream into India raised the total world figure, in just over six months, 
from 17.6 million to 27.6 million and the increase affected only one country.802  The 
cost of sheltering this ‘flood of destitute humanity’ until the end of the year was 
estimated at over 500 million dollars and likely to increase.803  Consequently, in 
addition to the dire social and political ramifications of the refugee flow, the effect on 
the Indian economy would be to ‘disrupt, possibly even to halt for several years, the 
normal economic development of the whole country….We find neither historical 
precedent nor juridical definition applicable to this situation’.804   
The British thus remained in regular contact with Indira Gandhi and other 
officials, assuring them Britain was trying to defuse the crisis in order to inhibit the flow 
of refugees.  As the Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary emphasized to 
Downing Street: 
The Indians still harbour suspicions that H.M.G. tend to favour the Government of 
Islamabad and it is important to make it clear that this is not so and that we are doing 
what we can behind the scenes to influence President Yahya Khan.  Moreover, whatever 
the ultimate relationship between the East and West wings, Pakistan has become 
weakened…and the relative importance of India in the sub-continent has been 
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increased.  In present circumstances our interest lies in retaining with Mrs. Gandhi as 
close and satisfactory a working relationship as we can.805  
 
In evidence of this relationship, the Foreign Secretaries of both countries publicly 
issued the previously mentioned ‘Agreed Statement’ in June 1971, declaring that a 
‘political solution must…be found which was acceptable to the people of East 
Pakistan’.806  Pakistani authorities objected—the statement not only attested to Britain’s 
tilt towards India, they declared, it ‘is a clear attempt at interference in the internal 
affairs of a Commonwealth country’. 807  ‘In the face of incontrovertible evidence of 
blatant Indian threats and attempts at bullying and browbeating, it is a matter of extreme 
regret that the British government should have found it necessary to compliment India 
on her “restraint and generosity”.’808  Unfortunately, ‘statements of this nature have set 
a new and regrettable pattern of relationship between Commonwealth countries’.809  
Britain’s Foreign Secretary while dismayed by this reaction, remained convinced that 
‘the more we demonstrated friendship for Pakistan the greater the risk of incurring 
Indian displeasure’.810  
A joint approach to both countries via Commonwealth mediation, moreover, 
appeared unfeasible, just as it had in past Indo-Pakistani clashes.  Janice Musson claims 
that British officials did not hold Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary General 
(1965-1975), in particularly high regard.811  Widely considered to be a figurehead rather 
than a negotiator, Smith appeared to have had ‘no coherent strategy’ to mediate.812  In 
his memoirs, Smith himself, earnestly recounts the two occasions when he personally 
approached Indian and Pakistani leaders in the hopes of acting as an arbitrator; these, he 
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says, came to no avail, not because of any shortcoming in his strategy, but simply 
because neither party appeared confident in the Commonwealth as a medium for 
intervention.813  Thus although ‘on the face of it, the vaunted informality and intimacy 
of the Commonwealth association should have furnished the ideal circumstances for 
good offices in the Indo-Pakistan dispute,’ remarks Northedge, it was unable to offer 
such recourse.814  ‘Neither India nor Pakistan have much regard for the 
Commonwealth,’ Heath’s Minister of Defence rightly concluded in October of 1971 as 
tensions between the two escalated, ‘and I see no scope for action in this forum’.815  
For Britain, violence in East Pakistan was not only Pakistan’s ‘internal affair’—
it was also India’s.  HMG consequently left the matter to the Gandhi government as the 
conflict evolved, having concluded that a brief war would in fact increase India’s 
cachet.  For if, the Foreign Secretary reflected, the subcontinent was to ‘henceforth be 
divided in three…India is the only one of the three of whose political future one can feel 
reasonably sure’; ‘India will…be the most stable of the three entities in the sub-
continent, the most powerful and, to western interests, the most important’.816 
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Chapter Summary: the subcontinent’s ‘reduced importance’  
Notwithstanding the relative closeness of London and Delhi in 1971, Britain’s tilt 
towards India was just that—a tilt, not a forthright pledge of unconditional support.  In 
truth, the Cabinet Defence Committee had decided that a short war between India and 
Pakistan, which the former was likely to win, would not drastically jeopardise HMG’s 
interests: ‘British investment in both countries is substantial.  Some running down of 
activity must be expected.  But the assumption is that both countries will try to keep 
going industries connected with the war effort, and export industries….Unless 
widespread and prolonged, hostilities following the expected course would not directly 
and seriously affect British interests’.817  Under the circumstances, while leaning 
towards India was viewed as beneficial, the British did not consider any form of support 
that that might have expressed this too concretely.818 
In the preceding years, India had gradually slipped from the top of Britain’s 
foreign policy agenda, leading some observers to declare that the Indo-British 
relationship from the late 1950s can at best be described as ‘thin’.  According to Arjan 
de Haan, ‘Indo-British relations are not merely “thin”, but have evolved from being 
among the most important in the “world system” towards being negligible’; ‘A question 
which comes to mind when reading about Indo-British relations is: what relations?’819    
Given the Heath administration’s varied efforts to influence events on the 
subcontinent in 1971, this is somewhat of an overstatement.  Britain kept in close 
contact with Indian officials; it ignored India’s involvement with East Pakistani 
guerrillas, occasionally defended the Gandhi administration to Pakistani officials, and 
remained neutral during the Indo-Pakistani war, when other states were pressuring India 
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to accept a ceasefire.  The Indo-British relationship, at least with regards to this crisis 
(and particularly during the latter half), was not ‘thin’, but moderately dynamic.   
Yet the fact remains that India, while still a British interest, fell far behind the 
European and domestic priorities of the government.  It therefore comes as little 
surprise that key analyses of British foreign policy in the post-war era tend to omit 
mention of the Indo-British relationship, fundamental as it once was.  David Sanders’ 
influential Losing an Empire, Finding a Role (1990), as De Haan points out, claims to 
look at “the most important developments”820 since 1945—and ‘the relationship with 
India is clearly not among these’.821  Likewise, David Reynolds’s well-received 
Britannia Overruled (2000) passes over the post-colonial Indo-British relationship with 
notable brevity.  Hence, following the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, the Foreign Secretary 
reminded the Cabinet Overseas Defence Committee, ‘in terms of our worldwide 
interests, the sub-continent is today of much reduced importance’.822 Britain’s 
overarching policy, from their perspective, had been to remain ‘equidistant between 
India and Pakistan’, a position which they prided themselves, ‘no other large power has 
succeeded in doing’.823  
In 1971, Britain may have tended towards that part of the subcontinent where the 
majority of her interests lay, but in the post-war era, those interests occupied at best a 
secondary (even tertiary) place on its foreign policy agenda.  They could not induce the 
British to get actively involved in the region again—indeed it had not done so, neither 
bilaterally nor through the Commonwealth, during any of the subcontinent’s major 
upheavals.   
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Britain, after World War II, entered a phase in which internal and external 
circumstances consistently prevented it from pursuing its desired policies towards South 
Asia.  In 1947, economic decline, domestic problems and upheaval on the subcontinent 
finally forced the British to relinquish their ‘jewel in the crown’.  Afterwards, these 
same factors, exacerbated by the independent foreign policies of the successor states 
and the seeming inefficacy of the Commonwealth association, dashed Britain’s hopes 
for maintaining a strong strategic alliance with either.  Moreover, having set a precedent 
of neutrality and non-intervention after partition and again (twice) in Kashmir, ‘the 
British [had] annoyed both dominions….[and] their unequivocal attitude reflected their 
fast-ebbing influence in South Asia’.824  Subsequent British governments continued 
dismantling the Empire and retreating from international activity (albeit haphazardly), 
culminating in Labour’s military retrenchments in the late 1960s.  
Thus while many consider Britain’s failed intervention in Suez the end of its 
great power status, Britain’s inability a decade earlier to keep its Indian Empire, or to 
retain robust links with it afterwards, sounded the definitive finale of ‘Pax Britannia’.  
As Lawrence James states:  
India’s own liberation signalled the end of Britain as a world power.  Its international 
standing had already declined beyond the point of recovery….India had always been the 
keystone of the British Empire, and once it had been removed the structure swiftly fell 
apart….And yet in the quarter-century after Indian independence, British politicians, 
diplomats and strategists talked themselves into believing that their country was still a 
world power and behaved accordingly.  In fact, it was downhill all the way with some 
awkward bumps…and attempt to reverse fate ended disastrously with the Suez debacle 
in 1956.825  
 
Edward Heath, a prime example of the disorderly change in British official thinking, 
hailed 1970 as a ‘new era in British diplomacy which would leave behind years of 
retreat’,826 and just months later, reassured European audiences that Britain’s imperial 
activities were at an end; Heath, as they say, ‘U-turned’.  However, the government’s 
                                                
824 Inder Singh The Limits of British Influence, 29-30. 
825 Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1997), 641. 
826 Heath’s first speech as PM to the Conservative Party Conference, 10 October 1970 (quoted in Hill and 
Lord ‘Foreign Policy’, 286). 
 212 
U-turns in foreign policy were not only the consequence of false promises or ineptitude. 
For the British lacked not necessarily the will, but mainly the enabling circumstances to 
decisively exert influence in regions in which they had once been active—let alone in 
their former Indian colony from whence they had so hastily withdrawn a quarter of a 
century earlier.  Britain’s days of Empire were unmistakably over: ‘No longer were vast 
stretches of Africa and Asia to be daubed pink in the atlases of the word, as had been 
the case before 1945, when over one-fourth of the earth’s surface was ruled one way or 
the other from London or the British Commonwealth capitals’.827  
This reduced state of affairs however did not prevent the British from finding 
minor avenues through which to retain influence abroad and advance bilateral relations 
with the successor states on the subcontinent, however vulnerable these relations were 
to changing leadership and circumstances.  So it was that during the East Pakistan crisis 
in 1971, the British upheld a varied policy predicated on neutrality and non-
interference, at the same time as they pressured for a political resolution, sought to ease 
humanitarian suffering, and subtly supported their long-standing interest on the 
subcontinent, India.  Many of these actions, it would seem, had precedents in an earlier 
era, and are thus indicative of a nuanced pattern in Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Pakistan 
relations in the post-independence age.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
‘All judgement in history is, to some extent, provisional.  Some questions—who initiated policy, 
what it was, when did it occur and where—are easier to answer than why did events happen as 
they did, and with what effect.  For historical judgement to have any value, it must be deeply 
rooted in the events as they unfolded, and the options which were open at the time’.  
    — Anthony Seldon, ‘The Heath Government in History’828 
  
After the crisis ended in December 1971 with India’s victory (and by extension East 
Pakistan’s), it became clear that Britain’s diverse courses of action had, to a large 
extent, succeeded in protecting its regional interests—and established a positive 
relationship with the victorious party.  Trade between India and Britain increased, with 
British exports experiencing a rise of over 75% compared to the previous year, while 
relations between the two heads of states remained notably cordial.829  
 In war-ravaged but newly independent East Pakistan, meanwhile, the British were 
highly regarded.  Foreign Office representatives provided regional advice to the many 
international NGO representatives arriving in the area, and the British Council actively 
assisted the education sector to recover and rebuild following the loss of life and 
damage caused to universities at the start of the military repression.830  On 4 February 
1972, furthermore, Britain officially recognized East Pakistan as the state of 
Bangladesh.  According to Janice Musson’s study of British diplomatic files during the 
period, this decision was not taken out of hostility towards Pakistan (as President Bhutto 
charged as he withdraw Pakistan from the Commonwealth), but rather because the new 
state was widely considered to have met the formal international legal requirements for 
political recognition having ‘a permanent population, specific territory, effective 
government and the ability to relate with other states’.831  Hence, as Britain’s former 
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Deputy High Commissioner recalls: ‘We were always very courteously received in 
Bangladesh…Indeed, we became very popular because we were understood to be 
sympathetic to the Bengali cause.  We were not overtly pro-Bengali, but we must have 
done something to help from time to time.  We were in good “odour”, one might say.  
Whether we achieved a great deal is another matter’.832  
The foundling Bangladeshi government, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, came under immediate domestic pressure to try members of the Pakistani 
army and their supporters for war crimes.  Consequently, an ‘Order for Constitution of 
War Crimes Tribunal 1972’ was issued, back-dated to 26 March 1971 (the date Awami 
League leaders had unilaterally declared Bangladesh’s independence).  British officials 
were contrary to the trials: such a form of justice, they feared, would prevent a climate 
of reconciliation, both in Bangladesh and in Pakistan; it could also complicate ongoing 
negotiations over the tens of thousands Indian and Pakistani POWs remaining in the 
two countries; lastly, there were considerable concerns that trials in the fragile new 
country would simply be unable to meet international norms of legality.833  ‘The 
Bangladesh Government’, the head of the South Asia Department reflected, ‘…would 
do well to avoid an “Asian Nuremberg”.’834  
The British, however, were reluctant to petition Bangladeshi authorities too 
strongly.  ‘We had not felt able to do this mainly because we ourselves had participated 
in the Nuremberg trials;…We also consider that there was too much political pressure 
on Sheikh Mujib to expect him to drop the trials altogether but that it would be very 
desirable…for the whole affair to be played down as much as possible’.835  Britain’s 
representative in New Delhi agreed: ‘I imagine that our participation in the Nuremberg 
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trials, and the overwhelming evidence of the savage atrocities committed by the 
Pakistan Army, will make it hard for us to oppose in principle a properly conducted 
tribunal, however much in this day and age we may find it distasteful’.836  Bangladesh, 
engaged as it was in massive post-war reconstruction efforts, eventually stopped 
pursuing the issue having accepted the political necessity (stressed by British officials) 
of reaching an official reconciliation with Pakistan.837   
The subject of Britain at the birth of Bangladesh is clearly beginning to draw the 
attention of scholars.  Simon Smith, as described, uses the crisis to underline the 
differences in Anglo and American approaches to Asia in the post-war era, arguing that 
HMG’s regional activities in the fields of aid and bilateral diplomacy (as distinct from 
the USA’s questionable geopolitical strategies) demonstrate that the Heath 
administration had global interests, which it pursued with remarkable results.  ‘[B]y 
adopting a policy of backing the winning side, Britain had successfully navigated the 
treacherous waters of crisis and war in South Asia while protecting its interests in the 
subcontinent’.838  Smith is correct that Britain’s varied responses in 1971 established 
beneficial links with India and Bangladesh—or what Joseph Godber, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, referred to as “the winning side”.839  What is more, relations with the 
defeated party remained relatively intact.  Smith points out that even though Pakistan 
withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1972, the High Commissioner in Islamabad was 
soon able to report that British trade and industrial interests had “not suffered as much 
as might have been expected, partly because the commercial centre is in Karachi, out of 
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the political main stream”.840  Smith’s favourable view of British ‘nuanced responses’841 
to the crisis, in part shared by this thesis, counters those historians of post-war Britain 
who suggest that the Eurocentric Heath government had next to no overseas ambitions 
(the ‘Thatcherite view’ discussed below).  Concerned with the efficacy and implications 
of British foreign policy in 1971, however, Smith pays little attention to Britain’s 
perceptions of the violence in East Pakistan itself; there is scant description and no 
analysis of regional intelligence reports.  Indeed, Britain’s decision not to acknowledge 
state-endorsed atrocities against civilians is avoided entirely, an omission that casts a 
shadow over the article’s complimentary assessment of the government. 
International relations specialist, Karen E. Smith’s brief review of the crisis in 
Genocide and the Europeans, by contrast, focuses exclusively on Britain’s private and 
public responses to reports of systematic violence by Pakistani forces. In her summary 
of these reports, Smith states: ‘The despatches do not use the term genocide, though 
arguably they are in fact describing it’.842  Hence, the Foreign Office’s incriminating 
assessment “that the Government of Pakistan are in breach of the Genocide Convention; 
it would certainly be difficult to argue they are not”.843  Karen Smith correctly describes 
Britain’s interpretation of its duties under the Genocide Convention as a notably 
‘narrow reading’.844  This restricted interpretation, she concludes disapprovingly, led ‘to 
no action taken and no declaration using the term “genocide” to describe events’.845  
Focusing her description of the crisis exclusively on the actions of the Pakistani state, 
Smith fails to mention violence committed by non-state actors in East Pakistan, a 
prominent feature of British reports that largely shaped official responses, and 
reinforced the reluctance to use the term genocide.  Her critical appraisal of Britain’s 
                                                
840 Islamabad to FCO, 1 January 1972 (quoted in Smith ‘Britain and the South Asia Crisis’, 463).  
841 Smith ‘Britain and the South Asia Crisis’, 463.   
842 Smith Genocide and the Europeans, 84. 
843 Quoted in Smith Genocide and the Europeans, 87. 
844 Smith Genocide and the Europeans, 83, 88. 
845 Smith Genocide and the Europeans, 88. 
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apparent inaction contrasts markedly with Simon Smith’s rather rosy account of 
Britain’s efficacious responses.  This divergence may reflect the fact that these authors 
approach the conflict from different perspectives (international relations versus post-war 
British history), and therefore emphasise distinct aspects of the crisis. Nevertheless, 
neither treatment describes or analyses the violence itself in the detail one might expect 
when writing about responses to a civil war and possible genocide.  
Richard Pilkington’s analysis of Canada’s official responses towards the East 
Pakistan crisis, while providing a useful comparison to British responses, is marred by 
the same oversight.  Pilkington describes how the British diplomatic files upon which 
Canadian intelligence was based, essentially described a one-sided state persecution 
campaign, which Canada nevertheless maintained was a civil war and so continued 
bilateral aid disbursements to Pakistan.  Canadian responses, the author argues, were 
shaped by a short-term formulation of Canada’s national interests, defined as 
maintaining influence in Islamabad through cordial relations with the military junta—as 
opposed to pursuing ‘Canada’s broader global interests in the longer term, through the 
promotion of its human rights and democratic values’.846  By favouring the former 
formulation, Pilkington concludes that the Canadian government took the ‘moral low 
ground’847 and ultimately upheld a policy belying ‘an unfortunate absence of principle 
and an uncomfortable air of appeasement’.848  
Pilkington’s article does not address whether the Canadian government in 1971 
explicitly defined the promotion of democracy and human rights as a national interest 
(by most accounts, this would appear to be a recent formulation).  More to the point, the 
author (as those above) does not refer to widespread atrocities committed by Bengalis 
against ‘non-Bengalis’ and others, which were also described in British reports.  His 
description of the affair, in other words, would be considerably more textured if it 
                                                
846 Pilkington ‘Canada and the East Pakistan crisis’, 469. 
847 Pilkington ‘Canada and the East Pakistan crisis’, 452, 468. 
848 Pilkington ‘Canada and the East Pakistan crisis’, 451, 452, 469.  
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referred to the complicated picture external observers were confronted with, which by 
and large weighed against expressions of wholesale condemnation of one party. 
The historian Dirk Moses does address the various forms of violence in his study 
of the crisis.849  He describes how different actors, depending on their agenda, tended to 
frame the East Pakistan crisis in exclusive terms: either as a civil war in a sovereign 
state or as a struggle for self-determination against a genocidal regime, rather than 
admit that multiple dimensions of violence were unfolding, genocidal or otherwise.  The 
British, by supporting the civil war narrative and refusing to condemn the Pakistani 
terror campaign publicly or privately, sought to justify their commitment to the 
inviolability of state sovereignty.  What is more, by continuing to cautiously pressure 
Pakistani leaders to reach a political solution, even though it was evident that no 
political solution was forthcoming, British diplomatic efforts were ‘riddled with 
contradiction’.850 ‘In substance,’ Moses concludes, ‘the UK position accorded with that 
of Pakistan itself’.851   
In his generally disapproving assessment of the British, based on diplomatic files 
covering the first three months of the conflict, Moses makes a key point: government 
officials insisted on portraying the conflict exclusively as a civil war, despite reports 
indicating that systematic persecution by Pakistani forces—or ‘genocide’—was taking 
place.  Meanwhile civil society—the British media, parliamentarians, and Bengalis 
themselves—maintained the opposite.  By doing so, he accurately observes, both parties 
promoted simplistic versions of what was actually a composite moment of violence, 
perpetrated by a variety of state and non-state actors alike.  All the same, Moses’ 
suggestion that Britain effectively sided with Pakistan is questionable.  Although the 
Heath administration did seek to maintain relations with the country’s leadership and 
avoid direct interference in its affairs, Britain discreetly tilted towards India (and 
                                                
849 Moses, ‘Britain and the Secession of East Pakistan’, forthcoming. 
850 Moses, ‘Britain and the Secession of East Pakistan’, forthcoming. 
851 Moses, ‘Britain and the Secession of East Pakistan’, forthcoming. 
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therefore East Pakistan) as the conflict evolved, out of strategic and humanitarian 
concerns; moreover, the government’s motives for espousing the ‘civil war narrative’ 
were not entirely cynical.  
British intelligence indicates that East Pakistan in 1971 experienced a nexus of 
extreme violence characterized by state terror, both systematic and spontaneous, and 
nationalist uprising. Reports on government forces and nationalist combatants 
graphically describe atrocities committed by both parties against perceived opponents. 
These are followed, to a lesser degree, by descriptions of violence between ordinary 
civilians, arising from pre-existing tensions and opportunism afforded by the general 
‘state of lawlessness’.852 Communal violence at the local level—that is, between 
ordinary civilians in East Pakistan—appeared to be an underlying aspect of the 
violence, woven into the greater fabric of state terror and murderous civil war.  
In London, accounts of violence on all sides and the generally conflicting 
behaviour of the Pakistani military after the opening assault, consistently undercut those 
that detailed the army’s systematic persecution of civilians, brutal as this persecution 
was.  As a consequence, British officials concluded that East Pakistan from March to 
December 1971 was embroiled in a bitter civil war fuelled by ethnic hatred, not only to 
justify their commitment to non-interference, but also because they genuinely believed 
so. The Foreign Office’s two internal assessments that Pakistan’s government may in 
fact have been guilty of breaching the Genocide Convention were not enough, on their 
own, to alter the wider interpretation of events.   
This interpretation, it is true, legitimated Britain’s commitment to non-
involvement while at the same time accurately describing one major aspect of the 
violence, namely that of civil war, a term which became an umbrella for the range of 
international crimes committed.  As Douglas-Home stated during the first weeks of the 
                                                
852 FCO 37/886. Telegram 421 ‘High Commissioner: East Pakistan’ Dacca—FCO, 19 May 1971. 
 220 
crisis, when Pakistan’s campaign of systematic repression was arguably at its height: 
‘We reacted very quickly to the horrible events that took place in Pakistan—but these 
events do take place in civil wars’.853  Britain’s perceptions of the violence, concerns for 
its regional interests, as well as Cold War geopolitical paralysis and related sense of 
impotence, reinforced the Heath administration’s inherent preference for neutrality and 
non-interference—a preference that also led them to ignore, or at the most, pay only 
superficial attention to reports of state atrocities.  For the fact remains that British 
intelligence (particularly during the first weeks of violence), did describe a punitive 
military campaign against perceived opponents and ordinary civilians, authorized by the 
central government.  Thus the British High Commissioner in Islamabad in 1971, in 
seeking to attribute responsibility for the Army’s actions, concluded that ‘While he [the 
Pakistani President] is open to [the] influence of his closest associates the final 
decisions appear to rest with him’.854 Britain’s former representative in Dacca agrees: ‘I 
am quite satisfied that the “punitive action”, carried out against East Pakistanis, which 
included destruction and killing—teaching them a lesson, in a sense—was a deliberate 
decision taken by the Army headquarters in Islamabad, with the authority of the 
President’.855  
It would seem that the British government did not wish to receive ‘gory reports 
from Dacca’856 describing mass killing by state forces.  Concerned that such 
descriptions were ‘less than objective’,857 it is possible that those who submitted what 
resembled ‘emotional and rumour-laden reporting’858 were replaced by diplomats who 
had less regional knowledge and therefore less attachment, or those who were 
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inexperienced, accustomed to administration, and who could, while diligently reporting 
systematic terror in East Pakistan respect it as the internal affair of a sovereign state.  
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office furnished the government with rationale why Britain 
need not pursue allegations of state terror, either through the UN or by activating the 
Genocide Convention, essentially because they were not obliged to do so under 
international law (narrowly interpreted), because of their powerlessness and distance 
from events, and because of the threat such action would have posed to their regional 
interests.  In 1971, officials in the British government, whether in London or on the 
subcontinent, appeared to agree that the carnage in East Pakistan “was the responsibility 
of neither Britain nor the world”.859  ‘They realized there was bad behaviour, but…it 
was not much good us making a fuss about it, because there was nothing whatever we 
could do to redress the balance’.860  Britain’s perception of events, it would seem, was 
indeed a convenient truth—employed variably by government actors on a conscious and 
subconscious level. 
In keeping with this perspective, Britain sought to influence events by exercising 
discreet diplomacy, sending and withholding aid, and subtly tilting towards India—the 
only practical ways, it seemed, to ease suffering during the civil war, while at the same 
time, maintain regional interests and uphold Britain’s image at home.  On those 
occasions when the government was able to do the latter, little need was felt for stronger 
action.  In particular, Britain was given widespread credit for its contribution to the 
humanitarian crisis, which in comparison to that of other governments, was generous.  
Having received this recognition, regardless of how effective it actually was to ease 
suffering on the subcontinent, they refrained from extending further relief assistance.  
Publicity and public opinion, both negative and positive, often conditioned HMG’s 
actions in 1971.   
                                                
859 Terence Garvey, Britain’s High Commissioner to India in 1971 (quoted in Musson, ‘Britain and the 
Recognition of Bangladesh in 1972’, 141). (Garvey is pictured in Appendix Document 23.)  
860 Peter Smith, Interview by author, 16 June 2009. 
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Indeed, it would seem that a large portion of the government’s decisions in 1971 
were taken on a mostly spontaneous or ad hoc basis in response to circumstances as 
they arose.  ‘Did they have a policy?  I don’t think I knew what it was at the time!  
Governments do not have policies—they react,’ declared Peter Smith recalling his 
experiences of the Foreign Office.861  Meanwhile, from the former High Commissioner 
Cyril Pickard’s perspective, ‘it might be argued that foreign policy is never formulated 
at all….Indeed, it could be argued that British foreign policy since the war has basically 
been to deal with crises as they turn up’.862  
When it came to foreign policy decisions in 1971, Heath famously focused on 
European entry, while non-European affairs fell under the remit of Alec Douglas-Home.  
And while there was concern that Downing Street may occasionally have crossed this 
boundary, both the former Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca and Home’s Private 
Undersecretary were unequivocal in their view that ‘In those days, the Foreign 
Secretary was his own man’.864  With the exception of Europe, moreover, the Prime 
Minister did not appear to have ‘cherry pick[ed] important issues’865 over which he 
wished to exercise influence.  Thus ‘[f]oreign policy under the Heath government can 
reasonably be seen as a mare tranquillitatis by comparison to the domestic troubles 
which finally engulfed it, with such [overseas] traumas as there were being externally 
generated and affecting Britain for the most part indirectly’.866  The East Pakistan crisis 
certainly constituted the latter, and while both Heath and Home were active on different 
aspects of the crisis, neither expressed overt interest (as they did with East-West 
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865 Young British Practice, 1963-1976, 21. 
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relations, Africa, and the Middle and Far East), nor did either ‘take it up as a cause’867 
in addition to these central foreign policy concerns of the day. 
Instead, in order to formulate Britain’s position during the conflict (with the 
exception of non-intervention which was adopted from the outset), the government’s 
most senior officials appeared to rely on situation reports, regional interest assessments, 
and policy briefs formulated by civil servants at the Foreign Office, and particularly 
those at the South Asia Department, who in turn, based their conclusions on the content 
and (contradictory) nature of reports from the region.  In many cases, diplomatic 
intelligence reports and SAD briefs reached the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister 
largely unaltered, reproduced in parts, or at the very least, faithfully summarised.  
Hence, as Edward Playfair aptly concluded, ‘There is no simple answer to the question 
how decisions are made.  In the last resort it is a Minister who makes them, because at a 
crucial point he goes off without the civil servant to the Cabinet and to 
Parliament.…But the formation of policy is a joint effort—the result of constant 
discussion’.868  This discussion, in 1971, appears to have taken place between ministers, 
senior and junior civil servants and regional diplomats, rendering policy making for the 
most part (in this case where no leading official displayed explicit interest in matters), a 
fluid and collective process.  Helen McCarthy’s observation (albeit with reference to 
British foreign policy in an earlier period) aptly describes this situation as one 
‘constituted…by networks of information and knowledge creation and exchange’, that 
is ‘a larger, dynamic system through which knowledge about international politics and 
foreign societies is generated, circulated, and eventually fed into policy decision 
making’.869  
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869 Helen McCarthy, review of On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-
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Yet, the matter cannot be left there, for in addition to the influence of the civil 
service—there was also the effect of public opinion, press and parliamentary comment, 
as well as the turbulent socio-economic conditions of the era.  Complicating matters 
further, was the factor of ‘unconscious assumptions’870 and ‘unconscious 
motivations’871 of government actors that, without doubt, had some effect (leading 
them, for example, to implicitly view analogies to the crisis, such as the Biafra conflict, 
as a deterrent to action).  As Bloch astutely observed, ‘To read certain books of history, 
one might think mankind made up entirely of logical wills whose reasons for acting 
would never hold the slightest mystery for them….We should seriously misrepresent 
the problem of causes in history if we always and everywhere reduced them to a 
problem of motive’.872  A plethora of factors, in other words, went into ministerial 
decisions during the East Pakistan crisis with the influence of the civil service being 
perhaps uniquely evident in what was a matter of medium-scale importance for the 
government as a whole.  
This semi-reactive approach to events may be symptomatic of British 
governments in general, which some civil servants maintain, are inclined to react to 
problems as they arise rather than work to an overarching policy.  The Heath 
administration, in particular, appeared to prefer a ‘problem-solving approach’873 to an 
ideological one.  Heath, according to his principle private secretary, “had a vision of 
what he wanted to achieve, but I don’t know that he would have set it out as a set of 
principles.  A series of thing happened and he responded to them, as a matter of 
necessity”.874  As a result, the administration did not necessarily have a unified strategy 
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with which to approach the various international and domestic issues that arose within 
months of their taking office.875 
For the former head of the Foreign Office, Guy Millard, this constituted a 
“central dilemma” for the state: “One of our troubles is that we lack what one might call 
a philosophy of foreign policy.  To a large extent we go on answering telegrams without 
having any very clear idea of where exactly we want to get to…we do not know what 
our national ends are supposed to be.  This lack of philosophy is more marked now than 
before”.876  Interestingly, while British responses to the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 
appear largely to have been influenced by immediate circumstances related to the event, 
in this case, it did not prevent the government from obtaining a relatively successful 
outcome.  Evidence of an ad hoc or reactive approach thus does not imply a strategic 
fault here, so much as it renders any discussion of a predetermined British ‘policy’ 
during the period limited, and supports those who claim that the country’s foreign 
policy practitioners tend ‘to eschew conceptualisation and to emphasise empirical 
adjustment (which some might call “muddling though” and others “pragmatism”)’.877 
As a result of its varied approach, Britain managed to negotiate the diplomatic 
minefield and international instability posed by the affair with its regional interests and 
reputation intact.  Britain’s responses to the Pakistan crisis may thus be perceived, on 
the one hand, as a praiseworthy example of diplomatic deftness, or on the other, as 
evidence of the ‘moral bankruptcy’878 of state actors who become bystanders to terror.  
In truth, British responses, which reflect apathy, political realism and humanitarian 
concern, fall somewhere between these two perspectives, rendering incomplete any 
account that highlights one aspect over another.  Britain’s responses to the East Pakistan 
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crisis, in other words, do not sit well with the judgements issued to date of ‘good’ or 
‘bad’.  What is necessary rather, are textured accounts which, as this thesis has 
attempted to do, delve into Britain’s perceptions of and responses to the violence, 
unpacking how the concepts of ‘civil war’ and ‘genocide’ were being contemplated, 
interpreted and employed by government officials—both those on the ground, and 
behind the closed doors of policy makers, to reveal the ambiguities that characterised 
both the conflict, and British responses. 
This uneasy situation reflects Britain’s peculiar position in the early 1970s, as a 
state apparently ready to accept its middle-ranking status, but at the same time, 
hankering to retain international credentials.  The foreign policy of the Heath 
government is indicative of this dualism.  For Heath may have spoken of a Britain with 
strong global commitments, and he may have overturned some of his predecessors’ 
policies of retrenchment, but these gestures turned out to be cosmetic.  In reality, 
whether they had intended to or not, the Conservative government was obliged to 
continue the process of decolonization that had begun with the dismantling of British 
India in 1947, and continued in earnest in the 1960s after the Suez debacle.  Britain by 
the early 1970s, if not entirely in principle, was in practice, a second-ranking power.  
David Reynolds in Britannia Overruled observes, ‘As historians our first 
question should not be “What’s the problem?” but “What’s the story”, for Britain’s 
story is a distinctive one’.879  The dualism of the Heath era aptly demonstrates just how 
distinctive it has been.  And whereas, for Reynolds, the central motifs of the twentieth 
century are one of ‘decline, revival and fall’,880 the limited time span of this study on 
British foreign policy towards South Asia in 1971 reflects decline but also moderate 
determination.  Such a perspective falls largely into what Anthony Seldon labels the 
‘contingencies’ view of the Heath government, that is the ‘good intentions, fair strategy, 
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hostile environment’ view, which contends that the government achieved some 
successes, but was largely thrown off course because of ‘circumstances beyond its 
control’.881  This is contested by the ‘Thatcherite’ camp that declares Heath’s 
Conservatives to have been a failure, having reneged on their (possibly insincere) 
international promises in order to focus on the country’s back garden that, ultimately, 
they did not know how to tend.882  The government’s approach to the East Pakistan 
secession crisis, from the perspective of British history, counters this view with a case 
where the government was reasonably successful in the international sphere.  Of course 
British responses to this episode of mass nationalist violence cannot only be described 
in terms of success, there was also an element of denial; the ‘story’, as it were, is 
considerably gradated and defies easy judgement.  As such, while the perspectives 
described above are useful, the analysis of the Heath government in this thesis does not 
fall neatly into any one of them. 
This discomfiting state of affairs relates not only to the specifics of British 
government during the period, but also, in part, to the ambiguous nature of the East 
Pakistan conflict itself, in which ‘there was organization and planning…but there were 
also local acts of violence carried out for a multiplicity of reasons and motives that were 
not genocidal in intent’.883  As any account of twentieth century conflict demonstrates, 
such instances of composite violence are frequent; indeed, much more so than one-sided 
premeditated attacks on innocents.  State-endorsed atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 and in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, to name two prominent examples, also 
occurred amidst civil war and encompassed acts of violence perpetrated by an array of 
participants.884  Those who assess such complex episodes in history, therefore, have the 
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task of unravelling the various dimensions of violence, and judiciously attributing 
responsibility to the different parties who are involved.  Doing so does not necessarily 
mean equating acts of violence in terms of quality or scale, nor does it mean distributing 
responsibility equally among those who engage in violence, or among those who 
observe it.  
Bangladesh, today under the political leadership of the pro-independence 
Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina, the eldest surviving daughter of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, has commenced war crimes proceedings comparable to those initiated by her 
father after the country’s independence.  Unlike the trials proposed for members of the 
Pakistani army in 1972, however, current proceedings are directed against Bengalis 
accused of collaborating with Pakistani authorities to commit war crimes, including 
genocide and crimes against humanity.  The country’s efforts to administer justice 
through the framework of a war crimes tribunal have generated a great deal of 
international attention and discussion over this contentious and under-researched 
episode of violence, and as such, may provide impetus for deeper inquiry.885  However, 
there are serious concerns over the tribunal’s legality.  To date all of the defendants 
charged are leading figures of the political opposition.  The statute of the tribunal, 
known as the ‘1973 International Crimes (Tribunal) Act’, sanctions the death penalty 
and, according to many legal observers, has major shortcomings with regards to fair 
trial and due process.  It displays, moreover, numerous violations of the principle of 
legality: ‘the universally recognised requirement that criminal laws be clear and people 
are not prosecuted for what was not criminal at the time that the acts were 
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committed’.886  Bangladeshi legislation, in other words, is highly irregular and fails to 
meet international standards on many counts.887  While attempts are apparently being 
made to update procedures (with the International Criminal Court as guidance), as it 
stands, the tribunal resembles a political instrument aimed at achieving retribution and 
consolidating power, rather than a vehicle for facilitating justice and assessing 
responsibility for the mass killing and atrocities committed in 1971.  
Polemics will always pose a challenge to understanding the past; so too, of 
course, will lack of historical observation and critical analysis.  Examining Britain’s 
perceptions of and responses to the East Pakistan crisis, based largely on British 
diplomatic files—is, at the core, an attempt to contribute to the historical record of two 
countries.  It is widely acknowledged amongst historians that arriving at a finite or 
ultimate history—that is, ‘the Truth’ is not possible.  What is considered fact today will, 
following the uncovering of new facts, or when compared to those that are already 
known, precipitate fresh understanding.  Such is the cycle of historical research, which 
is essentially a collective pool of knowledge, seemingly without end.  ‘Historians expect 
their work to be superseded again and again: “They consider that knowledge of the past 
has come down through one or more human minds, has been ‘processed’ by them”.’888 
‘The past is, by definition, a datum which nothing in the future will change.  But the 
knowledge of the past is something progressive which is constantly transforming and 
perfecting itself’.889  In the case of Britain at the birth of Bangladesh, the past is now 
beginning to be uncovered.  It is hoped that the exhaustive analysis of events presented 
in this thesis will serve as a cornerstone on the path to further knowledge.  
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